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Agent Skill · 研究检索

info-disclosure(信息披露)

info-disclosure 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

info-disclosure 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为接触敏感数据;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描有未通过项,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 66,724。

总安装 259周安装 11GitHub Stars 9下载 91核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:info-disclosure(信息披露)
来源仓库:https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code
仓库路径:skills/info-disclosure
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill info-disclosure
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill info-disclosure

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

info-disclosure 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。适用于信息披露管理、合规性检查和公开资料整理场景。

通过 npx skills add 命令从指定 GitHub 仓库安装,需结合原始 README 核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。适用宿主包括 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,接入前应确认版本、权限和运行环境要求。

来源仓库内路径:skills/info-disclosure

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill info-disclos…;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要接触敏感数据,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

info-disclosure 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill info-disclosure。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

info-disclosure 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

info-disclosure 需要什么权限?

权限级别是接触敏感数据。该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

info-disclosure 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

info-disclosure 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 259 次,近一周安装 11 次,下载 91 次,GitHub 9 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

info-disclosure 安全吗?

第三方扫描有未通过项,风险较高。除非你确认过源码,否则不建议直接安装到常用环境。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。

先想清楚的地方

  • 需要接触敏感数据,装到常用环境前要先评估影响面。
  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方扫描存在提醒项或未通过项,需要人工逐条确认。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 环境里有大量密钥、凭证,不方便给第三方 Skill 读取的人。
  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
info-disclosure

信息披露 · 本页

2599接触敏感数据未明确未通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Information Disclosure Analysis

Analyze source code for information disclosure threats where sensitive data leaks to unauthorized parties. Maps to STRIDE I -- violations of the Confidentiality security property.

Supported Flags

Read ../../shared/schemas/flags.md for the full flag specification. This skill supports all cross-cutting flags including --scope, --depth, --severity, --format, --fix, --quiet, and --explain.

Framework Context

Read ../../shared/frameworks/stride.md, specifically the I - Information Disclosure section, for the threat model backing this analysis. Key concerns: data breaches, directory traversal, error message leaks, timing attacks, memory dumps, cleartext transmission.

Workflow

1. Determine Scope

Parse flags and resolve the target file list per the flags spec. Filter to files likely handling sensitive data:

  • API response builders and serializers
  • Error handlers and exception middleware
  • Logging configuration and log output
  • Database queries returning user data
  • Configuration files and environment loaders
  • Debug/diagnostic endpoints and health checks
  • File-serving routes and static asset configuration
  • Frontend templates and server-side rendering
  • GraphQL schema definitions and resolvers

2. Analyze for Information Disclosure Threats

For each in-scope file, apply the Analysis Checklist below. At --depth standard, examine each file for data exposure patterns. At --depth deep, trace data flows from database/store through processing to API response to confirm sensitive fields are filtered before transmission across trust boundaries.

3. Report Findings

Output findings per ../../shared/schemas/findings.md using the DISC ID prefix (e.g., DISC-001). Set references.stride to "I" on every finding.

Analysis Checklist

Work through these questions against the scoped code. Each "yes" may produce a finding.

  1. Verbose error messages -- Do error responses expose stack traces, database schemas, SQL queries, internal file paths, or library versions to the client? Search for unfiltered exception serialization in error handlers and catch blocks. Check if NODE_ENV=production or DEBUG=False actually suppresses detail.
  2. Excessive API response data -- Do API endpoints return full database objects instead of explicitly selected fields? Look for SELECT *, ORM .toJSON(), serialize(), or spreading entire model objects into responses without field allowlists. Compare the API response shape against the model definition to identify leaked internal fields (password_hash, internal_id, created_by).
  3. Sensitive data in logs -- Are passwords, tokens, credit card numbers, SSNs, or PII written to logs? Search for log calls near authentication, payment, or user profile handlers that dump request bodies or sensitive variables. Check if log redaction middleware is configured.
  4. Debug endpoints in production -- Are debug routes, profiling endpoints, or diagnostic pages accessible without feature flags or environment guards? Look for /debug, /health with excessive detail, phpinfo(), /actuator, /graphiql, /__debug__, /metrics, /_profiler, Swagger UI without auth.
  5. Directory traversal on reads -- Can user input control file read paths? Look for fs.readFile, open(), file_get_contents where the path incorporates req.params, request.args, or URL segments without path canonicalization and containment checks (realpath + prefix validation).
  6. Missing encryption for sensitive data -- Is PII, authentication data, or financial data stored or transmitted in cleartext? Check database schemas for unencrypted sensitive columns, API calls over HTTP instead of HTTPS, and missing field-level encryption on high-sensitivity data.
  7. Hardcoded secrets in source -- Are API keys, database passwords, encryption keys, or private certificates committed in source files? Search for high-entropy strings assigned to variables named key, secret, password, token, credential. Check .env files, config files, and test fixtures.
  8. HTTP headers leaking info -- Does the application set Server, X-Powered-By, X-AspNet-Version, or other headers that reveal technology stack details? Check response header configuration and whether helmet/equivalent suppression is applied.
  9. Timing side channels -- Are operations on secret data (password comparison, token validation, license checks) performed with early-exit logic that leaks information through response time differences? Look for short-circuit if statements on secret bytes.
  10. Client-side data exposure -- Is sensitive data embedded in HTML source, JavaScript bundles, or local storage? Look for server-side rendering that injects user data, API keys, internal URLs, or feature flag values into page templates or window.__CONFIG__ objects.
  11. Verbose health/status endpoints -- Do health check or status endpoints expose internal details like database connection strings, dependency versions, internal hostnames, queue sizes, or environment variable dumps? Check /health, /status, /info, /env endpoints.
  12. Source map exposure -- Are JavaScript source maps deployed to production, allowing attackers to read original source code? Check for .map files in build output and sourceMappingURL references in bundled JavaScript.

Pragmatism Notes

  • Debug mode in development is expected. Only flag DEBUG=True or equivalent when it appears in production configuration or when there is no environment gating.
  • SELECT * is not always a disclosure risk. It depends on whether the full result is serialized to the API response. If application code filters fields before responding, the query itself is not the issue.
  • Source maps in production are a trade-off: they improve error reporting but expose source code. Rate this low unless the source contains hardcoded secrets or sensitive business logic.
  • Technology stack headers (X-Powered-By) are low severity on their own but contribute to reconnaissance. They matter more in combination with known vulnerabilities in the disclosed versions.

What to Look For

Concrete code patterns and grep heuristics to surface information disclosure risks:

  • Stack traces in responses: traceback.format_exc(), e.stack, err.message sent in HTTP responses, DEBUG = True in production config, app.use(errorHandler) without production mode filtering. Grep: (stack|traceback|stackTrace)\b near response serialization.
  • Full object serialization: res.json(user), return JsonResponse(model.__dict__), JSON.stringify(record) without field selection -- compare against the model definition to see if password_hash, ssn, internal_notes fields leak.
  • Secrets in logs: logger.debug(f"token={token}"), console.log(req.headers.authorization), log.info("password: " + pwd). Grep: log\w*\.\w+\(.*\b(password|token|secret|key|authorization|ssn|credit.?card)\b.
  • Path traversal reads: open(os.path.join(base, request.args['file'])) without os.path.realpath containment, fs.readFile(req.params.name) without validation. Grep: (readFile|open|fopen)\s*\(.*req\.(params|query|body).
  • Debug routes: /debug/, /admin/phpinfo, /_profiler, /graphiql, /swagger, /actuator without auth guards. Grep: (debug|profiler|phpinfo|actuator|graphiql) in route definitions.
  • Missing field filtering: SELECT * FROM users returned directly via API, .find({}) in MongoDB without projection, Sequelize findAll without attributes restriction. Grep: SELECT \*|\.find\(\s*\{\s*\}\s*\)|findAll\(\s*\).
  • Technology headers: X-Powered-By, Server: Apache/2.4.51, X-AspNet-Version -- check for helmet, removeHeader, or equivalent suppression. Grep: X-Powered-By|x-powered-by|server.*header.
  • Source maps in production: .map files in build/dist directories, sourceMappingURL= in production JS bundles. Grep: sourceMappingURL|\.js\.map.

Output Format

Each finding must conform to ../../shared/schemas/findings.md.

id:          DISC-<NNN>
severity:    critical | high | medium | low
confidence:  high | medium | low
location:    file, line, function, snippet
description: What data is exposed and through which channel
impact:      What sensitive information an attacker can obtain
fix:         Concrete remediation with diff when possible
references:
  stride: "I"
  cwe:    CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Info), CWE-209 (Error Messages), or relevant CWE
metadata:
  tool:      info-disclosure
  framework: stride
  category:  I

Severity Guidelines for Information Disclosure

SeverityCriteria
criticalHardcoded production secrets in source, directory traversal exposing arbitrary files, PII/credentials in API responses
highStack traces with internal paths/queries in production errors, sensitive data in logs, debug endpoints without auth
mediumExcessive API fields exposing non-critical internal data, technology stack headers, timing side channels
lowVerbose health check responses, minor information in HTTP headers, source maps in production, client-side comments

Common CWE References

CWEDescription
CWE-200Exposure of Sensitive Information to Unauthorized Actor
CWE-209Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Info
CWE-532Insertion of Sensitive Info into Log File
CWE-22Path Traversal
CWE-215Insertion of Sensitive Info Into Debugging Code
CWE-312Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information
CWE-319Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
CWE-548Exposure of Information Through Directory Listing

平台分布

Codex

37.56%
按下载量换算34

Claude

31.26%
按下载量换算28

Cursor

16.52%
按下载量换算15

Gemini CLI

9.68%
按下载量换算9

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

未通过

权限和风险

接触敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在提醒或未通过项,安装前请自行复核。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

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