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Agent Skill · 研究检索

web-app-security-audit(Web 应用程序安全审计)

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

web-app-security-audit 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为操作浏览器;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描有提醒项,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 47,767。

总安装 720周安装 30GitHub Stars 5下载 240核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:web-app-security-audit(Web 应用程序安全审计)
来源仓库:https://github.com/ahmedhamadto/software-forge
仓库路径:skills/web-app-security-audit
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/ahmedhamadto/software-forge --skill web-app-security-audit
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/ahmedhamadto/software-forge --skill web-app-security-audit

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。适合梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能将工具输出直接当作最终结论;涉及密钥、令牌或生产系统时应先确认最小权限和操作边界。

安装命令:npx skills add https://github.com/ahmedhamadto/software-forge --skill web-app-security-audit。当前维护状态未知,建议核对仓库活跃度与权限边界后再使用。

来源仓库内路径:skills/web-app-security-audit

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/ahmedhamadto/software-forge --skill web-app-se…;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要操作浏览器,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

web-app-security-audit 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/ahmedhamadto/software-forge --skill web-app-security-aud…。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

web-app-security-audit 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

web-app-security-audit 需要什么权限?

权限级别是操作浏览器。该 Skill 可能涉及浏览器控制能力,使用时可能读取或操作网页内容,需要在受控环境中确认权限边界。

web-app-security-audit 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

web-app-security-audit 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 720 次,近一周安装 30 次,下载 240 次,GitHub 5 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

web-app-security-audit 安全吗?

第三方扫描有提醒项,说明存在需要人工确认的行为。安装前请打开源码看清它读了什么、联网到哪里。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。

先想清楚的地方

  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方扫描存在提醒项或未通过项,需要人工逐条确认。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
web-app-security-audit

Web 应用程序安全审计 · 本页

7205操作浏览器未明确有提醒

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Web Application Security Audit

Overview

A structured penetration testing methodology based on *The Web Application Hacker's Handbook*. Guides you through 10 sequential phases to systematically identify vulnerabilities in any web application you're building or reviewing.

When to Use

  • Before deploying a web application to production
  • When adding authentication, payment processing, or user-facing features
  • During periodic security reviews
  • After integrating third-party services or APIs
  • When you suspect a specific vulnerability class but want comprehensive coverage

When NOT to Use

  • Against applications you don't own or have authorization to test
  • As a replacement for professional penetration testing on critical systems
  • For network-level security (this is application-layer focused)

Process

Work through each phase sequentially. At each phase:

  1. Ask targeted questions about the specific application
  2. Read the relevant chapter summary from cybersecurity/web-application-hackers-handbook/ for detailed guidance
  3. Suggest and execute concrete tests (grep patterns in source code, curl commands, Burp Suite steps, automated scripts)
  4. Flag findings with severity: CRITICAL / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW / INFO
  5. Summarize findings before moving to the next phase

If the application doesn't have a relevant surface for a phase (e.g., no file uploads), acknowledge and skip with rationale.

digraph audit_phases {
  rankdir=TB;
  node [shape=box, style=rounded];

  p1 [label="Phase 1\nMap the Application"];
  p2 [label="Phase 2\nAnalyze the Application"];
  p3 [label="Phase 3\nClient-Side Controls"];
  p4 [label="Phase 4\nAuthentication"];
  p5 [label="Phase 5\nSession Management"];
  p6 [label="Phase 6\nAccess Controls"];
  p7 [label="Phase 7\nInjection Vulnerabilities"];
  p8 [label="Phase 8\nApplication Logic"];
  p9 [label="Phase 9\nApplication Server"];
  p10 [label="Phase 10\nReview & Report"];
  report [label="Security Audit\nReport", shape=note];

  p1 -> p2 -> p3 -> p4 -> p5 -> p6 -> p7 -> p8 -> p9 -> p10 -> report;
}

Phase 1: Map the Application

Reference: cybersecurity/web-application-hackers-handbook/ch04-mapping-the-application.md

Goal: Discover the full attack surface before testing anything.

Questions to ask:

  • What is the application's tech stack? (framework, language, database, hosting)
  • What are all the routes/endpoints? (read route files, API definitions, OpenAPI specs)
  • Are there admin panels, API docs, or debug endpoints?
  • What third-party services are integrated?

Tests to run:

  • Enumerate all routes from source code: # Express.js grep -rn "app\.\(get\|post\|put\|delete\|patch\)" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" # Django grep -rn "path\|url(" --include="*.py" urls.py # Rails grep -rn "get\|post\|put\|delete\|patch\|resources\|resource" config/routes.rb # Next.js — check app/ and pages/ directory structure
  • Check for exposed files: robots.txt, sitemap.xml, .env, .git/, package.json
  • Search for hardcoded secrets in source: grep -rni "password\|secret\|api_key\|token\|private_key" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py" --include="*.env*"
  • Review HTML/JS comments for sensitive information
  • Identify all input vectors: URL params, POST bodies, cookies, headers, file uploads, WebSockets

Deliverable: Complete attack surface map — routes, parameters, technologies, entry points.


Phase 2: Analyze the Application

Reference: cybersecurity/web-application-hackers-handbook/ch03-web-application-technologies.md

Goal: Understand what the application does and identify high-risk areas.

Questions to ask:

  • What are the core business functions? (user management, payments, data CRUD, search, file handling)
  • Which functions handle sensitive data? (PII, financial, credentials)
  • Are there multi-step processes? (checkout, registration, approval workflows)
  • What user roles exist? What can each role do?

Prioritize testing areas (highest risk first):

  1. Authentication and credential handling
  2. Payment/financial transaction processing
  3. File upload functionality
  4. Administrative interfaces
  5. API endpoints (often have weaker controls than web UI)
  6. Search functionality (frequent injection target)
  7. User-to-user features (stored XSS vector)
  8. Data export/import (injection, XXE)

Deliverable: Functional map with risk-prioritized areas of interest.


Phase 3: Test Client-Side Controls

Reference: cybersecurity/web-application-hackers-handbook/ch05-bypassing-client-side-controls.md

Goal: Verify the server never trusts client-side validation or state.

Questions to ask:

  • Are there hidden form fields the server relies on? (prices, roles, user IDs)
  • Is input validation only done client-side? (JavaScript, HTML5 attributes)
  • Does the client transmit data that should be server-side state? (cart totals, discount flags, permission levels)

Tests to run:

  • Search for hidden fields: grep -rn 'type="hidden"\|type=.hidden.' --include="*.html" --include="*.tsx" --include="*.jsx"
  • Search for client-only validation: grep -rn "maxlength\|pattern=\|required\b" --include="*.html" --include="*.tsx" --include="*.jsx"
  • Check if server-side validation mirrors client-side: grep -rn "validate\|sanitize\|zod\|yup\|joi\|class-validator" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py"
  • For each form, submit requests with: missing required fields, values exceeding maxlength, values violating patterns, modified hidden fields
  • Test price/role/permission manipulation by modifying request bodies

Finding template:

[SEVERITY] Client-Side Control Bypass: [description]
  Affected: [endpoint/parameter]
  Test: [what you did]
  Result: [what happened]
  Impact: [what an attacker could achieve]
  Fix: [server-side validation recommendation]

Phase 4: Test Authentication

Reference: cybersecurity/web-application-hackers-handbook/ch06-attacking-authentication.md

Goal: Verify authentication cannot be bypassed, brute-forced, or abused.

Tests to run:

Username enumeration:

  • Compare responses for valid vs invalid usernames on login, registration, and password reset
  • Check response body, status codes, timing differences, and response length
  • Search for inconsistent error messages: grep -rn "invalid.*username\|user.*not found\|no.*account\|incorrect.*password" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py"

Brute-force resilience:

  • Check for account lockout, rate limiting, CAPTCHA
  • Search for rate limiting implementation: grep -rn "rate.limit\|throttle\|brute\|lockout\|max.*attempts" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py"

Password policy:

  • Test minimum length, complexity requirements, common password blocking
  • Check password storage: grep -rn "bcrypt\|argon2\|scrypt\|pbkdf2\|sha256\|sha1\|md5\|plaintext" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py"
  • CRITICAL if passwords stored as plaintext, MD5, or SHA1 without salt

Password reset:

  • Check token randomness, expiry, single-use enforcement
  • Check if reset tokens are in URLs (logged in server logs, browser history)

Multi-factor authentication:

  • Can MFA step be skipped by directly requesting authenticated endpoints?
  • Can MFA be bypassed by replaying codes or using expired codes?

Remember me:

  • Decode the remember-me token (Base64, JWT) — does it contain user info?
  • Is it invalidated on password change?

Phase 5: Test Session Management

Reference: cybersecurity/web-application-hackers-handbook/ch07-attacking-session-management.md

Goal: Verify sessions cannot be hijacked, fixated, or predicted.

Tests to run:

Token generation:

  • Collect multiple session tokens and check for patterns (sequential, timestamp-based, low entropy)
  • Decode tokens (Base64, JWT) — do they contain sensitive data? # For JWTs grep -rn "jwt\|jsonwebtoken\|jose" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py"

Cookie flags:

  • Check every cookie for: Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite, Domain, Path grep -rn "Set-Cookie\|cookie\|setCookie\|httpOnly\|secure\|sameSite" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py"
  • HIGH if session cookie missing HttpOnly (XSS can steal it)
  • HIGH if session cookie missing Secure (transmitted over HTTP)
  • MEDIUM if session cookie missing SameSite (CSRF vector)

Session lifecycle:

  • Does the token change after login? (session fixation if not)
  • Is the session invalidated server-side on logout? (not just cookie deletion)
  • Is there idle timeout and absolute timeout?

CSRF protection:

  • Identify all state-changing operations (POST/PUT/DELETE)
  • Check for anti-CSRF tokens: grep -rn "csrf\|xsrf\|_token\|csrfmiddleware" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py" --include="*.html"
  • Can state-changing requests succeed without the CSRF token?

Phase 6: Test Access Controls

Reference: cybersecurity/web-application-hackers-handbook/ch08-attacking-access-controls.md

Goal: Verify users cannot access unauthorized data or functionality.

Questions to ask:

  • What user roles exist? (admin, user, moderator, API consumer)
  • How is authorization enforced? (middleware, decorators, inline checks)
  • Are there resource IDs in URLs or request bodies that could be manipulated?

Tests to run:

IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference):

  • Find all endpoints with resource IDs: grep -rn "/users/\|/orders/\|/documents/\|/api/.*/:id\|/api/.*/<.*>" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py"
  • As User A, request User B's resources by changing IDs
  • CRITICAL if successful

Vertical privilege escalation:

  • As a regular user, request admin endpoints directly
  • Check if authorization is enforced per-endpoint: grep -rn "isAdmin\|requireAdmin\|role.*admin\|authorize\|permission\|@Roles\|@RequiresRole" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py"
  • Check if any endpoints lack authorization middleware

Horizontal privilege escalation:

  • Modify user-identifying parameters (user_id, account_id, email) in requests
  • Check if the server validates that the requested resource belongs to the authenticated user

Multi-step process controls:

  • For multi-step flows (checkout, approval), test skipping to later steps directly
  • Test performing steps out of order

Phase 7: Test for Injection Vulnerabilities

Reference: cybersecurity/web-application-hackers-handbook/ch09-attacking-data-stores.md, ch10-attacking-back-end-components.md, ch12-attacking-users-xss.md

Goal: Verify all input is safely handled across every context.

SQL Injection:

# Find raw query construction (CRITICAL pattern)
grep -rn "query.*+\|execute.*+\|raw.*+\|\\.format.*SELECT\|f\".*SELECT\|f'.*SELECT" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py"
# Verify parameterized queries are used
grep -rn "prepare\|parameterized\|\$[0-9]\|placeholder\|\?" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py"
  • CRITICAL if string concatenation/interpolation used in SQL queries

XSS (Cross-Site Scripting):

# Find dangerous DOM operations
grep -rn "innerHTML\|outerHTML\|document\.write\|\.html(\|dangerouslySetInnerHTML\|v-html\|\{!! " --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.tsx" --include="*.jsx" --include="*.vue" --include="*.blade.php"
# Find eval usage
grep -rn "eval(\|Function(\|setTimeout.*string\|setInterval.*string" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js"
  • HIGH for stored XSS, MEDIUM for reflected XSS, MEDIUM for DOM-based XSS

OS Command Injection:

grep -rn "exec(\|execSync\|spawn(\|system(\|popen\|subprocess\|child_process\|shell_exec\|passthru\|backtick" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py" --include="*.php"
  • CRITICAL if user input flows into command execution

Path Traversal:

grep -rn "readFile\|writeFile\|createReadStream\|open(\|path\.join.*req\|path\.resolve.*req\|fs\." --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py"
  • Check if user input is used in file paths without sanitization

XXE (XML External Entity):

grep -rn "parseXML\|DOMParser\|SAXParser\|XMLReader\|etree\.parse\|xml2js\|libxml" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py"
  • Check if external entity processing is disabled

SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery):

grep -rn "fetch(\|axios\|request(\|urllib\|http\.get\|https\.get\|curl\|wget" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py"
  • Check if user-supplied URLs are validated against an allowlist
  • CRITICAL if user input flows directly into server-side HTTP requests without validation

Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI):

grep -rn "render_template_string\|Template(\|Jinja2\|nunjucks.*render\|handlebars.*compile\|ejs.*render" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py"
  • Check if user input is embedded in templates before rendering

Phase 8: Test Application Logic

Reference: cybersecurity/web-application-hackers-handbook/ch11-attacking-application-logic.md

Goal: Identify flaws in business logic that automated scanners cannot find.

Questions to ask:

  • What assumptions does each function make about user behavior?
  • Are there multi-step processes? Can steps be skipped or reordered?
  • Are there financial transactions? Can amounts be manipulated (negative values, zero, overflow)?
  • Are there referral/reward/coupon systems? Can they be abused?

Tests to run:

Race conditions:

grep -rn "balance\|credits\|quantity\|stock\|inventory\|coupon\|redeem\|transfer\|withdraw" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py"
  • For any check-then-act pattern (check balance → deduct), test concurrent requests
  • HIGH if double-spending or double-redemption is possible

Multi-step process abuse:

  • Map every multi-step flow (checkout, registration, approval)
  • Test: skip steps, repeat steps, go backward, change data between steps, switch user context between steps

Transaction logic:

  • Test negative amounts, zero amounts, extremely large amounts
  • Test fractional values where integers expected
  • Test self-referral, circular referral chains

Input normalization conflicts:

  • Test unicode normalization issues (different representations of same character)
  • Test case sensitivity conflicts (register as "Admin" when "admin" exists)

Phase 9: Test Application Server

Reference: cybersecurity/web-application-hackers-handbook/ch18-attacking-the-application-server.md

Goal: Verify the server platform itself is hardened.

Tests to run:

Default credentials:

  • Check if admin panels exist at common paths: /admin, /wp-admin, /phpmyadmin, /console, /manager
  • Test default credentials for any discovered admin interfaces

Dangerous HTTP methods:

curl -X OPTIONS <target-url> -i
  • MEDIUM if PUT, DELETE, or TRACE are enabled unnecessarily

Security headers:

curl -s -I <target-url>

Check for:

  • Content-Security-Policy — HIGH if missing (XSS mitigation)
  • Strict-Transport-Security — HIGH if missing (HTTPS enforcement)
  • X-Frame-Options or CSP frame-ancestors — MEDIUM if missing (clickjacking)
  • X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff — LOW if missing (MIME sniffing)
  • Referrer-Policy — LOW if missing (information leakage)
  • Permissions-Policy — INFO if missing
  • Server / X-Powered-By — INFO if present (version disclosure)

Debug mode:

grep -rn "DEBUG.*=.*True\|debug.*:.*true\|NODE_ENV.*development\|FLASK_DEBUG\|DJANGO_DEBUG" --include="*.py" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts" --include="*.env*" --include="*.yaml" --include="*.yml"
  • HIGH if debug mode enabled in production config

Dependency vulnerabilities:

# Node.js
npm audit
# Python
pip-audit  # or safety check
# Ruby
bundle audit

Known CVEs:

  • Check framework/library versions against known vulnerabilities
  • CRITICAL for RCE CVEs, HIGH for auth bypass CVEs

Phase 10: Review & Report

Reference: cybersecurity/web-application-hackers-handbook/ch15-exploiting-information-disclosure.md, ch21-web-application-hackers-methodology.md

Final checks:

Information disclosure:

grep -rn "console\.log\|print(\|logger\.\(debug\|info\)\|TODO\|FIXME\|HACK\|XXX" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" --include="*.py"
  • Check for verbose error messages exposing internals
  • Check for exposed .git/, .env, source maps, backup files

SSL/TLS:

# If accessible externally
nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers -p 443 <target>
# Or use testssl.sh

Generate the audit report:

# Security Audit Report: [Application Name]
**Date:** [date]
**Auditor:** [name]
**Scope:** [what was tested]

## Executive Summary
[1-2 paragraph summary of overall security posture and critical findings]

## Findings Summary
| # | Severity | Finding | Phase |
|---|----------|---------|-------|
| 1 | CRITICAL | [title] | [phase] |
| 2 | HIGH     | [title] | [phase] |
| ... | ... | ... | ... |

## Detailed Findings

### Finding 1: [Title]
**Severity:** CRITICAL / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW / INFO
**Phase:** [which phase found it]
**Affected Component:** [endpoint, file, function]

**Description:**
[What the vulnerability is and why it exists]

**Reproduction Steps:**
1. [Step-by-step to reproduce]

**Impact:**
[What an attacker could achieve — data access, account takeover, RCE, etc.]

**Remediation:**
[Specific, actionable fix with code example if possible]

**Reference:**
[OWASP, CWE, or WAHH chapter reference]

---
[Repeat for each finding]

## Recommendations Priority
1. [Fix critical/high findings immediately]
2. [Fix medium findings before next release]
3. [Fix low/info findings as part of regular maintenance]

## Out of Scope / Not Tested
[What was explicitly excluded and why]

Severity Rating Guide

SeverityCriteriaExamples
CRITICALImmediate exploitation, RCE, full data breach, auth bypassSQL injection with data access, RCE via command injection, hardcoded admin credentials, unauthenticated admin access
HIGHSignificant data exposure, account takeover, privilege escalationStored XSS, IDOR on sensitive data, broken access controls, session fixation, missing HTTPS enforcement
MEDIUMLimited exploitation, requires user interaction, partial data exposureReflected XSS, CSRF on non-critical functions, missing SameSite cookies, verbose error messages with internal paths
LOWMinor information disclosure, best practice violationVersion disclosure in headers, missing X-Content-Type-Options, autocomplete on sensitive fields
INFOObservation, no direct security impactMissing Permissions-Policy, minor configuration notes, suggestions for defense-in-depth

Common Mistakes

MistakeFix
Testing only the happy pathTest every parameter with malicious input — injection lives in the edge cases
Skipping access control testingIDOR is consistently a top vulnerability — test every resource endpoint with different user contexts
Only testing through the UIThe UI hides parameters, endpoints, and capabilities — test the API directly
Assuming the framework handles securityFrameworks provide tools, not guarantees — verify each mechanism is correctly configured and used
Testing in isolationChain findings — info disclosure + IDOR + XSS can escalate from LOW to CRITICAL
Stopping at first finding per categoryOne SQL injection doesn't mean all queries are vulnerable — test each endpoint independently

平台分布

Codex

34.19%
按下载量换算82

Claude

31.55%
按下载量换算76

Cursor

18.84%
按下载量换算45

Gemini CLI

8.93%
按下载量换算21

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

可疑

Snyk

可疑

权限和风险

操作浏览器

该 Skill 可能涉及浏览器控制能力,使用时可能读取或操作网页内容,需要在受控环境中确认权限边界。

安装前确认

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