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vtex-io-auth-and-policiesvtex io 身份验证和策略

Agent Skill

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

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GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:vtex-io-auth-and-policies(vtex io 身份验证和策略)
来源仓库:https://github.com/vtex/skills
仓库路径:skills/vtex-io-auth-and-policies
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/vtex/skills --skill vtex-io-auth-and-policies
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

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复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/vtex/skills --skill vtex-io-auth-and-policies

简介

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查和认证流程分析。vtex-io-auth-and-policies 属于前端设计类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

  • 适合梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险或生成安全复核清单。
  • 通过 npx skills add 命令从指定仓库安装并使用该技能。
  • 不能将工具输出直接作为最终结论,涉及密钥或生产系统时需确认最小权限。
  • 建议结合项目实际环境评估操作边界和脱敏方式。

SKILL.md

Authorization & Policy Design

When this skill applies

Use this skill when a VTEX IO app needs explicit permissions to call external services, consume VTEX resources, or expose access-controlled behavior.

  • Adding an external API integration
  • Consuming VTEX resources that require declared permissions
  • Reviewing whether a route or client needs policy changes
  • Tightening app permissions around an existing integration

Do not use this skill for:

  • service runtime tuning
  • HTTP handler structure
  • frontend UI authorization behavior
  • broader trust-boundary or sensitive-data modeling
  • choosing between AUTH_TOKEN, STORE_TOKEN, and ADMIN_TOKEN

Decision rules

  • Treat manifest.json policies as explicit declarations of what the app is allowed to access.
  • Use this skill to decide what the app is authorized to do, not which runtime token identity should make the call.
  • Add only the policies required for the integrations and resources the app actually uses.
  • Use License Manager policies when the app needs access to VTEX platform resources protected by LM resource keys.
  • Use app policies such as "vendor.app-name:policy-name" when the app consumes resources or operations exposed by another VTEX IO app through role-based policies.
  • Use outbound-access when the app needs to call external HTTP services or URLs that are not covered by License Manager or app policies.
  • Prefer narrowly scoped outbound-access declarations over wildcard hosts or paths.
  • When exposing your own routes or operations, define access on the server side through resource-based policies, route protections, or auth directives instead of assuming consumers will declare something in their own manifest.
  • A VRN (VTEX Resource Name) is the internal identifier format VTEX uses for resources and identities. Role-based policies use resources expressed as VRNs, and resource-based policies use principals expressed as VRNs.
  • Use VRNs only where the platform expects them, especially in service.json resource-based policies or when interpreting authorization errors. Do not generate VRNs in manifest.json for consumer-side policy declarations.
  • In resource-based policies, multiple principals are evaluated as alternatives, and explicit deny rules override allow rules.
  • When exposing your own role-based policies, keep them minimal and operation-specific rather than broad catch-all permissions.
  • Review policy requirements when adding a new client, external integration, or service route that depends on protected access.
  • Keep route implementation and policy declaration aligned: if a route depends on a protected integration, make sure the permission boundary is visible and intentional.

Policy types at a glance:

  • License Manager policy:
{
  "policies": [
    { "name": "Sku.aspx" }
  ]
}
  • App policy:
{
  "policies": [
    { "name": "vtex.messages:graphql-translate-messages" }
  ]
}
  • Outbound-access policy:
{
  "policies": [
    {
      "name": "outbound-access",
      "attrs": {
        "host": "partner.example.com",
        "path": "/api/*"
      }
    }
  ]
}
  • Resource-based route policy with app principal VRN:
{
  "routes": {
    "privateStatus": {
      "path": "/_v/private/status/:code",
      "public": false,
      "policies": [
        {
          "effect": "allow",
          "actions": ["POST"],
          "principals": [
            "vrn:apps:*:my-sponsor-account:*:app/vendor.partner-app@0.x"
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}

This route allows a specific IO app principal. Other apps remain denied by default because they do not match any allow rule.

  • Resource-based route policy with VTEX ID principal VRN:
{
  "routes": {
    "status": {
      "path": "/_v/status/:code",
      "public": false,
      "policies": [
        {
          "effect": "allow",
          "actions": ["POST"],
          "principals": [
            "vrn:vtex.vtex-id:-:bibi:-:user/vtexappkey-mcc77-HBXYAE"
          ]
        },
        {
          "effect": "deny",
          "actions": ["POST"],
          "principals": [
            "vrn:vtex.vtex-id:-:bibi:-:user/*@vtex.com"
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}

This is an advanced pattern for integrations that identify callers through a specific VTEX ID principal, including appkey-based contracts. Prefer app VRNs for IO-to-IO access when the caller is another VTEX IO app. VTEX IO auth tokens such as AUTH_TOKEN, STORE_TOKEN, and ADMIN_TOKEN play a different role: they authenticate requests to VTEX services and help preserve requester context, but they do not automatically replace route-level resource policies based on VRN principals.

Hard constraints

Constraint: Every protected integration must have an explicit supporting policy

If a client or route depends on access controlled by License Manager policies, role-based app policies, or outbound-access, the app MUST declare the corresponding permission explicitly in manifest.json. Resources protected by resource-based policies define access on the server side and do not require consumer apps to declare additional policies just for that server-side enforcement.

Why this matters

Without the required policy, the code may be correct but the platform will still block the access at runtime, leading to failures that are hard to debug from handler code alone.

Detection

If you see a new external host, VTEX resource, or protected capability being consumed, STOP and verify that the required consumer-side policy exists before merging the code. If the app is exposing a protected route or operation, STOP and confirm that the access rule is also enforced on the server side.

Correct

{
  "policies": [
    {
      "name": "outbound-access",
      "attrs": {
        "host": "partner.example.com",
        "path": "/api/*"
      }
    }
  ]
}

Wrong

{
  "policies": []
}

Constraint: Outbound policies must follow least privilege

Outbound-access policies MUST be scoped as narrowly as practical for the target host and path.

Why this matters

Broad outbound rules increase risk, make reviews harder, and allow integrations to expand silently beyond their intended surface.

Detection

If you see wildcard hosts or overly broad paths when the integration uses a much smaller surface, STOP and narrow the declaration.

Correct

{
  "name": "outbound-access",
  "attrs": {
    "host": "partner.example.com",
    "path": "/orders/*"
  }
}

Wrong

{
  "name": "outbound-access",
  "attrs": {
    "host": "*",
    "path": "/*"
  }
}

Constraint: Policy changes must be reviewed together with the behavior they enable

When a policy is added or widened, the route or integration behavior that depends on it MUST be reviewed in the same change.

Why this matters

Permissions are meaningful only in context. Reviewing a policy change without the code that consumes it makes overreach and hidden side effects easier to miss.

Detection

If a PR changes manifest.json permissions without showing the relevant route, client, or integration code, STOP and request the linked behavior before approving.

Correct

{
  "policies": [
    {
      "name": "outbound-access",
      "attrs": {
        "host": "partner.example.com",
        "path": "/orders/*"
      }
    }
  ]
}

Wrong

{
  "policies": [
    {
      "name": "outbound-access",
      "attrs": {
        "host": "partner.example.com",
        "path": "/api/*"
      }
    }
  ]
}

This broader policy alone does not explain why the app needs the expanded access.

Preferred pattern

Start from the client or route behavior, identify the minimal access needed, and declare only that permission in manifest.json. When the app exposes protected routes or operations, define the resource-based access rule on the server side as part of the same review.

Example pattern:

{
  "policies": [
    {
      "name": "outbound-access",
      "attrs": {
        "host": "partner.example.com",
        "path": "/orders/*"
      }
    }
  ]
}

Review permissions whenever integrations change, not only when policy errors appear in runtime.

Common failure modes

  • Forgetting the outbound-access policy for a new external integration.
  • Using an outbound-access policy when the real requirement is a License Manager resource key or an app policy exposed by another VTEX IO app.
  • Using wildcard hosts or paths when a narrower declaration would work.
  • Assuming consumer apps must declare manifest policies for resources that are actually enforced through resource-based policies on the server side.
  • Adding permissions without reviewing the route or client behavior they enable.
  • Treating policy failures as code bugs instead of permission bugs.
  • Treating a 403 that names a VRN resource or principal as a handler bug instead of an authorization or policy-mapping problem.

Review checklist

  • Does every protected integration have an explicit policy?
  • Is the policy type correct for the access pattern: License Manager, app policy, or outbound-access?
  • Are outbound-access rules narrow enough for the real integration surface?
  • If the app exposes protected routes or operations, is server-side access control defined explicitly as well?
  • Is the policy change reviewed together with the route or client that needs it?
  • Are wildcard permissions avoided unless strictly necessary?

Reference

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