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Agent Skill · 研究检索

turtle-harden(龟变硬)

turtle-harden 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

turtle-harden 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为执行命令;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描已通过,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 41,140。

总安装 1,213周安装 34GitHub Stars 4下载 280核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:turtle-harden(龟变硬)
来源仓库:https://github.com/autumnsgrove/groveengine
仓库路径:skills/turtle-harden
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/autumnsgrove/groveengine --skill turtle-harden
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/autumnsgrove/groveengine --skill turtle-harden

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

turtle-harden 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。它通过关键词、任务场景或来源线索进行信息检索与筛选,帮助 Agent 快速定位相关资源。

安装命令:npx skills add https://github.com/autumnsgrove/groveengine --skill turtle-harden。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

适用宿主包括 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,接入前应确认版本、权限和运行环境要求。

来源仓库内路径:skills/turtle-harden

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/autumnsgrove/groveengine --skill turtle-harden;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要执行命令,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

turtle-harden 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/autumnsgrove/groveengine --skill turtle-harden。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

turtle-harden 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

turtle-harden 需要什么权限?

权限级别是执行命令。安装流程涉及命令执行,可能通过 npx skills add https://github.com/autumnsgrove/groveengine --skill turtle-harden 联网下载 Skill 或依赖。用户安装前应确认命令来源、仓库内容和执行环境。

turtle-harden 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

turtle-harden 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 1,213 次,近一周安装 34 次,下载 280 次,GitHub 4 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

turtle-harden 安全吗?

第三方扫描结果为通过,但这只覆盖已知的静态检查项,不能替代自己读一遍源码和安装命令。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。
  • 第三方扫描已通过,常见的高风险行为没有命中。

先想清楚的地方

  • 需要执行命令,装到常用环境前要先评估影响面。
  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 不能接受 Skill 在你机器上执行命令的人。
  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
turtle-harden

龟变硬 · 本页

1,2134执行命令未明确通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Turtle Harden 🐢

The turtle doesn't rush. It moves through the forest floor with ancient patience, checking each root, each stone, each shadow. Its shell isn't armor bolted on — it's bone fused with spine, keratin layered over plate, three layers of defense grown from within. This is what secure-by-design means: protection that is part of the thing itself, not something you add before shipping. Where the Raccoon rummages after the mess is made and the Spider weaves locks at the doorway, the Turtle ensures the ground itself is safe to walk on. Defense in depth. Every layer. Every time.

When to Activate

  • User says "harden this" or "make this secure" or "security review"
  • User calls /turtle-harden or mentions turtle/hardening
  • Building a new feature and want it secure by design
  • Before deploying anything to production
  • Auditing existing code for deep/subtle vulnerabilities
  • When the Raccoon found surface issues and you want to go deeper
  • After implementing auth (Spider wove the web, now harden everything else)
  • User says "defense in depth" or "secure by design"
  • When working on anything that handles user input, file uploads, or sensitive data
  • Reviewing code that interacts with external services (SSRF risk)
  • Any multi-tenant boundary work

IMPORTANT: The Turtle is thorough by nature. Do not skip phases. Do not rush. A shell with gaps protects nothing.

Pair with: raccoon-audit for secret scanning first, spider-weave for auth implementation, beaver-build for writing security regression tests


The Hardening

WITHDRAW --> LAYER --> FORTIFY --> SIEGE --> SEAL
    |           |         |          |         |
  Survey      Build     Harden     Attack    Lock
  Attack     Found-     Deep       Test      Down &
  Surface    ation     Defense    Defenses   Report

Phase 1: WITHDRAW

*The turtle withdraws into its shell, eyes watchful, studying the world from safety...*

Before hardening anything, understand what you're protecting and what threatens it.

  • Identify scope: new code (secure-by-design) or existing code (audit)? What threat model applies?
  • Map all entry points where data enters the system (URL params, forms, headers, cookies, files, WebSockets, APIs, webhooks)
  • Map all exit points where data leaves (HTML, JSON, DB writes, external calls, logs, redirects)
  • Trace data flows for sensitive data: credentials, PII, tokens, payment info — where it enters, lives, travels, displays, and dies
  • Assess tech-specific risks: SvelteKit layout bypass, CF Workers secret storage, prototype pollution in JS, D1 tenant isolation

Output: Complete attack surface map with entry points, exit points, data flows, and tech-specific risks

Deep reference: Load references/attack-surface.md for full entry/exit point checklists, data flow catalog, and tech stack risk patterns


Phase 2: LAYER

*Layer by layer, the shell grows stronger. Keratin over bone, bone over spine...*

Apply the foundational defenses. These are non-negotiable — every piece of code must have these layers.

  • 2A. Input Validation — Validate all entry points server-side, using allowlists with Zod/Valibot, strict types, length and range limits; reject invalid input, never silently coerce
  • 2B. Output Encoding — Encode for context at every exit point (HTML, JS, URL, CSS, JSON); never use {@html} with unsanitized input; use DOMPurify for rich text
  • 2C. Parameterized Queries — Zero string concatenation in SQL; all queries use .bind(); typed helpers from database.ts; parallel queries with Promise.all()
  • 2D. Type Safety — MANDATORY Rootwork utilities at all trust boundaries. parseFormData() for form data, safeJsonParse() for KV/JSON reads, isRedirect()/isHttpError() for catch blocks. No as casts at boundaries. TypeScript strict mode is table stakes; Rootwork is the lock. Reference: AgentUsage/rootwork_type_safety.md
  • 2E. Error Handling — Every error uses a Signpost code; logGroveError() for server errors; generic user messages only; no enumeration leaks; no swallowed exceptions

Output: Foundational defenses applied to all entry and exit points

Deep reference: Load references/foundational-defenses.md for full checklists, code examples, and SvelteKit patterns for all five foundational layers


Phase 3: FORTIFY

*Each plate of the shell interlocks with the next. No gaps. No seams. No way through...*

Apply deep, layered hardening across all security domains.

  • 3A–3B. HTTP Headers & CSP — Required security headers on every response; strict nonce-based CSP; remove framework-leaking headers
  • 3C. CORS — Exact allowlist validation; never reflect origin verbatim; never * with credentials
  • 3D–3E. Sessions & CSRF — CSPRNG session IDs, HttpOnly/Secure/SameSite cookies, session regeneration on auth; CSRF tokens on all state-changing requests
  • 3F. Rate Limiting — Auth and reset endpoints rate-limited; Cloudflare edge rules; limits applied before expensive operations
  • 3G–3H. Auth & Authorization — Argon2id hashing; no enumeration; PKCE OAuth; JWT verified with explicit algorithm; authz enforced in hooks.server.ts, not layouts; default deny
  • 3I. Multi-Tenant Isolation — Tenant context resolved at request boundary; every query scoped with WHERE tenant_id =?; cache keys include tenant ID
  • 3J. File Uploads — ALLOWLIST of types + magic byte inspection; server-generated names; stored outside web root; Content-Disposition: attachment when served
  • 3K. Data Protection — TLS 1.2+; HSTS; secrets in Workers Secrets not source; PII minimized; constant-time comparison for tokens

Output: Deep, layered defenses applied across all security domains

Deep reference: Load references/deep-defenses.md for full checklists and code examples for all eleven FORTIFY sub-sections (3A–3K)


Phase 4: SIEGE

*Test the shell. Strike it. Push it. Try every angle. What holds is worthy. What breaks is found before the enemy finds it...*

Think like an attacker. Check for the subtle, exotic vulnerabilities that slip through standard reviews.

  • Work through all 19 exotic attack vector categories below
  • For each: attempt the attack mentally (or practically if safe) and verify defenses hold
  • Mark each as CLEAR, FOUND, or N/A based on whether the attack surface exists

Vectors to check: 4A Prototype Pollution · 4B Timing Side-Channels · 4C Race Conditions (TOCTOU) · 4D ReDoS · 4E SSRF · 4F CRLF Injection · 4G Unicode Attacks · 4H Deserialization · 4I postMessage · 4J WebSocket · 4K CSS Injection · 4L SVG XSS · 4M Cache Poisoning · 4N Open Redirects · 4O Verb Tampering · 4P Second-Order Vulnerabilities · 4Q Supply Chain · 4R Service Workers · 4S DNS & Infrastructure

Output: All exotic attack vectors tested, vulnerabilities identified or confirmed absent

Deep reference: Load references/exotic-vectors.md for the complete checklist and code examples for all 19 attack vector categories


Phase 5: SEAL

*The shell is complete. Every gap sealed. Every plate aligned. The turtle endures...*

Final verification and reporting.

  • Defense-in-depth compliance — Verify security is layered: network, application, data, infrastructure, and process layers all covered; each critical function has 2+ independent controls
  • Logging & monitoring — Auth events, authz failures, and validation rejections logged; logs contain no secrets or PII; alerting configured for brute force and anomalies
  • Build verification (MANDATORY) — Run pnpm install && gw ci --affected --fail-fast --diagnose; fix any regressions before sealing
  • Security scan — Grep for hardcoded secrets, dangerous patterns (eval, innerHTML, __proto__), and disabled security; run pnpm audit
  • Hardening report — Generate the full structured report with scope, defense layers, exotic vector results, vulnerabilities found, and recommendations

Output: Complete hardening report with defense-in-depth verification

Deep reference: Load references/verification-report.md for the defense-in-depth table, logging checklist, build commands, security scan patterns, and the full report template


Reference Routing Table

PhaseReferenceLoad When
WITHDRAWreferences/attack-surface.mdAlways (start of hardening)
LAYERreferences/foundational-defenses.mdAlways (core defenses are non-negotiable)
FORTIFYreferences/deep-defenses.mdWhen hardening HTTP/auth/sessions/multi-tenant
SIEGEreferences/exotic-vectors.mdWhen testing for advanced/exotic attack vectors
SEALreferences/verification-report.mdWhen writing final report

Turtle Rules

Patience

The turtle never rushes. Check every layer. Verify every defense. A shell with gaps protects nothing. If a phase feels too fast, you're skipping something.

Layering

One defense is not enough. Two is better. Three is the turtle way. For every critical function, verify that multiple independent controls prevent the same attack. If any single layer fails, the system must still be safe.

Secure by Design

Defense is not what you add — it's what you are. When reviewing new code, the question isn't "what security should we bolt on?" but "is security inherent in the design?" The shell grows from within.

Thoroughness Over Speed

The turtle wins the race. Every exotic attack vector in Phase 4 exists because someone assumed "that can't happen here." Check anyway. The attacks that seem unlikely are the ones that succeed.

Communication

Use shell metaphors:

  • "Withdrawing to study the terrain..." (surveying attack surface)
  • "Layering the foundation..." (applying base defenses)
  • "Fortifying the plates..." (deep hardening)
  • "Testing under siege..." (adversarial testing)
  • "Sealing the shell..." (final verification)
  • "The shell holds." (hardening complete)

Anti-Patterns

The turtle does NOT:

  • Skip phases because "it's just a small change" (small changes create big holes)
  • Assume any input is safe because it comes from "trusted" sources (trust nothing)
  • Apply security only at the perimeter (defense in depth means EVERY layer)
  • Treat security headers as optional ("we'll add them later" means never)
  • Ignore exotic attacks because "that's unlikely" (attackers love unlikely)
  • Use blocklists when allowlists are possible (blocklists always have gaps)
  • Bolt on security after the feature is "done" (secure by design, or not at all)
  • Duplicate the Raccoon's work (secrets scanning is the Raccoon's job — the Turtle hardens)
  • Rush through the SIEGE phase (adversarial thinking requires patience)

Example Hardening

User: "Harden the blog post creation endpoint before we ship"

Turtle flow:

  1. 🐢 WITHDRAW — "Studying the terrain... The post creation endpoint accepts title, content, slug, and optional image upload via form action. Data flows: user input -> form action -> D1 database -> rendered HTML. Attack surface: XSS in content, SQLi in queries, SSRF if content contains URLs fetched for embeds, path traversal in image upload."
  2. 🐢 LAYER — "Building the foundation... Adding Zod schema validation for all inputs. Title: 200 char max, trimmed. Content: 50k max, sanitized with DOMPurify before storage. Slug: alphanumeric + hyphens only. Image: allowlisted types, size-limited. All queries parameterized. Error responses generic."
  3. 🐢 FORTIFY — "Reinforcing the plates... CSP configured with nonces. Security headers set. CSRF token validated via SvelteKit form actions. Rate limit: 10 posts per hour per tenant. Session validated in hooks.server.ts. Tenant isolation verified — query scoped to authenticated tenant. Image upload: renamed, stored in R2 with tenant prefix, served with Content-Disposition: attachment."
  4. 🐢 SIEGE — "Testing under siege... Prototype pollution: form data goes through Zod, safe. ReDoS: slug regex is simple and non-backtracking, safe. SSRF: no URL fetching in this endpoint, N/A. Unicode: slug restricted to ASCII, title/content sanitized after normalization. Race conditions: post creation is idempotent per slug+tenant, safe. SVG in image upload: sanitized via DOMPurify, served from separate R2 domain. Second-order XSS: content sanitized before storage AND on output, dual defense."
  5. 🐢 SEAL — "Sealing the shell... Defense-in-depth verified: XSS prevented by sanitization + CSP + output encoding (3 layers). SQLi prevented by parameterized queries + input validation (2 layers). Auth bypass prevented by session + tenant scoping + CSRF (3 layers). All 5 defense layers present. The shell holds."

Quick Decision Guide

SituationApproach
Building a new featureFull WITHDRAW->SEAL flow, secure-by-design mode
Reviewing existing codeFull flow, audit mode — document what's missing
Quick security checkAt minimum: LAYER (input/output/queries) + FORTIFY (headers/CORS/CSRF)
After Spider wove authFORTIFY Phase 3D-3H (session, auth, authz hardening)
After Raccoon found issuesSIEGE phase — go deeper than the Raccoon went
Multi-tenant boundary workFocus: FORTIFY 3I + SIEGE 4C (race conditions) + 4P (second-order)
File upload featureFocus: FORTIFY 3J + SIEGE 4L (SVG XSS) + 4E (SSRF)
API endpointFocus: LAYER + FORTIFY 3A-3F + SIEGE 4O (verb tampering)
Pre-production deployFull flow, verify defense-in-depth compliance

Phase 2 (LAYER) Checklist

  • All form data uses parseFormData() with Zod schema
  • All KV/JSON reads use safeJsonParse() with Zod schema
  • All SvelteKit catch blocks use isRedirect()/isHttpError()
  • No as casts at trust boundaries
  • Schemas defined at module scope, not inside handlers

Integration with Other Skills

Before Hardening:

  • bloodhound-scout — Understand the codebase before hardening it
  • eagle-architect — For security architecture decisions
  • raccoon-audit — Let the Raccoon find secrets first, then Turtle hardens

During Hardening:

  • spider-weave — If auth needs implementation (not just hardening)
  • elephant-build — If hardening requires multi-file changes
  • beaver-build — Write security regression tests alongside hardening

After Hardening:

  • raccoon-audit — Final sweep for anything missed
  • fox-optimize — If rate limiting or security checks impact performance
  • owl-archive — Document the security architecture

*The shell grows from within. Defense is not what you add — it's what you are.* 🐢

平台分布

Codex

37.46%
按下载量换算105

Claude

29.41%
按下载量换算82

Cursor

20.41%
按下载量换算57

Gemini CLI

8.33%
按下载量换算23

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

执行命令

安装流程涉及命令执行,可能通过 npx skills add https://github.com/autumnsgrove/groveengine --skill turtle-harden 联网下载 Skill 或依赖。用户安装前应确认命令来源、仓库内容和执行环境。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

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