Token导航 LogoToken导航

Agent Skill · 研究检索

triaging-security-incident(分类安全事件)

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

triaging-security-incident 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为需要联网;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描已通过,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 50,488。

总安装 612周安装 26GitHub Stars 5,923下载 214核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:triaging-security-incident(分类安全事件)
来源仓库:https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills
仓库路径:skills/triaging-security-incident
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill triaging-security-incident
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill triaging-security-incident

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查和常见漏洞排查。适合梳理敏感配置、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。不能将工具输出直接当作最终结论,需人工复核。涉及密钥、用户数据时应确认最小权限和脱敏方式。triaging-security-incident 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

来源仓库内路径:skills/triaging-security-incident

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skil…;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要需要联网,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

triaging-security-incident 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill triaging…。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

triaging-security-incident 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

triaging-security-incident 需要什么权限?

权限级别是需要联网。该 Skill 可能需要联网访问来源站点、仓库或外部 API;具体网络访问范围需要结合源码和 README 复核。

triaging-security-incident 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

triaging-security-incident 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 612 次,近一周安装 26 次,下载 214 次,GitHub 5,923 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

triaging-security-incident 安全吗?

第三方扫描结果为通过,但这只覆盖已知的静态检查项,不能替代自己读一遍源码和安装命令。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。
  • 第三方扫描已通过,常见的高风险行为没有命中。
  • 来源仓库有 5,923 星,维护活跃度相对可查。

先想清楚的地方

  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
triaging-security-incident

分类安全事件 · 本页

6125,923需要联网未明确通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Triaging Security Incidents

When to Use

  • A SIEM or EDR alert fires and requires human classification before escalation
  • Multiple concurrent alerts arrive and the SOC must prioritize response order
  • An end user reports suspicious activity and the incident needs initial categorization
  • A threat intelligence feed matches an IOC observed in the environment

Do not use for routine vulnerability scanning results or compliance audit findings that do not represent active security incidents.

Prerequisites

  • Access to SIEM platform (Splunk, Elastic, Microsoft Sentinel) with current alert data
  • Incident classification taxonomy aligned to NIST SP 800-61r3 categories
  • Predefined severity matrix mapping asset criticality to threat type
  • Contact roster for escalation paths (Tier 1 through Tier 3 and CIRT)
  • Asset inventory with business criticality ratings

Workflow

Step 1: Collect Initial Alert Data

Gather all available context from the triggering alert before making classification decisions:

  • Alert source: Which detection system generated the alert (EDR, SIEM, IDS/IPS, firewall, user report)
  • Timestamp: When the event occurred and when it was detected (dwell time gap)
  • Affected assets: Hostnames, IP addresses, user accounts involved
  • Alert fidelity: Historical true-positive rate for this detection rule
  • Raw evidence: Log entries, packet captures, process execution chains
Example SIEM alert context:
Source:       CrowdStrike Falcon
Detection:    Suspicious PowerShell Execution (T1059.001)
Host:         WORKSTATION-FIN-042
User:         jsmith@corp.example.com
Timestamp:    2025-11-15T14:23:17Z
Severity:     High (detection rule confidence: 92%)
Process:      powershell.exe -enc SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoA...
Parent:       outlook.exe (PID 4812)

Step 2: Classify the Incident Type

Map the alert to a standard incident category per NIST SP 800-61r3:

CategoryExamples
Unauthorized AccessCompromised credentials, privilege escalation, IDOR
Denial of ServiceVolumetric DDoS, application-layer flood, resource exhaustion
Malicious CodeMalware execution, ransomware detonation, cryptominer
Improper UsagePolicy violation, insider data exfiltration, shadow IT
ReconnaissancePort scanning, directory enumeration, credential spraying
Web Application AttackSQL injection, XSS, SSRF exploitation

Step 3: Assign Severity Using Impact Matrix

Calculate severity by combining asset criticality with threat severity:

Severity = f(Asset Criticality, Threat Type, Data Sensitivity, Lateral Movement Potential)

Critical (P1): Crown jewel systems compromised, active data exfiltration, ransomware spreading
High (P2):     Production system compromise, confirmed malware execution, privileged account takeover
Medium (P3):   Non-production compromise, unsuccessful exploitation attempt, single endpoint malware
Low (P4):      Reconnaissance activity, policy violation, benign true positive

Response SLA targets:

  • P1: Acknowledge within 15 minutes, containment within 1 hour
  • P2: Acknowledge within 30 minutes, containment within 4 hours
  • P3: Acknowledge within 2 hours, investigation within 24 hours
  • P4: Acknowledge within 8 hours, investigation within 72 hours

Step 4: Perform Initial Enrichment

Before escalation, enrich the alert with contextual data:

  • Threat intelligence: Check IOCs (IP, hash, domain) against TI platforms (VirusTotal, OTX, MISP)
  • Asset context: Query CMDB for asset owner, business function, data classification
  • User context: Check identity provider for recent authentication anomalies, MFA status
  • Historical correlation: Search for related alerts on the same host/user in the past 30 days
  • Network context: Verify if source/destination IPs are internal, known partners, or external threat actors

Step 5: Document and Escalate

Create a structured triage record and route to the appropriate response tier:

Incident Triage Record
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Ticket ID:       INC-2025-1547
Triage Analyst:  [analyst name]
Triage Time:     2025-11-15T14:35:00Z (12 min from alert)
Classification:  Malicious Code - Macro-based initial access
Severity:        P2 - High
Affected Assets: WORKSTATION-FIN-042 (Finance dept, handles PII)
Affected Users:  jsmith@corp.example.com
IOCs Identified: powershell.exe spawned by outlook.exe, encoded command
TI Matches:      Base64 payload matches known Qakbot loader pattern
Escalation:      Tier 2 - Malware IR team
Recommended:     Isolate endpoint, preserve memory dump, block sender domain

Step 6: Initiate Containment Hold

If severity is P1 or P2, initiate immediate containment actions while awaiting full investigation:

  • Network-isolate the affected endpoint via EDR (CrowdStrike contain, Defender isolate)
  • Disable compromised user accounts in Active Directory or identity provider
  • Block identified malicious IPs/domains at firewall and DNS sinkhole
  • Preserve volatile evidence (memory dump) before any remediation

Key Concepts

TermDefinition
TriageRapid assessment process to classify and prioritize security incidents based on severity and business impact
PICERLSANS incident response framework: Preparation, Identification, Containment, Eradication, Recovery, Lessons Learned
Dwell TimeDuration between initial compromise and detection; average is 10 days per Mandiant M-Trends 2025
True Positive RatePercentage of alerts from a detection rule that represent genuine security incidents
Crown Jewel AssetsSystems and data critical to business operations whose compromise would cause severe organizational impact
Alert FatigueDegraded analyst performance caused by high volumes of low-fidelity or false-positive alerts
Mean Time to Acknowledge (MTTA)Average time from alert generation to analyst acknowledgment; key SOC performance metric

Tools & Systems

  • Splunk Enterprise Security: SIEM platform for alert aggregation, correlation, and triage workflow management
  • CrowdStrike Falcon: EDR platform providing endpoint telemetry, detection, and one-click host containment
  • TheHive: Open-source incident response platform for case management, task tracking, and team collaboration
  • MISP: Threat intelligence sharing platform for IOC enrichment during triage
  • Cortex XSOAR: SOAR platform for automating enrichment playbooks and triage decision trees

Common Scenarios

Scenario: Encoded PowerShell from Email Client

Context: SOC analyst receives a P2 alert showing powershell.exe with a Base64-encoded command spawned as a child process of outlook.exe on a finance department workstation.

Approach:

  1. Decode the Base64 payload to determine the command intent
  2. Check the parent process chain for anomalies (Outlook spawning PowerShell is abnormal)
  3. Query VirusTotal for the decoded payload hash
  4. Correlate with email gateway logs to identify the triggering email and sender
  5. Check if other recipients in the organization received the same email
  6. Isolate the endpoint and escalate to Tier 2 with full triage context

Pitfalls:

  • Dismissing encoded PowerShell as a false positive without decoding the payload
  • Failing to check for lateral spread to other recipients of the same phishing email
  • Remediating the endpoint before capturing volatile memory evidence

Output Format

INCIDENT TRIAGE REPORT
======================
Ticket:          INC-[YYYY]-[NNNN]
Date/Time:       [ISO 8601 timestamp]
Triage Analyst:  [Name]
Time to Triage:  [minutes from alert to classification]

CLASSIFICATION
Type:            [NIST category]
Severity:        [P1-P4] - [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Confidence:      [High/Medium/Low]
MITRE ATT&CK:   [Technique ID and name]

AFFECTED SCOPE
Assets:          [hostname(s), IP(s)]
Users:           [account(s)]
Data at Risk:    [classification level]
Business Unit:   [department]

EVIDENCE SUMMARY
[Bullet list of key observations]

ENRICHMENT RESULTS
TI Matches:      [Yes/No - details]
Historical:      [Related prior incidents]
Asset Criticality: [rating]

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
1. [Immediate action]
2. [Investigation step]
3. [Escalation target]

ESCALATION
Routed To:       [Team/Individual]
SLA Target:      [Containment deadline]

平台分布

Codex

38.41%
按下载量换算82

Claude

28.67%
按下载量换算61

Cursor

18.78%
按下载量换算40

Gemini CLI

9.28%
按下载量换算20

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

需要联网

该 Skill 可能需要联网访问来源站点、仓库或外部 API;具体网络访问范围需要结合源码和 README 复核。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

继续浏览同类 Skills