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Agent Skill · 前端设计

threat-model-generator(威胁模型生成器)

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

threat-model-generator 是前端设计类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为接触敏感数据;许可证为 MIT,第三方扫描已通过,按安装量在前端设计类的 10,216 个 Skill 里排第 2,529。

总安装 2,172周安装 87GitHub Stars 33下载 703核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
MIT

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:threat-model-generator(威胁模型生成器)
来源仓库:https://github.com/patricio0312rev/skills
仓库路径:skills/threat-model-generator
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/patricio0312rev/skills --skill threat-model-generator
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。不同来源提供的安装方式可能略有差异;本站展示可直接复制的安装命令,安装前请核对来源页面。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/patricio0312rev/skills --skill threat-model-generator

这个 Skill 是做什么的

前端设计类 Skill 关注页面结构、视觉规范和组件写法,输出通常是可运行的界面代码。

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查与常见漏洞排查工作。适合梳理敏感配置、分析依赖风险或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能将工具输出直接视为最终结论,需人工复核关键项。

安装命令:npx skills add https://github.com/patricio0312rev/skills --skill threat-model-generator。涉及密钥、令牌等敏感信息时应先脱敏再操作。

来源仓库内路径:skills/threat-model-generator

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/patricio0312rev/skills --skill threat-model-ge…;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要接触敏感数据,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

threat-model-generator 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/patricio0312rev/skills --skill threat-model-generator。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

threat-model-generator 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

threat-model-generator 需要什么权限?

权限级别是接触敏感数据。该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

threat-model-generator 是免费的吗?

来源标注的许可证是 MIT。本站不代收任何费用,也不托管安装包;能否商用、要不要署名,以许可证原文为准。

threat-model-generator 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 2,172 次,近一周安装 87 次,下载 703 次,GitHub 33 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

threat-model-generator 安全吗?

第三方扫描结果为通过,但这只覆盖已知的静态检查项,不能替代自己读一遍源码和安装命令。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。
  • 3 个目录同时收录,说明这个 Skill 流传比较广。
  • 许可证明确为 MIT,商用和分发边界好判断。
  • 第三方扫描已通过,常见的高风险行为没有命中。

先想清楚的地方

  • 需要接触敏感数据,装到常用环境前要先评估影响面。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理前端设计类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。
  • 需要许可证清楚、并且有第三方扫描结果的团队项目。

不太适合

  • 环境里有大量密钥、凭证,不方便给第三方 Skill 读取的人。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

前端设计类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
frontend-design

前端设计 · Codex、Claude

8,823,360126,072只读MIT通过
vercel-composition-patterns

Vercel 组合模式 · Codex、Claude

3,858,81625,893需要联网MIT通过
vercel-react-native-skills

Vercel React native skills 前端 · Codex、Claude

2,468,66425,878只读MIT通过
adapt

adapt 搜索 · Codex、Claude

2,027,04023,125操作浏览器未明确通过
bolder

bolder 分析 · Codex、Claude

2,004,28823,130只读未明确通过
threat-model-generator

威胁模型生成器 · 本页

2,17233接触敏感数据MIT通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Threat Model Generator

Systematically identify and mitigate security threats.

STRIDE Methodology

S - Spoofing: Impersonating someone/something
T - Tampering: Modifying data or code
R - Repudiation: Claiming you didn't do something
I - Information Disclosure: Exposing protected information
D - Denial of Service: Making system unavailable
E - Elevation of Privilege: Gaining unauthorized permissions

Asset Identification

interface Asset {
  name: string;
  type: "data" | "service" | "user" | "infrastructure";
  sensitivity: "public" | "internal" | "confidential" | "restricted";
  criticality: "low" | "medium" | "high" | "critical";
}

const assets: Asset[] = [
  {
    name: "User Credentials (passwords, tokens)",
    type: "data",
    sensitivity: "restricted",
    criticality: "critical",
  },
  {
    name: "Payment Information (credit cards)",
    type: "data",
    sensitivity: "restricted",
    criticality: "critical",
  },
  {
    name: "API Service",
    type: "service",
    sensitivity: "internal",
    criticality: "high",
  },
  {
    name: "User Profile Data",
    type: "data",
    sensitivity: "confidential",
    criticality: "medium",
  },
];

Threat Enumeration

interface Threat {
  id: string;
  category: "S" | "T" | "R" | "I" | "D" | "E";
  description: string;
  asset: string;
  attackVector: string;
  likelihood: "low" | "medium" | "high";
  impact: "low" | "medium" | "high" | "critical";
  riskScore: number;
}

const threats: Threat[] = [
  {
    id: "T-001",
    category: "S",
    description: "Attacker impersonates user with stolen credentials",
    asset: "User Credentials",
    attackVector: "Phishing, credential stuffing, brute force",
    likelihood: "high",
    impact: "critical",
    riskScore: 9,
  },
  {
    id: "T-002",
    category: "T",
    description: "SQL injection allows data modification",
    asset: "User Profile Data",
    attackVector: "Malicious SQL in input fields",
    likelihood: "medium",
    impact: "high",
    riskScore: 7,
  },
  {
    id: "T-003",
    category: "I",
    description: "API exposes sensitive user data without auth",
    asset: "User Profile Data",
    attackVector: "Direct API access, IDOR",
    likelihood: "medium",
    impact: "high",
    riskScore: 7,
  },
  {
    id: "T-004",
    category: "D",
    description: "DDoS attack overwhelms API",
    asset: "API Service",
    attackVector: "Volumetric attack, application-layer flood",
    likelihood: "medium",
    impact: "high",
    riskScore: 7,
  },
  {
    id: "T-005",
    category: "E",
    description: "Privilege escalation via role manipulation",
    asset: "User Profile Data",
    attackVector: "Parameter tampering, insecure direct object reference",
    likelihood: "low",
    impact: "critical",
    riskScore: 6,
  },
];

Mitigation Strategies

interface Mitigation {
  threatId: string;
  strategy: string;
  implementation: string;
  effectiveness: "low" | "medium" | "high";
  cost: "low" | "medium" | "high";
  priority: 1 | 2 | 3;
}

const mitigations: Mitigation[] = [
  {
    threatId: "T-001",
    strategy: "Multi-factor authentication",
    implementation: "TOTP via authenticator app + SMS backup",
    effectiveness: "high",
    cost: "medium",
    priority: 1,
  },
  {
    threatId: "T-001",
    strategy: "Rate limiting on login attempts",
    implementation: "Max 5 attempts per 15 minutes per IP",
    effectiveness: "medium",
    cost: "low",
    priority: 1,
  },
  {
    threatId: "T-002",
    strategy: "Parameterized queries",
    implementation: "Use ORM (Prisma) for all database access",
    effectiveness: "high",
    cost: "low",
    priority: 1,
  },
  {
    threatId: "T-003",
    strategy: "Authentication & Authorization",
    implementation: "JWT tokens + RBAC middleware on all routes",
    effectiveness: "high",
    cost: "low",
    priority: 1,
  },
  {
    threatId: "T-004",
    strategy: "Rate limiting & CDN",
    implementation: "CloudFlare with rate limits + WAF rules",
    effectiveness: "high",
    cost: "medium",
    priority: 2,
  },
  {
    threatId: "T-005",
    strategy: "Role-based access control",
    implementation: "Enforce RBAC checks on all mutations",
    effectiveness: "high",
    cost: "low",
    priority: 1,
  },
];

Residual Risk Assessment

interface ResidualRisk {
  threatId: string;
  originalRisk: number;
  mitigatedRisk: number;
  residualRisk: number;
  acceptanceReason?: string;
  monitoringRequired: boolean;
}

function calculateResidualRisk(
  threat: Threat,
  mitigations: Mitigation[]
): ResidualRisk {
  const threatMitigations = mitigations.filter((m) => m.threatId === threat.id);

  // Calculate risk reduction
  const maxEffectiveness = Math.max(
    ...threatMitigations.map((m) => {
      if (m.effectiveness === "high") return 0.8;
      if (m.effectiveness === "medium") return 0.5;
      return 0.2;
    })
  );

  const mitigatedRisk = threat.riskScore * (1 - maxEffectiveness);

  return {
    threatId: threat.id,
    originalRisk: threat.riskScore,
    mitigatedRisk,
    residualRisk: Math.round(mitigatedRisk),
    acceptanceReason:
      mitigatedRisk < 3 ? "Risk reduced to acceptable level" : undefined,
    monitoringRequired: mitigatedRisk >= 3,
  };
}

Threat Model Document Template

# Threat Model: User Authentication System

**Date:** 2024-01-15
**Owner:** Security Team
**Reviewers:** Engineering, Product

## 1. System Overview

### Architecture

- Frontend: React SPA
- Backend: Node.js + Express
- Database: PostgreSQL
- Auth: JWT tokens

### Trust Boundaries

- Internet → CDN
- CDN → Backend API
- Backend API → Database

## 2. Assets

| Asset            | Type | Sensitivity  | Criticality |
| ---------------- | ---- | ------------ | ----------- |
| User Credentials | Data | Restricted   | Critical    |
| Session Tokens   | Data | Restricted   | Critical    |
| User Profile     | Data | Confidential | Medium      |

## 3. Threats (STRIDE)

### Spoofing (S)

**T-001: Credential Theft**

- **Likelihood:** High
- **Impact:** Critical
- **Risk Score:** 9
- **Attack Vector:** Phishing, credential stuffing
- **Mitigations:**
  - MFA required for all accounts
  - Rate limiting on login (5 attempts/15min)
  - Breach password detection
- **Residual Risk:** 3 (Low)

### Tampering (T)

**T-002: Token Modification**

- **Likelihood:** Medium
- **Impact:** High
- **Risk Score:** 7
- **Attack Vector:** Token tampering, replay attacks
- **Mitigations:**
  - HMAC signature on JWT
  - Short token expiry (15 min)
  - Refresh token rotation
- **Residual Risk:** 2 (Low)

### Information Disclosure (I)

**T-003: Sensitive Data Leakage**

- **Likelihood:** Medium
- **Impact:** High
- **Risk Score:** 7
- **Attack Vector:** Error messages, logs, API responses
- **Mitigations:**
  - Generic error messages
  - PII redaction in logs
  - HTTPS everywhere
- **Residual Risk:** 2 (Low)

## 4. Risk Summary

| Priority | Threats | Mitigated | Residual Risk |
| -------- | ------- | --------- | ------------- |
| P1       | 3       | 3         | Low           |
| P2       | 2       | 1         | Medium        |
| P3       | 1       | 0         | Medium        |

## 5. Recommendations

1. **Immediate (P1)**

   - Implement MFA
   - Add rate limiting
   - Deploy PII redaction

2. **Short-term (P2)**

   - Add DDoS protection
   - Implement RBAC auditing

3. **Long-term (P3)**
   - Security training for team
   - Penetration testing

## 6. Acceptance

- [ ] Security Team Approval
- [ ] Engineering Lead Approval
- [ ] Product Manager Approval

Automated Threat Detection

// scripts/detect-threats.ts
interface CodePattern {
  pattern: RegExp;
  threat: string;
  severity: "low" | "medium" | "high" | "critical";
}

const patterns: CodePattern[] = [
  {
    pattern: /eval\(/,
    threat: "Code injection via eval()",
    severity: "critical",
  },
  {
    pattern: /innerHTML\s*=/,
    threat: "XSS via innerHTML",
    severity: "high",
  },
  {
    pattern: /process\.env\./,
    threat: "Hardcoded environment variable",
    severity: "medium",
  },
  {
    pattern: /password|secret|key/i,
    threat: "Potential secret in code",
    severity: "high",
  },
];

Best Practices

  1. Regular updates: Quarterly threat model reviews
  2. Include stakeholders: Security, Engineering, Product
  3. Document decisions: Why threats accepted/mitigated
  4. Test mitigations: Verify controls work
  5. Monitor residual risks: Track over time
  6. Automate where possible: Integrate into CI/CD

Output Checklist

  • Assets identified and classified
  • Threats enumerated using STRIDE
  • Attack vectors documented
  • Mitigations defined for each threat
  • Residual risk calculated
  • Risk acceptance documented
  • Monitoring plan created
  • Threat model document generated
  • Stakeholder approval obtained
  • Review schedule set

平台分布

Claude Code

30.1%
按下载量换算212

Gemini CLI

24.5%
按下载量换算172

Antigravity

16.04%
按下载量换算113

windsurf

11.8%
按下载量换算83

github-copilot

7.74%
按下载量换算54

Codex

3.78%
按下载量换算27

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

接触敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。

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