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supabase-audit-auth-usersSupabase 审核 auth users

Agent Skill

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

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安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:supabase-audit-auth-users(Supabase 审核 auth users)
来源仓库:https://github.com/yoanbernabeu/supabase-pentest-skills
仓库路径:skills/supabase-audit-auth-users
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/yoanbernabeu/supabase-pentest-skills --skill supabase-audit-auth-users
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/yoanbernabeu/supabase-pentest-skills --skill supabase-audit-auth-users

简介

supabase-audit-auth-users 用于辅助安全审计与用户枚举风险排查,适合检测认证端点漏洞。

  • 可识别显式消息与时序攻击导致的用户信息泄露。
  • 通过 github 安装,使用 npx skills add 命令添加。
  • 需确认响应时间归一化与验证码实施建议。
  • 建议核实警报模式与监控配置细节。

SKILL.md

User Enumeration Audit

🔴 CRITICAL: PROGRESSIVE FILE UPDATES REQUIRED You MUST write to context files AS YOU GO, not just at the end. - Write to .sb-pentest-context.json IMMEDIATELY after each endpoint tested - Log to .sb-pentest-audit.log BEFORE and AFTER each test - DO NOT wait until the skill completes to update files - If the skill crashes or is interrupted, all prior findings must already be saved This is not optional. Failure to write progressively is a critical error.

This skill tests for user enumeration vulnerabilities in authentication flows.

When to Use This Skill

  • To check if user existence can be detected
  • To test login, signup, and recovery flows for information leakage
  • As part of authentication security audit
  • Before production deployment

Prerequisites

  • Supabase URL and anon key available
  • Auth endpoints accessible

What is User Enumeration?

User enumeration occurs when an application reveals whether a user account exists through:

VectorIndicator
Different error messages"User not found" vs "Wrong password"
Response timingFast for non-existent, slow for existing
Response codes404 vs 401
Signup response"Email already registered"

Why It Matters

RiskImpact
Targeted attacksAttackers know valid accounts
PhishingConfirm targets have accounts
Credential stuffingReduce attack scope
PrivacyReveal user presence

Tests Performed

EndpointTest Method
/auth/v1/signupTry registering existing email
/auth/v1/tokenTry login with various emails
/auth/v1/recoverTry password reset
/auth/v1/otpTry OTP for various emails

Usage

Basic Enumeration Test

Test for user enumeration vulnerabilities

Test Specific Endpoint

Test login endpoint for user enumeration

Output Format

═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 USER ENUMERATION AUDIT
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

 Project: abc123def.supabase.co

 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 Signup Endpoint (/auth/v1/signup)
 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

 Test: POST with known existing email
 Response for existing: "User already registered"
 Response for new email: User object returned

 Status: 🟠 P2 - ENUMERABLE

 The response clearly indicates if an email is registered.

 Exploitation:

curl -X POST https://abc123def.supabase.co/auth/v1/signup \ -H "apikey: [anon-key]" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"email": "target@example.com", "password": "test123"}'

# If user exists: {"msg": "User already registered"} # If new user: User created or confirmation needed


───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Login Endpoint (/auth/v1/token) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

Test: POST with different email scenarios

Existing email, wrong password: ├── Response: {"error": "Invalid login credentials"} ├── Time: 245ms └── Code: 400

Non-existing email: ├── Response: {"error": "Invalid login credentials"} ├── Time: 52ms ← Significantly faster! └── Code: 400

Status: 🟠 P2 - ENUMERABLE VIA TIMING

Although the error message is the same, the response time is noticeably different: ├── Existing user: ~200-300ms (password hashing) └── Non-existing: ~50-100ms (no hash check)

Timing Attack PoC:

import requests import time

def check_user(email): start = time.time() requests.post( 'https://abc123def.supabase.co/auth/v1/token', params={'grant_type': 'password'}, json={'email': email, 'password': 'wrong'}, headers={'apikey': '[anon-key]'} ) elapsed = time.time() - start return elapsed > 0.15 # Threshold

exists = check_user('target@example.com')


───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Password Recovery (/auth/v1/recover) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

Test: POST recovery request for different emails

Existing email: ├── Response: {"message": "Password recovery email sent"} ├── Time: 1250ms (email actually sent) └── Code: 200

Non-existing email: ├── Response: {"message": "Password recovery email sent"} ├── Time: 85ms ← Much faster (no email sent) └── Code: 200

Status: 🟠 P2 - ENUMERABLE VIA TIMING

Same message, but timing reveals existence. Existing users trigger actual email sending (~1s+).

───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Magic Link / OTP (/auth/v1/otp) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

Test: Request OTP for different emails

Existing email: ├── Response: {"message": "OTP sent"} ├── Time: 1180ms └── Code: 200

Non-existing email: ├── Response: {"error": "User not found"} ├── Time: 95ms └── Code: 400

Status: 🔴 P1 - DIRECTLY ENUMERABLE

The error message explicitly states user doesn't exist.

───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Summary ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

Endpoints Tested: 4 Enumerable: 4 (100%)

Vulnerability Severity: ├── 🔴 P1: OTP endpoint (explicit message) ├── 🟠 P2: Signup endpoint (explicit message) ├── 🟠 P2: Login endpoint (timing attack) └── 🟠 P2: Recovery endpoint (timing attack)

Overall User Enumeration Risk: HIGH

An attacker can determine if any email address has an account in your application.

───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Mitigation Recommendations ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

1. CONSISTENT RESPONSES Return identical messages for all scenarios: "If an account exists, you will receive an email"
2. CONSISTENT TIMING Add artificial delay to normalize response times: `const MIN_RESPONSE_TIME = 1000; // 1 second const start = Date.now(); //... perform auth operation... const elapsed = Date.now() - start; await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, Math.max(0, MIN_RESPONSE_TIME - elapsed))); return response;`
3. RATE LIMITING Already enabled: 3/hour per IP Consider per-email rate limiting too.
4. CAPTCHA Add CAPTCHA for repeated attempts:
  - After 3 failed logins
  - For password recovery
  - For signup
5. MONITORING Alert on enumeration patterns:
  - Many requests with different emails
  - Sequential email patterns (user1@, user2@,...)

═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

Timing Analysis

The skill measures response times to detect timing-based enumeration:


Existing user: ├── Password hash verification: ~200-300ms ├── Email sending: ~1000-2000ms └── Database lookup: ~5-20ms

Non-existing user: ├── No hash verification: 0ms ├── No email sending: 0ms └── Database lookup: ~5-20ms (not found)

Threshold detection:

  • Difference > 100ms: Possible timing leak
  • Difference > 500ms: Definite timing leak

Context Output

{
  "user_enumeration": {
    "timestamp": "2025-01-31T13:30:00Z",
    "endpoints_tested": 4,
    "vulnerabilities": [
      {
        "endpoint": "/auth/v1/otp",
        "severity": "P1",
        "type": "explicit_message",
        "existing_response": "OTP sent",
        "missing_response": "User not found"
      },
      {
        "endpoint": "/auth/v1/signup",
        "severity": "P2",
        "type": "explicit_message",
        "existing_response": "User already registered",
        "missing_response": "User created"
      },
      {
        "endpoint": "/auth/v1/token",
        "severity": "P2",
        "type": "timing_attack",
        "existing_time_ms": 245,
        "missing_time_ms": 52
      },
      {
        "endpoint": "/auth/v1/recover",
        "severity": "P2",
        "type": "timing_attack",
        "existing_time_ms": 1250,
        "missing_time_ms": 85
      }
    ]
  }
}

Mitigation Code Examples

Consistent Response Time

// Edge Function with normalized timing
const MIN_RESPONSE_TIME = 1500; // 1.5 seconds

Deno.serve(async (req) => {
  const start = Date.now();

  try {
    // Perform actual auth operation
    const result = await handleAuth(req);

    // Normalize response time
    const elapsed = Date.now() - start;
    await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r,
      Math.max(0, MIN_RESPONSE_TIME - elapsed)
    ));

    return new Response(JSON.stringify(result));
  } catch (error) {
    // Same timing for errors
    const elapsed = Date.now() - start;
    await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r,
      Math.max(0, MIN_RESPONSE_TIME - elapsed)
    ));

    // Generic error message
    return new Response(JSON.stringify({
      message: "Check your email if you have an account"
    }));
  }
});

Generic Error Messages

// Don't reveal user existence
async function requestPasswordReset(email: string) {
  // Always return success message
  const response = {
    message: "If an account with that email exists, " +
             "you will receive a password reset link."
  };

  // Perform actual reset in background (don't await)
  supabase.auth.resetPasswordForEmail(email).catch(() => {});

  return response;
}

MANDATORY: Progressive Context File Updates

⚠️ This skill MUST update tracking files PROGRESSIVELY during execution, NOT just at the end.

Critical Rule: Write As You Go

DO NOT batch all writes at the end. Instead:

  1. Before testing each endpoint → Log the action to .sb-pentest-audit.log
  2. After each timing measurement → Immediately update .sb-pentest-context.json
  3. After each enumeration vector found → Log the finding immediately

This ensures that if the skill is interrupted, crashes, or times out, all findings up to that point are preserved.

Required Actions (Progressive)

  1. Update .sb-pentest-context.json with results: {"user_enumeration": {"timestamp": "...", "endpoints_tested": 4, "vulnerabilities": [...]}}
  2. Log to .sb-pentest-audit.log: [TIMESTAMP] [supabase-audit-auth-users] [START] Testing user enumeration [TIMESTAMP] [supabase-audit-auth-users] [FINDING] P1: OTP endpoint enumerable [TIMESTAMP] [supabase-audit-auth-users] [CONTEXT_UPDATED].sb-pentest-context.json updated
  3. If files don't exist, create them before writing.

FAILURE TO UPDATE CONTEXT FILES IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.

MANDATORY: Evidence Collection

📁 Evidence Directory: .sb-pentest-evidence/05-auth-audit/enumeration-tests/

Evidence Files to Create

FileContent
enumeration-tests/login-timing.jsonLogin endpoint timing analysis
enumeration-tests/recovery-timing.jsonRecovery endpoint timing
enumeration-tests/otp-enumeration.jsonOTP endpoint message analysis

Evidence Format

{
  "evidence_id": "AUTH-ENUM-001",
  "timestamp": "2025-01-31T11:00:00Z",
  "category": "auth-audit",
  "type": "user_enumeration",

  "tests": [
    {
      "endpoint": "/auth/v1/token",
      "test_type": "timing_attack",
      "severity": "P2",

      "existing_user_test": {
        "email": "[KNOWN_EXISTING]@example.com",
        "response_time_ms": 245,
        "response": {"error": "Invalid login credentials"}
      },

      "nonexisting_user_test": {
        "email": "definitely-not-exists@example.com",
        "response_time_ms": 52,
        "response": {"error": "Invalid login credentials"}
      },

      "timing_difference_ms": 193,
      "result": "ENUMERABLE",
      "impact": "Can determine if email has account via timing"
    },
    {
      "endpoint": "/auth/v1/otp",
      "test_type": "explicit_message",
      "severity": "P1",

      "existing_user_response": {"message": "OTP sent"},
      "nonexisting_user_response": {"error": "User not found"},

      "result": "ENUMERABLE",
      "impact": "Error message explicitly reveals user existence"
    }
  ],

  "curl_commands": [
    "# Timing test - existing user\ntime curl -X POST '$URL/auth/v1/token?grant_type=password' -H 'apikey: $ANON_KEY' -d '{\"email\": \"existing@example.com\", \"password\": \"wrong\"}'",
    "# Timing test - non-existing user\ntime curl -X POST '$URL/auth/v1/token?grant_type=password' -H 'apikey: $ANON_KEY' -d '{\"email\": \"nonexistent@example.com\", \"password\": \"wrong\"}'"
  ]
}

Related Skills

  • supabase-audit-auth-config — Full auth configuration
  • supabase-audit-auth-signup — Signup flow testing
  • supabase-report — Include in final report

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