Token导航 LogoToken导航

Agent Skill · 研究检索

state-inconsistency-auditor(状态不一致审计员)

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

state-inconsistency-auditor 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为只读;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描已通过,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 61,129。

总安装 356周安装 15GitHub Stars 218下载 125核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:state-inconsistency-auditor(状态不一致审计员)
来源仓库:https://github.com/0xiehnnkta/nemesis-auditor
仓库路径:skills/state-inconsistency-auditor
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/0xiehnnkta/nemesis-auditor --skill state-inconsistency-auditor
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/0xiehnnkta/nemesis-auditor --skill state-inconsistency-auditor

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

state-inconsistency-auditor 审计智能合约中状态变量耦合关系与突变路径。识别可能破坏不变量的读写冲突与映射删除误报。适用于 Solidity 合约安全审查与漏洞预防。结果需结合 NatSpec 注释与调用链上下文人工复核。禁止假设未经验证的耦合关系,必须显示具体代码行号证据。

来源仓库内路径:skills/state-inconsistency-auditor

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/0xiehnnkta/nemesis-auditor --skill state-incon…;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它标注为只读,先用只读任务试一次,确认行为符合预期再扩大使用范围。

常见问题

6 条

state-inconsistency-auditor 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/0xiehnnkta/nemesis-auditor --skill state-inconsistency-a…。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

state-inconsistency-auditor 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

state-inconsistency-auditor 需要什么权限?

权限级别是只读。该 Skill 主要提供规则、说明或参考内容,本身偏只读;真正读写文件、联网或执行命令仍取决于宿主 Agent 的任务。

state-inconsistency-auditor 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

state-inconsistency-auditor 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 356 次,近一周安装 15 次,下载 125 次,GitHub 218 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

state-inconsistency-auditor 安全吗?

第三方扫描结果为通过,但这只覆盖已知的静态检查项,不能替代自己读一遍源码和安装命令。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。
  • 第三方扫描已通过,常见的高风险行为没有命中。
  • 标注为只读权限,试用阶段不容易误改本地文件。

先想清楚的地方

  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。
  • 只想先试试效果、不希望它改动本地文件的人。

不太适合

  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
state-inconsistency-auditor

状态不一致审计员 · 本页

356218只读未明确通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

State Inconsistency Auditor

Finds bugs where an operation mutates one piece of coupled state without updating its dependent counterpart, causing silent data corruption or reverts in subsequent operations.

Language-agnostic by design. Coupled state bugs exist in any system that maintains related storage values — Solidity, Move, Rust, Go, C++, or anything else.

This agent performs structural invariant analysis — systematically mapping every coupled state pair, every mutation path, and every gap where one side updates without the other. It complements first-principles reasoning (Feynman) and pattern-matching tools by finding structural state desync bugs that other methodologies miss.

When to Activate

  • User says "/state-audit" or "state inconsistency audit" or "coupled state audit"
  • User wants to find stale state, broken invariants, or desynchronized storage
  • After any other audit methodology to catch what it missed

When NOT to Use

  • Quick pattern-matching scans where you only need known vulnerability patterns
  • First-principles logic bugs only (use /feynman instead)
  • Simple spec compliance checks
  • Report generation from existing findings

The Abstract Pattern

Every system has COUPLED STATE PAIRS — two or more storage values that must maintain a relationship (an invariant) with each other. When any operation changes one side of the pair without adjusting the other, the invariant breaks. Future operations that read both values produce incorrect results.

Examples of coupled state:

  • balance & checkpoint
  • position size & accumulated tracker
  • collateral & obligation
  • voting power & snapshot
  • shares & any per-share derived value
  • principal & any cumulative index
  • totalSupply & sum of all individual balances
  • debt & interest accumulator
  • liquidity & fee growth trackers
  • stake amount & reward debt
  • token balance & voting delegation
  • position collateral & position health factor cache

The bug class: Operation X correctly updates State A, but fails to proportionally adjust the coupled State B. State B is now stale relative to State A.


Language Adaptation

When you start, detect the language and adapt terminology:

ConceptSolidityMoveRustGoC++
Storagestate variablesglobal storage / resourcesstruct fields / statestruct fields / DBmember variables
Mappingmapping(k => v)Table<K, V> / SmartTableHashMap / BTreeMapmap[K]Vstd::map / unordered_map
Deletedelete mapping[key]table::removemap.remove(&key)delete(map, key)map.erase(key)
Eventemit Event()event::emit()emit! / logEventEmit()signal / callback
Internal callinternal functionfriend functionpub(crate) fnunexported funcprivate method

Core Rules

RULE 0: MAP BEFORE YOU HUNT
Never start checking functions until you have the complete coupled state
dependency map. You cannot find a missing update if you don't know what
updates are required.

RULE 1: EVERY MUTATION PATH MATTERS
A state variable might be modified by 5 different functions. ALL 5 must
update the coupled state. If 4 do and 1 doesn't — that's the bug.

RULE 2: PARTIAL OPERATIONS ARE THE #1 SOURCE
Full removals (delete everything) usually reset all state correctly.
Partial operations (reduce by X) frequently forget to proportionally
reduce the coupled state.

RULE 3: COMPARE PARALLEL PATHS
If transfer() and burn() both reduce a balance, they MUST both update
the same set of coupled state. If one does and the other doesn't — finding.

RULE 4: DEFENSIVE CODE MASKS BUGS
Code like `x > y ? x - y : 0` or `min(computed, available)` silently
hides broken invariants. These are red flags, not safety nets.

RULE 5: EVIDENCE-BASED FINDINGS ONLY
Every finding must include: the coupled pair, the breaking operation,
a concrete trigger sequence, and the downstream consequence.

Audit Process

Phase 1: Map All Coupled State Pairs

For every storage variable, ask: "What other storage values must change when this one changes?"

Build a dependency map:

State A changes → State B MUST also change (and vice versa)
State C changes → State D and State E MUST also change

Look for:

  • Any per-user value paired with any per-user accumulator/tracker
  • Any balance paired with any historical snapshot or checkpoint
  • Any numerator paired with its denominator
  • Any position-describing value paired with any position-derived value
  • Anything stored at time T that is later used with a value from time T+1
  • Any total/aggregate paired with individual components that sum to it
  • Any cached computation paired with the inputs it was derived from
  • Any index/accumulator paired with the last-known snapshot of that index

Output of Phase 1: A Coupled State Dependency Map.

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ COUPLED STATE DEPENDENCY MAP                                 │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                              │
│ PAIR 1: userBalance[user] ↔ checkpoint[user]                 │
│   Invariant: checkpoint must reflect balance at last update  │
│   Mutation points: deposit(), withdraw(), transfer(), burn() │
│                                                              │
│ PAIR 2: totalStaked ↔ rewardPerTokenStored                   │
│   Invariant: rewardPerToken must be updated before           │
│              totalStaked changes                             │
│   Mutation points: stake(), unstake(), emergencyWithdraw()   │
│                                                              │
│ PAIR 3: position.collateral ↔ position.debtShares            │
│   Invariant: health factor derived from both must stay valid │
│   Mutation points: addCollateral(), borrow(), repay(),       │
│                    liquidate(), withdrawCollateral()          │
│                                                              │
│ ...                                                          │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Phase 2: Find Every Operation That Mutates Each State

For EACH state variable identified in Phase 1, list every function and code path that modifies it. Include:

  • Direct writes: state = newValue
  • Increments/decrements: state += delta, state -= delta
  • Deletions: delete state, state = 0, state = default
  • Indirect mutations: calling a function that internally modifies it (e.g., _mint(), _burn(), _transfer())
  • Implicit changes: burning reduces balance via internal _burn, rebasing changes effective balance without explicit write
  • Batch operations: loops or multicalls that modify state multiple times
  • External triggers: callbacks, hooks, or oracle updates that modify state as a side effect

Output of Phase 2: A Mutation Matrix.

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ MUTATION MATRIX                                                   │
├──────────────────┬───────────────────┬───────────────────────────┤
│ State Variable   │ Mutating Function │ Type of Mutation           │
├──────────────────┼───────────────────┼───────────────────────────┤
│ userBalance[u]   │ deposit()         │ increment (+= amount)      │
│ userBalance[u]   │ withdraw()        │ decrement (-= amount)      │
│ userBalance[u]   │ transfer()        │ decrement sender, inc recv │
│ userBalance[u]   │ _burn()           │ decrement (-= amount)      │
│ userBalance[u]   │ liquidate()       │ decrement (-= seized)      │
│ checkpoint[u]    │ deposit()         │ full reset                 │
│ checkpoint[u]    │ withdraw()        │ full reset                 │
│ checkpoint[u]    │ transfer()        │ ??? — CHECK THIS           │
│ checkpoint[u]    │ _burn()           │ ??? — CHECK THIS           │
│ checkpoint[u]    │ liquidate()       │ ??? — CHECK THIS           │
└──────────────────┴───────────────────┴───────────────────────────┘

The ??? entries are your primary audit targets — mutations of State A where you haven't confirmed State B is also updated.


Phase 3: Cross-Check — The Core Audit

For EVERY (operation, state variable) pair from Phase 2:

"This operation modifies State A. Does it ALSO update every coupled state that depends on A?"

Check specifically:

□ Full removal (A → 0): Is every coupled state reset/cleared?
□ Partial removal (A decreases): Is every coupled state proportionally reduced?
□ Increase (A grows): Is every coupled state proportionally increased?
□ Transfer (A moves between entities): Is coupled state moved too?
□ Deletion (mapping entry removed): Is the paired mapping entry also removed?
□ Batch modification: Is coupled state updated per-iteration or only once?

If ANY path updates A without updating its coupled state → FINDING.

For each potential finding, trace the FULL code path:

  1. Read the function that modifies State A
  2. Search for any write to State B within the same function
  3. Search for any internal call that writes to State B
  4. Search for any modifier/hook that writes to State B
  5. If none found → confirmed finding

Phase 4: Check Operation Ordering Within Functions

Many functions perform multiple state changes sequentially. Trace the exact order:

function doSomething() {
    step1: reads State A and State B → computes result
    step2: modifies State B based on result
    step3: modifies State A
    // State B is now stale relative to new State A
}

Ask at each step:

  • "After this step, are ALL coupled pairs still consistent?"
  • "Does step N use a value that step N-1 already invalidated?"
  • "If I read the coupled pair RIGHT HERE, would the invariant hold?"
  • "If an external call happens between step N and step N+1, can the callee observe inconsistent state?"

Common ordering bugs:

  • Claim rewards BEFORE reducing stake → rewards computed on old (higher) stake
  • Update index AFTER modifying supply → index uses stale supply
  • Read cached price AFTER changing position → health check uses wrong price
  • Emit event with old values AFTER state change → off-chain systems desync

Phase 5: Compare Parallel Code Paths

Find operations that achieve similar outcomes through different paths:

  • transfer() vs burn() — both reduce sender balance
  • withdraw() vs liquidate() — both reduce position
  • partial vs full removal — both decrease, different amounts
  • Direct call vs routed-through-wrapper call
  • Normal path vs emergency/admin path
  • Single operation vs batch operation
  • User-initiated vs keeper/bot-initiated

For each group, compare: do ALL paths update the same coupled state?

┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ PARALLEL PATH COMPARISON                                    │
├─────────────────┬──────────────┬──────────────┬────────────┤
│ Coupled State   │ withdraw()   │ liquidate()  │ emergencyW │
├─────────────────┼──────────────┼──────────────┼────────────┤
│ balance         │ ✓ updated    │ ✓ updated    │ ✓ updated  │
│ checkpoint      │ ✓ updated    │ ✗ MISSING    │ ✗ MISSING  │
│ totalSupply     │ ✓ updated    │ ✓ updated    │ ✗ MISSING  │
│ rewardDebt      │ ✓ updated    │ ✗ MISSING    │ ✗ MISSING  │
└─────────────────┴──────────────┴──────────────┴────────────┘

FINDINGS: liquidate() and emergencyWithdraw() don't update checkpoint
          or rewardDebt when reducing balance.

If Path A adjusts the coupled state but Path B doesn't → FINDING.


Phase 6: Trace Multi-Step User Journeys

Simulate sequences where a user interacts multiple times:

1. User enters a position (state initialized)
2. Time passes / external state evolves (index grows, prices change)
3. User does PARTIAL modification (coupled state may break here)
4. More time passes / external state evolves
5. User does another operation reading the coupled state

At step 5, ask:

  • "Is the coupled state still valid given the partial change at step 3?"
  • "Does the computation use stale State B with current State A?"
  • "If State B wasn't updated at step 3, how much error has accumulated by step 5?"

Key sequences to test:

  • Deposit → partial withdraw → claim rewards (rewards on correct amount?)
  • Stake → unstake half → restake → unstake all (reward debt correct?)
  • Open position → add collateral → partial close → check health (cached values fresh?)
  • Delegate votes → transfer tokens → vote (voting power reflects current balance?)
  • Provide liquidity → swap happens → remove liquidity (fee tracking correct?)

Phase 7: Check What Masks the Bug

Look for defensive code that HIDES broken invariants:

MASKING PATTERN 1: Ternary clamp
  x > y ? x - y : 0
  → WHY would x ever be less than y? If the invariant held, it wouldn't.
    This silently returns 0 instead of reverting on the broken state.

MASKING PATTERN 2: Try/catch swallowing
  try target.call() {} catch {}
  → The revert from broken state is caught and ignored.

MASKING PATTERN 3: Early exit on zero
  if (value == 0) return;
  → Skips the computation entirely when the broken state produces zero.

MASKING PATTERN 4: Min cap
  min(computed, available)
  → Caps the result when broken state over-counts. The over-counting
    is the bug; the min() just prevents the revert.

MASKING PATTERN 5: SafeMath without root cause fix
  → Prevents underflow revert but doesn't fix WHY the subtraction
    would underflow. The state is still inconsistent.

MASKING PATTERN 6: Fallback to default
  value = mapping[key]  // returns 0 for non-existent key
  → If the key SHOULD exist but was deleted without cleaning its
    coupled entry, the zero default masks the missing data.

These patterns convert what SHOULD be a loud failure into a silent one. The invariant is still broken — the symptom is just suppressed. Flag every instance and trace whether the defensive code is hiding a real state inconsistency.


Red Flags Checklist

- [ ] A function modifies a base value but has no writes to its coupled state
- [ ] Two similar operations (e.g., transfer vs burn) handle coupled state differently
- [ ] A "claim/collect" step runs before a "reduce/remove" step, and
      nothing reconciles afterward
- [ ] Partial operations exist alongside full operations, but only the full
      operation resets/clears the coupled state
- [ ] A defensive ternary or min() exists in a computation involving two
      coupled values (asks: WHY would this ever underflow?)
- [ ] delete or reset of one mapping but not its paired mapping
- [ ] A loop processes multiple sub-positions but accumulates into a
      shared coupled value without per-iteration adjustment
- [ ] An emergency/admin function bypasses the normal state update path
- [ ] A migration or upgrade function copies State A but not State B
- [ ] A callback or hook modifies State A but the caller doesn't know
      to update State B afterward

Phase 8: Verification Gate (MANDATORY)

Every CRITICAL, HIGH, and MEDIUM finding MUST be verified before final report.

Verification Methods:

Method A: Code Trace Verification

  1. Read the exact function that breaks the invariant
  2. Trace every internal call — confirm no hidden update to the coupled state
  3. Check modifiers, hooks, and base class overrides
  4. Confirm no event-driven or callback-based reconciliation exists
  5. Verdict: TRUE POSITIVE / FALSE POSITIVE

Method B: PoC Test Verification

  1. Write a test using the project's native framework
  2. Execute the trigger sequence from the finding
  3. Assert that the coupled state is inconsistent after the operation
  4. Assert that a subsequent operation produces incorrect results
  5. If test passes: TRUE POSITIVE. If test fails: FALSE POSITIVE

Method C: Hybrid (trace + PoC) For complex multi-contract findings spanning multiple modules.

Common False Positive Patterns:

  1. Hidden reconciliation: The coupled state IS updated, but through an internal call chain you missed (e.g., _beforeTokenTransfer hook).
  2. Lazy evaluation: The coupled state is intentionally stale and reconciled on next read (e.g., _updateReward() modifier runs before every function).
  3. Immutable after init: The coupled state is set once and never needs updating because State A also never changes after init.
  4. Designed asymmetry: The two states are intentionally NOT coupled in the way you assumed (read the docs/comments).

Severity Classification

SeverityCriteria
CRITICALCoupled state desync causes direct value loss (wrong payouts, stolen funds, permanent lock)
HIGHCoupled state desync causes conditional value loss or broken core functionality
MEDIUMCoupled state desync causes incorrect accounting, griefing, or degraded functionality
LOWCoupled state desync causes cosmetic issues, event inaccuracy, or edge-case-only errors

Output Format

Save raw findings to: .audit/findings/state-inconsistency-raw.md Save verified findings to: .audit/findings/state-inconsistency-verified.md

# State Inconsistency Audit — Verified Findings

## Coupled State Dependency Map
[The map from Phase 1]

## Mutation Matrix
[The matrix from Phase 2]

## Parallel Path Comparison
[The comparison table from Phase 5]

## Verification Summary
| ID | Coupled Pair | Breaking Op | Original Severity | Verdict | Final Severity |
|----|-------------|-------------|-------------------|---------|----------------|

## Verified Findings

### Finding SI-001: [Title]
**Severity:** CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW
**Verification:** [Code trace / PoC / Hybrid]

**Coupled Pair:** State A ↔ State B
**Invariant:** [What relationship must hold between them]

**Breaking Operation:** `functionName()` in `Contract.sol:L123`
- Modifies State A: [how]
- Does NOT update State B: [what's missing]

**Trigger Sequence:**
1. [Step-by-step minimal sequence to break the invariant]

**Consequence:**
- [What goes wrong when a later operation reads both A and B]
- [Concrete impact: wrong payout amount, locked funds, etc.]

**Masking Code** (if present):

// This defensive code hides the broken invariant: [the masking pattern]


**Fix:**

// Add the missing state synchronization: [minimal fix]


---

## False Positives Eliminated

[Findings that failed verification, with explanation]

## Summary

- Coupled state pairs mapped: [N]
- Mutation paths analyzed: [N]
- Raw findings (pre-verification): [N]
- After verification: [N] TRUE POSITIVE | [N] FALSE POSITIVE
- Final: [N] CRITICAL | [N] HIGH | [N] MEDIUM | [N] LOW

Post-Audit Actions

ScenarioAction
Need deeper context on a functionRe-read the function and its callers line-by-line
Finding confirmed as true positiveWrite up with severity, trigger sequence, PoC, and fix
Need first-principles reasoning on a pairRun /feynman on the specific functions involved
Need exploit validationWrite a Foundry/Hardhat PoC test to confirm
Uncertain about design intentCheck NatSpec, comments, and project documentation

Anti-Hallucination Protocol


NEVER:

- Assume two states are coupled without verifying they are read together
- Claim a function is missing an update without reading its full call chain
- Report a finding without showing the exact code that breaks the invariant
- Ignore lazy-evaluation patterns (modifiers that reconcile on entry)
- Assume a mapping deletion is a bug without checking if the paired mapping is also deleted or intentionally kept

ALWAYS:

- Read the actual storage declarations to understand types and relationships
- Trace internal calls to check for hidden updates
- Check _before/_after hooks and modifiers for reconciliation logic
- Verify the coupled relationship by finding code that reads BOTH values together
- Show exact file paths and line numbers for all references

Quick-Start Checklist

  • [ ] Phase 1: Map all storage variables and their coupled dependencies
  • [ ] Phase 1: Build the Coupled State Dependency Map
  • [ ] Phase 2: For each state variable, list every mutating function
  • [ ] Phase 2: Build the Mutation Matrix (mark ??? for unconfirmed updates)
  • [ ] Phase 3: Cross-check every mutation — does it update all coupled state?
  • [ ] Phase 4: Check operation ordering within each function
  • [ ] Phase 5: Compare parallel code paths (transfer/burn, withdraw/liquidate, etc.)
  • [ ] Phase 6: Trace multi-step user journeys for stale state accumulation
  • [ ] Phase 7: Flag all defensive/masking code and trace whether it hides broken invariants
  • [ ] Phase 8: Verify ALL C/H/M findings (code trace + PoC)
  • [ ] Phase 8: Eliminate false positives (hidden reconciliation, lazy eval, designed asymmetry)
  • [ ] Phase 8: Save verified findings to .audit/findings/state-inconsistency-verified.md
  • [ ] Phase 8: Present ONLY verified report to the user

平台分布

Codex

32.94%
按下载量换算41

Claude

33.15%
按下载量换算41

Cursor

20.47%
按下载量换算26

Gemini CLI

9.09%
按下载量换算11

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

只读

该 Skill 主要提供规则、说明或参考内容,本身偏只读;真正读写文件、联网或执行命令仍取决于宿主 Agent 的任务。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

继续浏览同类 Skills