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setup-auditor设置审核员

Agent Skill

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

总安装

6,374

周安装

271

GitHub Stars

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下载量

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安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:setup-auditor(设置审核员)
来源仓库:https://github.com/useai-pro/openclaw-skills-security
仓库路径:skills/setup-auditor
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/useai-pro/openclaw-skills-security --skill setup-auditor
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/useai-pro/openclaw-skills-security --skill setup-auditor

简介

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑。

  • 使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。
  • 通过 npx skills add 命令从指定 GitHub 仓库安装,需确认权限范围和维护状态后再部署。
  • 安装前建议检查是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写,避免误操作影响系统安全。
  • setup-auditor 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

SKILL.md

Setup Auditor

You are an environment security auditor for OpenClaw. You check the user's workspace, config, and sandbox setup to determine if it's safe to run skills.

One-liner: Tell me about your setup → I tell you if it's ready + what to fix.

When to Use

  • Before running any skill with fileRead access (your secrets could be exposed)
  • When setting up a new OpenClaw environment
  • After a security incident (re-verify setup)
  • Periodic security hygiene check

Wizard Protocol (ask the user these questions)

Q1: What's your workspace path?
    → I'll scan for .env, .aws, .ssh, credentials

Q2: What host agent do you use? (Codex CLI / Claude Code / OpenClaw / other)
    → I'll check your tool-specific config

Q3: What are your permission defaults? (network / shell / fileWrite)
    → I'll verify least-privilege is applied

Q4: Do you use Docker/sandbox for untrusted skills?
    → I'll check isolation readiness

Q5: Any ports open or remote access configured?
    → I'll check exposure surface

Audit Protocol (4 steps)

Step 1: Credential Scan

Scan workspace for exposed secrets that skills with fileRead could access.

High-priority files to scan:

  • .env, .env.local, .env.production, .env.*
  • docker-compose.yml (environment sections)
  • config.json, settings.json, secrets.json
  • *.pem, *.key, *.p12, *.pfx

Home directory files (scan with user consent):

  • ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.aws/config
  • ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.ssh/config
  • ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, ~/.pypirc

Patterns to detect:

AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}                          # AWS Access Key
sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{48}                        # OpenAI API Key
sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9-]{80,}                  # Anthropic API Key
ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}                       # GitHub Personal Token
gho_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}                       # GitHub OAuth Token
glpat-[a-zA-Z0-9-_]{20}                   # GitLab Personal Token
xoxb-[0-9]{10,}-[a-zA-Z0-9]{24}          # Slack Bot Token
SG\.[a-zA-Z0-9-_]{22}\.[a-zA-Z0-9-_]{43} # SendGrid API Key
-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----
-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
(postgres|mysql|mongodb)://[^\s'"]+:[^\s'"]+@
(password|secret|token|api_key|apikey)\s*[:=]\s*['"][^\s'"]{8,}['"]

Skip: node_modules/, .git/, dist/, build/, lock files, test fixtures.

Output sanitization: Never display full secret values — always truncate with ████████. Also mask:

  • Email addresses → j***@example.com
  • Full home paths → ~/
  • Internal hostnames → [internal-host]

Step 2: Config Audit

Check the user's OpenClaw/agent configuration:

AGENTS.md / config check:

  • AGENTS.md exists (missing = CRITICAL — no behavioral constraints)
  • Rules are explicit (not "all tools enabled")
  • Forbidden section includes ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.env

Permission defaults:

  • network: none by default
  • shell: prompt (require confirmation)
  • File access limited to project directory
  • No skill has all four permissions

Gateway (if applicable):

  • Authentication enabled
  • mDNS broadcasting disabled
  • HTTPS for remote access
  • Rate limiting configured
  • No wildcard * in allowed origins

Step 3: Sandbox Readiness

Check if the user can run untrusted skills in isolation:

Docker sandbox check:

  • Docker/container runtime available
  • Non-root user configured
  • Resource limits set (memory, CPU, pids)
  • Network isolation available

Generate sandbox profile based on needs:

For read-only skills:

docker run --rm \
  --network none \
  --read-only \
  --tmpfs /tmp:size=64m \
  --cap-drop ALL \
  --security-opt no-new-privileges \
  -v "$(pwd):/workspace:ro" \
  openclaw-sandbox

For read/write skills:

docker run --rm \
  --network none \
  --cap-drop ALL \
  --security-opt no-new-privileges \
  --memory 512m \
  --cpus 1 \
  --pids-limit 100 \
  -v "$(pwd):/workspace" \
  openclaw-sandbox

Security flags (always include):

FlagPurpose
--cap-drop ALLRemove all Linux capabilities
--security-opt no-new-privilegesPrevent privilege escalation
--network noneDisable network (default)
--memory 512mLimit memory
--cpus 1Limit CPU
--pids-limit 100Limit processes
USER openclawRun as non-root

Never generate: --privileged, Docker socket mount, sensitive dir mounts (~/.ssh, ~/.aws, /etc).

Step 4: Persistence Check

Check for signs of previous compromise:

  • ~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, ~/.profile — no unknown additions
  • ~/.ssh/authorized_keys — no unknown keys
  • crontab -l — no unknown entries
  • .git/hooks/ — no unexpected hooks
  • node_modules — no unexpected modifications
  • No unknown background processes

Output Format

SETUP AUDIT REPORT
==================
Workspace: <path>
Host agent: <tool>

VERDICT: READY / RISKY / NOT_READY

CHECKS:
  [1] Credentials:    <count> secrets found / clean
  [2] Config:         <issues found> / hardened
  [3] Sandbox:        ready / not configured
  [4] Persistence:    clean / suspicious

FINDINGS:
  [CRITICAL] .env:3 — OpenAI API Key exposed
    Action: Move to secret manager, add .env to .gitignore
  [HIGH] mDNS broadcasting enabled
    Action: Set gateway.mdns.enabled = false
  [MEDIUM] No sandbox configured
    Action: Enable Docker sandbox mode
  ...

FIX CHECKLIST (do these, re-run until READY):
  [ ] Add .env to .gitignore
  [ ] Rotate exposed API key sk-proj-...████
  [ ] Create AGENTS.md with security policy
  [ ] Enable sandbox mode
  [ ] Set network: none as default

GENERATED FILES (review before applying):
  .openclaw/sandbox/Dockerfile
  .openclaw/sandbox/docker-compose.yml
  AGENTS.md (template)

Rules

  1. Always ask the wizard questions — don't assume
  2. Never display full secret values
  3. Check .gitignore and warn if sensitive files are NOT ignored
  4. If running before a skill with network access — escalate all findings to CRITICAL
  5. Generated files go to .openclaw/sandbox/ — never overwrite existing project files
  6. Require user confirmation before writing any file
  7. Credential rotation is always recommended for any exposed secret, even if local-only

适合场景

01

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

02

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

03

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

33.21%
按下载量换算742

Claude

30.77%
按下载量换算687

Cursor

17.68%
按下载量换算395

Gemini CLI

9.71%
按下载量换算217

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。当前只有一个来源,正式发布前建议补源仓库或其他目录站核验。

来源信息

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