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Agent Skill · 研究检索

security-protocol(安全协议)

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

security-protocol 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为接触敏感数据;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描已通过,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 66,724。

总安装 259周安装 11GitHub Stars 24下载 91核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:security-protocol(安全协议)
来源仓库:https://github.com/noobygains/godmode
仓库路径:skills/security-protocol
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/noobygains/godmode --skill security-protocol
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/noobygains/godmode --skill security-protocol

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

用于分析通信协议的安全实现和潜在风险。适合检查加密机制和身份验证流程完整性。可识别常见协议层漏洞和配置错误。security-protocol 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。安装需通过 npx skills add 命令从指定仓库获取。适用于网络服务和 API 安全审查场景。

来源仓库内路径:skills/security-protocol

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/noobygains/godmode --skill security-protocol;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要接触敏感数据,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

security-protocol 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/noobygains/godmode --skill security-protocol。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

security-protocol 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

security-protocol 需要什么权限?

权限级别是接触敏感数据。该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

security-protocol 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

security-protocol 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 259 次,近一周安装 11 次,下载 91 次,GitHub 24 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

security-protocol 安全吗?

第三方扫描结果为通过,但这只覆盖已知的静态检查项,不能替代自己读一遍源码和安装命令。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。
  • 第三方扫描已通过,常见的高风险行为没有命中。

先想清楚的地方

  • 需要接触敏感数据,装到常用环境前要先评估影响面。
  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 环境里有大量密钥、凭证,不方便给第三方 Skill 读取的人。
  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
security-protocol

安全协议 · 本页

25924接触敏感数据未明确通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Security Protocol

Overview

Security is not a phase you bolt on. Every line of code is a security decision.

Core principle: Never trust data from outside your trust boundary. Validate at every boundary crossing.

No exceptions. No workarounds. No shortcuts.

The Prime Directive

NO EXTERNAL DATA REACHES A SYSTEM CALL, QUERY, OR OUTPUT WITHOUT VALIDATION AND SANITIZATION

When data crosses a trust boundary, it must be validated before consumption. This is absolute.

When to Use

Mandatory when writing code that:

  • Accepts user input (forms, URLs, headers, uploaded files)
  • Constructs database queries
  • Renders user-supplied content
  • Manages authentication or authorization
  • Handles secrets or credentials
  • Invokes external APIs
  • Manipulates file paths
  • Executes system commands
  • Sets HTTP response headers
  • Processes file uploads

This is not discretionary. Security awareness is woven into development, not applied afterward.

The Entry Protocol

BEFORE shipping ANY code that handles external data:

1. IDENTIFY: Where does data enter the system? (Trust boundary)
2. VALIDATE: Is input validated at the boundary?
3. SANITIZE: Is output encoded for its target context?
4. AUTHORIZE: Is access control verified before the action?
5. PROTECT: Are secrets, tokens, and keys managed safely?

Omit any step = vulnerability shipped

OWASP Top 10 Condensed Guide

A01: Broken Access Control

Every endpoint must verify: Can THIS user perform THIS action on THIS resource?

# VULNERABLE: Checks authentication but not authorization
GET /api/accounts/456/profile  # User 123 views user 456's private data

# SECURE: Verify resource ownership
if resource.owner_id != authenticated_user.id:
    return 403 Forbidden
VerificationMethod
AuthenticationIs the user who they claim to be?
AuthorizationIs this user permitted to perform this action?
Resource ownershipDoes this user own this specific resource?
Role enforcementServer-side role check; never trust client-provided role claims

Default posture: deny. If no explicit rule grants access, access is denied.

A02: Cryptographic Failures

Required PracticeProhibited Practice
bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 for password hashingMD5, SHA1, SHA256 for passwords
TLS everywhere (HTTPS)HTTP for anything sensitive
Cryptographically secure RNG for tokensMath.random() for security tokens
Encrypt sensitive data at restStore sensitive data in plaintext
Use established cryptographic librariesImplement custom cryptography

A03: Injection

Never concatenate external input into queries, commands, or templates.

Injection VectorPrevention
SQL injectionParameterized queries / prepared statements. Always.
NoSQL injectionType-check inputs; use ODM query builders
Command injectionAvoid shell execution. If unavoidable: allowlist arguments, never interpolate
LDAP injectionEscape special characters; use parameterized queries
Template injectionUse auto-escaping template engines
-- VULNERABLE: String concatenation
SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '" + userInput + "'

-- SECURE: Parameterized query
SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = $1

This is non-negotiable. There is no scenario where string concatenation in queries is acceptable.

A04: Insecure Design

  • Enforce rate limiting on authentication endpoints
  • Use CAPTCHA or proof-of-work for account creation
  • Validate business logic constraints server-side (never client-side only)
  • Design for abuse scenarios, not just intended usage

A05: Security Misconfiguration

CheckpointAction
Default credentialsReplace all defaults before deployment
Debug featuresDisable debug mode, admin consoles, and verbose errors in production
Error verbosityNever expose stack traces, SQL errors, or internal paths to users
Directory listingDisable on all web servers
Security headersSet them (see Security Headers section)
CORS policyRestrict to specific origins; never * for credentialed requests

A06: Vulnerable Components

BEFORE adding any dependency:

1. Is it actively maintained? (Last commit within 6 months)
2. Are known vulnerabilities published? (npm audit, snyk, dependabot)
3. Is it widely adopted? (Download counts and stars are signals, not guarantees)
4. Is it actually necessary? (Do not add a dependency for a single utility function)

Execute npm audit / pip audit / cargo audit regularly. Remediate critical and high findings immediately.

A07: Authentication Failures

RequirementImplementation
Password storagebcrypt/scrypt/argon2 with unique salts
Session tokensCryptographically random, httpOnly, secure, sameSite flags
Brute-force protectionLock account after 5-10 consecutive failures
Multi-factor authenticationSupport TOTP minimum for sensitive applications
Password policyMinimum 8 characters; cross-reference against breach databases
Session lifecycleExpire sessions; invalidate on password change

A08: Data Integrity Failures

  • Verify integrity of software updates and CI/CD pipelines
  • Use signed artifacts and checksums
  • Never auto-deserialize untrusted data (no eval(), no pickle.loads() on user input)

A09: Logging and Monitoring Failures

LogNever Log
Authentication attempts (success and failure)Passwords or authentication tokens
Authorization denialsComplete credit card numbers
Input validation failuresPersonally identifiable information without purpose
System errorsEncryption keys or secrets

A10: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

  • Validate and allowlist URLs before server-side requests
  • Never allow users to control URLs for server-side fetches
  • Block requests to internal networks (169.254.x.x, 10.x.x.x, 127.x.x.x, 192.168.x.x)

Security Headers

Set these on every HTTP response:

Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: DENY
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()

Begin restrictive and relax only when a specific requirement demands it.

Secrets Management

NEVER:
- Embed secrets in source code
- Commit .env files to version control
- Write secrets to log output
- Transmit secrets in URL query parameters
- Store secrets in client-side code

ALWAYS:
- Use environment variables or dedicated secret managers
- Add .env to .gitignore BEFORE the first commit
- Rotate secrets on a defined schedule
- Use distinct secrets per environment
- Audit secret access

Input Validation Checklist

For every input field:

  • Type validated (string, number, email, URL)
  • Length constrained (minimum and maximum)
  • Format validated (regex for structured data)
  • Range checked (numbers, dates)
  • Allowlisted where possible (enum values, known options)
  • Sanitized for output context (HTML, SQL, shell)
  • File uploads: type verified by content inspection (not extension), size limited

Cognitive Traps

RationalizationTruth
"Internal tool, no attacker"Internal tools get compromised. Internal users make mistakes. Insider threats are real.
"We will add security later"Security is not a feature. Retrofitting it costs 10x more than building it in.
"The framework handles it"Frameworks have escape hatches. Know exactly what your framework does and does not protect.
"Input validation is excessive"Every injection attack in history started with unvalidated input.
"It is just a prototype"Prototypes become production systems. Secure from the beginning.
"Too complicated, slows development"Data breaches slow development permanently.
"Nobody would do that"Attackers do exactly that. Assume all input is hostile.

Guardrails -- HALT and Fix

  • String concatenation in SQL queries
  • eval() or exec() on user-provided data
  • Secrets in source code or committed configuration files
  • Missing authorization checks on endpoints
  • User input rendered without encoding
  • Wildcard * CORS policy with credentials
  • HTTP for anything involving authentication or sensitive data
  • Client-side-only validation without server-side counterpart
  • Disabled CSRF protection
  • Default credentials in deployed environments

Every item on this list is a security vulnerability. Remediate before shipping.

Integration

Complementary skills:

  • godmode:system-design -- Authentication strategy and data flow design
  • godmode:quality-enforcement -- Security checks as automated quality gates
  • godmode:completion-gate -- Security verification before shipping
  • godmode:test-first -- Write security-focused test cases

The Bottom Line

Trust boundary crossed -> validate input, sanitize output, verify authorization

No exceptions. No "we will add it later." Security ships with the code or the code does not ship.

平台分布

Codex

36.12%
按下载量换算33

Claude

30.79%
按下载量换算28

Cursor

19.87%
按下载量换算18

Gemini CLI

10.09%
按下载量换算9

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

接触敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

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