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Agent Skill · 研究检索

security-engineering(安全工程)

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

security-engineering 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为接触敏感数据;许可证为 MIT,暂无第三方扫描结果,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 50,189。

总安装 624周安装 26GitHub Stars 公开资料未说明下载 208核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
MIT

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:security-engineering(安全工程)
来源仓库:https://github.com/outfitter-dev/agents
仓库路径:skills/security-engineering
安装命令:
npx skills add outfitter-dev/agents --skill "security-engineering"
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

AgentSkills.tonpx skills
npx skills add outfitter-dev/agents --skill "security-engineering"

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

用于辅助安全架构设计和工程实践。适合分析鉴权流程和认证机制合理性。可协助生成安全开发规范文档。security-engineering 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

安装命令:npx skills add outfitter-dev/agents --skill "security-engineering 输出内容应作为参考,需结合实际业务场景调整。

来源仓库内路径:skills/security-engineering

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add outfitter-dev/agents --skill "security-engineering";命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要接触敏感数据,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

security-engineering 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add outfitter-dev/agents --skill "security-engineering"。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

security-engineering 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

security-engineering 需要什么权限?

权限级别是接触敏感数据。该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

security-engineering 是免费的吗?

来源标注的许可证是 MIT。本站不代收任何费用,也不托管安装包;能否商用、要不要署名,以许可证原文为准。

security-engineering 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 624 次,近一周安装 26 次,下载 208 次。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

security-engineering 安全吗?

没有查到第三方扫描结果,安全性无法从公开资料判断,安装前请自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。
  • 许可证明确为 MIT,商用和分发边界好判断。

先想清楚的地方

  • 需要接触敏感数据,装到常用环境前要先评估影响面。
  • 没有第三方扫描结果,安全性只能靠自己读源码判断。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 环境里有大量密钥、凭证,不方便给第三方 Skill 读取的人。
  • 要求有安全扫描结论才肯安装的团队。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
security-engineering

安全工程 · 本页

624—接触敏感数据MIT未收录

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Security Engineering

Threat-aware code review. Vulnerability detection. Risk-ranked remediation.

<when_to_use>

  • Security audits and code reviews
  • Authentication/authorization review
  • Input validation and sanitization checks
  • Cryptographic implementation review
  • Dependency and supply chain security
  • Threat modeling for new features

NOT for: performance optimization, general code review, feature implementation

</when_to_use>

Track with TodoWrite. Each phase feeds the next.

PhaseTriggeractiveForm
Threat ModelSession start"Building threat model"
Attack SurfaceModel complete"Mapping attack surface"
Vulnerability ScanSurface mapped"Scanning for vulnerabilities"
Risk AssessmentVulns identified"Assessing risk levels"
Remediation PlanRisks assessed"Planning remediation"

Critical findings: add urgent remediation task immediately.

<severity_levels>

CVSS-aligned severity for findings:

IndicatorSeverityCVSSExamples
Critical9.0-10.0RCE, auth bypass, mass data exposure, admin privesc
High7.0-8.9SQLi, stored XSS, auth weakness, sensitive data leak
Medium4.0-6.9CSRF, reflected XSS, info disclosure, weak crypto
Low0.1-3.9Misconfig, missing headers, verbose errors

Format: "Critical RCE via unsanitized shell command"

</severity_levels>

<threat_modeling>

STRIDE Framework

Systematic threat identification by category:

ThreatQuestionCheck
SpoofingCan attacker impersonate?Auth mechanisms, tokens, sessions, API keys
TamperingCan attacker modify data?Input validation, integrity checks, DB access
RepudiationCan actions be denied?Audit logs, signatures, timestamps
Info DisclosureCan attacker access secrets?Encryption, access control, logging
Denial of ServiceCan attacker disrupt?Rate limits, timeouts, input size
ElevationCan attacker gain access?Authz checks, RBAC, least privilege

Attack Trees

Map paths from attacker goal to entry points:

Goal: Steal credentials
- Attack login
  - SQLi in username
  - Brute force (no rate limit)
  - Session fixation
- Intercept traffic
  - HTTPS downgrade
  - MITM
- Exploit reset
  - Predictable token
  - No expiry

For each branch assess: feasibility, impact, detection, current defenses.

Trust Boundaries

Identify where data crosses trust levels:

  • Browser to server
  • Server to database
  • Service to third-party API
  • Internal service to service

Every boundary needs validation.

</threat_modeling>

<attack_surface>

Entry Points

External:

  • HTTP/API endpoints (REST, GraphQL, gRPC)
  • WebSocket connections
  • File uploads
  • OAuth/SAML flows
  • Webhooks

Data Inputs:

  • User data (forms, query params, headers)
  • File content (type, size, payload)
  • API payloads (JSON, XML)
  • Database queries

Auth Boundaries:

  • Public (no auth)
  • Authenticated
  • Admin/privileged
  • Service-to-service

Prioritize Review

  1. Unauthenticated external inputs
  2. Privileged operations
  3. Data persistence layers
  4. Third-party integrations

For each entry point document:

  • Auth required? (none/user/admin)
  • Input validated? (none/basic/strict)
  • Rate limited?
  • Logged?
  • Encrypted?

</attack_surface>

<vulnerability_patterns>

Quick Reference

VulnerabilityVulnerableSecure
SQL InjectionString concat in queryParameterized queries
XSSinnerHTML with user datatextContent or DOMPurify
Command Injectionexec() with user inputexecFile() with array
Path TraversalDirect path concatbasename + prefix check
Weak PasswordMD5/SHA1/plainbcrypt (12+) or argon2
Predictable TokenMath.random/Date.nowcrypto.randomBytes(32)
Broken AuthClient-side role checkServer-side every request
IDORNo ownership checkVerify user owns resource
Hardcoded SecretAPI key in codeEnvironment variable
Info LeakStack trace to userGeneric error, log detail

Critical Checks

Authentication:

  • Passwords: bcrypt/argon2, cost 12+
  • Sessions: crypto.randomBytes(32), httpOnly, secure, sameSite
  • JWT: verify signature, specify algorithm, short expiry
  • Reset: random token, 1hr expiry, hash stored token

Authorization:

  • Server-side on every request
  • Verify ownership before resource access
  • Explicit allowlist for mass assignment
  • No role elevation from client input

Input Validation:

  • Type, length, format on all inputs
  • Parameterized queries (never concat)
  • Escape/sanitize HTML output
  • Validate file uploads (type, size, content)

Cryptography:

  • AES-256-GCM, SHA-256+
  • Never MD5, SHA1, DES, ECB
  • Secrets from env, never hardcoded
  • crypto.randomBytes for all tokens

See vulnerability-patterns.md for code examples.

</vulnerability_patterns>

<owasp_top_10>

2021 OWASP Top 10 categories. Check each during vulnerability scan.

#CategoryKey CWEsTop Mitigations
A01Broken Access Control200, 352, 639Server-side checks, ownership validation
A02Cryptographic Failures259, 327, 331TLS, bcrypt, no hardcoded secrets
A03Injection20, 79, 89Parameterized queries, input validation
A04Insecure Design209, 256, 434Threat modeling, rate limiting
A05Security Misconfiguration16, 611, 614Security headers, disable debug
A06Vulnerable Components1035, 1104npm audit, Dependabot
A07Auth Failures287, 307, 521Strong passwords, MFA, rate limiting
A08Integrity Failures502, 494Verify signatures, schema validation
A09Logging Failures117, 532, 778Audit logs, redact sensitive data
A10SSRF918URL allowlist, block private IPs

See owasp-top-10.md for detailed breakdowns with code examples.

</owasp_top_10>

Loop: Model Threats -> Map Surface -> Scan Vulnerabilities -> Assess Risk -> Plan Remediation

  1. Threat Model

- STRIDE analysis for component - Attack trees for critical paths - Identify trust boundaries - Document threat actors

  1. Attack Surface

- Inventory all inputs - Classify by auth level - Map data flows across boundaries - Prioritize high-risk entry points

  1. Vulnerability Scan

- Check each entry against OWASP Top 10 - Review auth/authz - Validate input handling - Check crypto usage - Scan deps: npm audit, cargo audit

  1. Risk Assessment

- Rate severity (Critical/High/Medium/Low) - Consider exploitability - Assess impact (CIA triad) - Calculate risk score

  1. Remediation Plan

- Critical: immediate action - High: fix before release - Medium: schedule in sprint - Low: backlog or accept

Update todos as you progress. Use review-checklist.md for verification.

Finding Format

## {SEVERITY} {VULN_NAME}

**Category**: {OWASP} | **CWE**: {ID} | **File**: {PATH}:{LINES}

### Issue
{CLEAR_EXPLANATION}

### Impact
{WHAT_ATTACKER_COULD_DO}

### Fix
{SPECIFIC_REMEDIATION_WITH_CODE}

Summary Format

# Security Audit: {SCOPE}

| Severity | Count |
|----------|-------|
| Critical | N |
| High | N |
| Medium | N |
| Low | N |

## Key Findings
1. {TOP_CRITICAL}
2. {SECOND}
3. {THIRD}

## Recommendations
- Immediate: {CRITICAL_FIXES}
- Short-term: {HIGH_MEDIUM}
- Long-term: {HARDENING}

See report-templates.md for full templates.

ALWAYS:

  • Start with threat modeling before code review
  • Map complete attack surface
  • Check against all OWASP Top 10 categories
  • Use severity indicators consistently
  • Provide specific remediation with code
  • Verify fixes don't introduce new vulnerabilities
  • Document security assumptions
  • Update todos when transitioning phases

NEVER:

  • Skip threat modeling for "simple" features
  • Assume input is trustworthy
  • Rely on client-side security
  • Use deprecated crypto (MD5, SHA1, DES)
  • Log sensitive data
  • Disable security checks "temporarily"
  • Mark complete without remediation plan

Deep dives:

Related skills:

  • codebase-analysis - evidence-based investigation foundation
  • debugging - when security issues manifest as bugs

External:

平台分布

Claude Code

25.51%
按下载量换算53

windsurf

20.97%
按下载量换算44

OpenCode

17.55%
按下载量换算37

Cursor

12.32%
按下载量换算26

Codex

8.51%
按下载量换算18

Antigravity

3.42%
按下载量换算7

安全审计

暂无安全审计结果可展示。

权限和风险

接触敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

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