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Agent Skill · 开发

performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection(在中间网络钓鱼检测中执行对手)

performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection 用于处理 GitHub 仓库、Issue、Pull Request 和代码协作信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要围绕仓库状态、代码变更或协作事项进行整理时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection 是开发类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为调用外部服务;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描已通过,按安装量在开发类的 21,746 个 Skill 里排第 20,954。

总安装 198周安装 8GitHub Stars 5,890下载 62核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection(在中间网络钓鱼检测中执行对手)
来源仓库:https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills
仓库路径:skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection

这个 Skill 是做什么的

开发类 Skill 面向写代码、改代码和排查问题,一般会读写仓库文件,部分还会执行构建或测试命令。

用于处理 GitHub 仓库、Issue 和 Pull Request 协作信息。适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中整理代码变更或协作事项。可结合来源仓库 README 核验具体用法,建议确认维护状态与权限范围。安装前需注意是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写操作。

performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection 属于开发类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

来源仓库内路径:skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skil…;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要调用外部服务,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill performi…。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection 需要什么权限?

权限级别是调用外部服务。该 Skill 可能调用第三方服务、云服务或外部模型 API,使用前需要确认账号、额度、数据发送范围和服务条款。

performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 198 次,近一周安装 8 次,下载 62 次,GitHub 5,890 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection 安全吗?

第三方扫描结果为通过,但这只覆盖已知的静态检查项,不能替代自己读一遍源码和安装命令。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。
  • 第三方扫描已通过,常见的高风险行为没有命中。
  • 来源仓库有 5,890 星,维护活跃度相对可查。

先想清楚的地方

  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理开发类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

开发类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
skill-vetter

技能审查员 · OpenClaw

8,779,018986操作浏览器MIT-0通过
ontology

本体论 · OpenClaw

6,636,960576只读MIT-0通过
entra-app-registration

内部应用程序注册 · Codex、Claude

6,631,872764接触敏感数据未明确通过
entra-app-registration

内部应用程序注册 · Codex、Claude

3,757,680201接触敏感数据未明确通过
nano-banana-pro

纳米香蕉专业版 · OpenClaw

3,526,898364接触敏感数据MIT-0有提醒
performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection

在中间网络钓鱼检测中执行对手 · 本页

1985,890调用外部服务未明确通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Performing Adversary-in-the-Middle Phishing Detection

Overview

Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks use reverse-proxy infrastructure to sit between the victim and the legitimate authentication service, intercepting both credentials and session cookies in real time. This allows attackers to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA). The most prevalent PhaaS kits in 2025 include Tycoon 2FA, Sneaky 2FA, EvilProxy, and Evilginx. Over 1 million PhaaS attacks were detected in January-February 2025 alone. These attacks have evolved from QR codes to HTML attachments and SVG files for link distribution.

When to Use

  • When conducting security assessments that involve performing adversary in the middle phishing detection
  • When following incident response procedures for related security events
  • When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
  • When validating security controls through hands-on testing

Prerequisites

  • Azure AD / Entra ID Conditional Access policies
  • SIEM with authentication log ingestion (Azure AD sign-in logs)
  • Web proxy with SSL inspection and URL categorization
  • Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solution
  • FIDO2/phishing-resistant MFA capability

Key Concepts

How AiTM Works

  1. Victim receives phishing email with link to attacker-controlled domain
  2. Attacker domain runs reverse proxy that mirrors legitimate login page
  3. Victim enters credentials on proxied page; credentials captured in transit
  4. Reverse proxy forwards credentials to real authentication service
  5. MFA challenge sent to victim; victim completes MFA on proxied page
  6. Attacker captures session cookie returned by legitimate service
  7. Attacker replays session cookie to access victim's account without MFA

Major AiTM Kits (2025)

KitTypePrimary TargetsEvasion
Tycoon 2FAPhaaSMicrosoft 365, GoogleCAPTCHA, Cloudflare turnstile
EvilProxyPhaaSMicrosoft 365, Google, OktaRandom URLs, IP rotation
EvilginxOpen-sourceAny web applicationCustom phishlets
Sneaky 2FAPhaaSMicrosoft 365Anti-bot checks
NakedPagesPhaaSMultipleMinimal infrastructure

Detection Indicators

  • Authentication from unusual IP not matching user profile
  • Session cookie reuse from different IP/device than authentication
  • Login page served from non-Microsoft/non-Google infrastructure
  • CDN requests to legitimate auth providers from phishing domains
  • Impossible travel between authentication and session usage

Workflow

Step 1: Deploy Phishing-Resistant MFA

  • Implement FIDO2 security keys or Windows Hello for Business for high-value accounts
  • Configure Conditional Access to require phishing-resistant MFA for admins
  • Enable certificate-based authentication where possible
  • Disable SMS and voice MFA for privileged accounts
  • AiTM cannot intercept FIDO2 because authentication is bound to origin domain

Step 2: Configure Conditional Access Policies

  • Require compliant/managed device for sensitive application access
  • Block authentication from anonymous proxies and Tor exit nodes
  • Enforce token binding to limit session cookie replay
  • Configure continuous access evaluation (CAE) for real-time token revocation
  • Implement sign-in risk policies that require re-authentication for risky sign-ins

Step 3: Build AiTM Detection Rules

  • Alert on sign-in followed by session from different IP within 10 minutes
  • Detect authentication where proxy IP does not match user's expected location
  • Monitor for impossible travel patterns in session usage
  • Alert on inbox rules created immediately after authentication (common post-compromise)
  • Detect new MFA method registration from suspicious sign-in

Step 4: Monitor Web Proxy for AiTM Infrastructure

  • Log and analyze DNS queries to newly registered domains
  • Detect connections to known PhaaS infrastructure IPs
  • Alert on authentication page backgrounds loaded from legitimate CDNs through proxy domains
  • Monitor for SSL certificates issued to domains mimicking corporate login pages
  • Block access to known EvilProxy/Evilginx infrastructure via threat intelligence

Step 5: Implement Post-Compromise Detection

  • Alert on mailbox forwarding rules created after suspicious authentication
  • Detect OAuth app consent after AiTM sign-in
  • Monitor for email sending patterns indicating BEC follow-up
  • Alert on SharePoint/OneDrive mass download after session hijack
  • Track lateral movement from compromised account

Tools & Resources

  • Microsoft Entra ID Protection: Risk-based Conditional Access
  • Azure AD Sign-in Logs: Authentication event analysis
  • Okta ThreatInsight: AiTM proxy detection at IdP level
  • Sekoia TDR: AiTM campaign tracking and intelligence
  • Evilginx (defensive): Understanding attack mechanics for detection

Validation

  • Phishing-resistant MFA blocks AiTM session capture in test scenario
  • Conditional Access denies session replay from different device/IP
  • SIEM alerts fire on simulated AiTM sign-in patterns
  • Web proxy blocks connections to known PhaaS infrastructure
  • Post-compromise rules detect inbox rule creation after suspicious auth

平台分布

Codex

36.89%
按下载量换算23

Claude

28.94%
按下载量换算18

Cursor

19.4%
按下载量换算12

Gemini CLI

8.28%
按下载量换算5

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

调用外部服务

该 Skill 可能调用第三方服务、云服务或外部模型 API,使用前需要确认账号、额度、数据发送范围和服务条款。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

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