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Agent Skill · 研究检索

security(安全)

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

security 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为接触敏感数据;许可证为 MIT,第三方扫描已通过,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 53,170。

总安装 539周安装 22GitHub Stars 26下载 172核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
MIT

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:security(安全)
来源仓库:https://github.com/outfitter-dev/agents
仓库路径:skills/security
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/outfitter-dev/agents --skill security
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。不同来源提供的安装方式可能略有差异;本站展示可直接复制的安装命令,安装前请核对来源页面。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/outfitter-dev/agents --skill security

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

security 用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。适用于梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。提供安全相关的检索与建议,但不替代人工最终判断。

安装命令为 npx skills add https://github.com/outfitter-dev/agents --skill security。涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

来源仓库内路径:skills/security

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/outfitter-dev/agents --skill security;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要接触敏感数据,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

security 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/outfitter-dev/agents --skill security。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

security 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

security 需要什么权限?

权限级别是接触敏感数据。该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

security 是免费的吗?

来源标注的许可证是 MIT。本站不代收任何费用,也不托管安装包;能否商用、要不要署名,以许可证原文为准。

security 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 539 次,近一周安装 22 次,下载 172 次,GitHub 26 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

security 安全吗?

第三方扫描结果为通过,但这只覆盖已知的静态检查项,不能替代自己读一遍源码和安装命令。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。
  • 3 个目录同时收录,说明这个 Skill 流传比较广。
  • 许可证明确为 MIT,商用和分发边界好判断。
  • 第三方扫描已通过,常见的高风险行为没有命中。

先想清楚的地方

  • 需要接触敏感数据,装到常用环境前要先评估影响面。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。
  • 需要许可证清楚、并且有第三方扫描结果的团队项目。

不太适合

  • 环境里有大量密钥、凭证,不方便给第三方 Skill 读取的人。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
security

安全 · 本页

53926接触敏感数据MIT通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Security Engineering

Threat-aware code review. Vulnerability detection. Risk-ranked remediation.

<when_to_use>

  • Security audits and code reviews
  • Authentication/authorization review
  • Input validation and sanitization checks
  • Cryptographic implementation review
  • Dependency and supply chain security
  • Threat modeling for new features

NOT for: performance optimization, general code review, feature implementation

</when_to_use>

Load the maintain-tasks skill for stage tracking. Each stage feeds the next.

StageTriggeractiveForm
Threat ModelSession start"Building threat model"
Attack SurfaceModel complete"Mapping attack surface"
Vulnerability ScanSurface mapped"Scanning for vulnerabilities"
Risk AssessmentVulns identified"Assessing risk levels"
Remediation PlanRisks assessed"Planning remediation"

Critical findings: add urgent remediation task immediately.

<severity_levels>

CVSS-aligned severity for findings:

IndicatorSeverityCVSSExamples
Critical9.0-10.0RCE, auth bypass, mass data exposure, admin privesc
High7.0-8.9SQLi, stored XSS, auth weakness, sensitive data leak
Medium4.0-6.9CSRF, reflected XSS, info disclosure, weak crypto
Low0.1-3.9Misconfig, missing headers, verbose errors

Format: "Critical RCE via unsanitized shell command"

</severity_levels>

<threat_modeling>

STRIDE Framework

Systematic threat identification by category:

ThreatQuestionCheck
SpoofingCan attacker impersonate?Auth mechanisms, tokens, sessions, API keys
TamperingCan attacker modify data?Input validation, integrity checks, DB access
RepudiationCan actions be denied?Audit logs, signatures, timestamps
Info DisclosureCan attacker access secrets?Encryption, access control, logging
Denial of ServiceCan attacker disrupt?Rate limits, timeouts, input size
ElevationCan attacker gain access?Authz checks, RBAC, least privilege

Attack Trees

Map paths from attacker goal to entry points:

Goal: Steal credentials
- Attack login
  - SQLi in username
  - Brute force (no rate limit)
  - Session fixation
- Intercept traffic
  - HTTPS downgrade
  - MITM
- Exploit reset
  - Predictable token
  - No expiry

For each branch assess: feasibility, impact, detection, current defenses.

Trust Boundaries

Identify where data crosses trust levels:

  • Browser to server
  • Server to database
  • Service to third-party API
  • Internal service to service

Every boundary needs validation.

</threat_modeling>

<attack_surface>

Entry Points

External:

  • HTTP/API endpoints (REST, GraphQL, gRPC)
  • WebSocket connections
  • File uploads
  • OAuth/SAML flows
  • Webhooks

Data Inputs:

  • User data (forms, query params, headers)
  • File content (type, size, payload)
  • API payloads (JSON, XML)
  • Database queries

Auth Boundaries:

  • Public (no auth)
  • Authenticated
  • Admin/privileged
  • Service-to-service

Prioritize Review

  1. Unauthenticated external inputs
  2. Privileged operations
  3. Data persistence layers
  4. Third-party integrations

For each entry point document:

  • Auth required? (none/user/admin)
  • Input validated? (none/basic/strict)
  • Rate limited?
  • Logged?
  • Encrypted?

</attack_surface>

<vulnerability_patterns>

Quick Reference

VulnerabilityVulnerableSecure
SQL InjectionString concat in queryParameterized queries
XSSinnerHTML with user datatextContent or DOMPurify
Command Injectionexec() with user inputexecFile() with array
Path TraversalDirect path concatbasename + prefix check
Weak PasswordMD5/SHA1/plainbcrypt (12+) or argon2
Predictable TokenMath.random/Date.nowcrypto.randomBytes(32)
Broken AuthClient-side role checkServer-side every request
IDORNo ownership checkVerify user owns resource
Hardcoded SecretAPI key in codeEnvironment variable
Info LeakStack trace to userGeneric error, log detail

Critical Checks

Authentication:

  • Passwords: bcrypt/argon2, cost 12+
  • Sessions: crypto.randomBytes(32), httpOnly, secure, sameSite
  • JWT: verify signature, specify algorithm, short expiry
  • Reset: random token, 1hr expiry, hash stored token

Authorization:

  • Server-side on every request
  • Verify ownership before resource access
  • Explicit allowlist for mass assignment
  • No role elevation from client input

Input Validation:

  • Type, length, format on all inputs
  • Parameterized queries (never concat)
  • Escape/sanitize HTML output
  • Validate file uploads (type, size, content)

Cryptography:

  • AES-256-GCM, SHA-256+
  • Never MD5, SHA1, DES, ECB
  • Secrets from env, never hardcoded
  • crypto.randomBytes for all tokens

See vulnerability-patterns.md for code examples.

</vulnerability_patterns>

<owasp_top_10>

2021 OWASP Top 10 categories. Check each during vulnerability scan.

#CategoryKey CWEsTop Mitigations
A01Broken Access Control200, 352, 639Server-side checks, ownership validation
A02Cryptographic Failures259, 327, 331TLS, bcrypt, no hardcoded secrets
A03Injection20, 79, 89Parameterized queries, input validation
A04Insecure Design209, 256, 434Threat modeling, rate limiting
A05Security Misconfiguration16, 611, 614Security headers, disable debug
A06Vulnerable Components1035, 1104npm audit, Dependabot
A07Auth Failures287, 307, 521Strong passwords, MFA, rate limiting
A08Integrity Failures502, 494Verify signatures, schema validation
A09Logging Failures117, 532, 778Audit logs, redact sensitive data
A10SSRF918URL allowlist, block private IPs

See owasp-top-10.md for detailed breakdowns with code examples.

</owasp_top_10>

Loop: Model Threats -> Map Surface -> Scan Vulnerabilities -> Assess Risk -> Plan Remediation

  1. Threat Model

- STRIDE analysis for component - Attack trees for critical paths - Identify trust boundaries - Document threat actors

  1. Attack Surface

- Inventory all inputs - Classify by auth level - Map data flows across boundaries - Prioritize high-risk entry points

  1. Vulnerability Scan

- Check each entry against OWASP Top 10 - Review auth/authz - Validate input handling - Check crypto usage - Scan deps: npm audit, cargo audit

  1. Risk Assessment

- Rate severity (Critical/High/Medium/Low) - Consider exploitability - Assess impact (CIA triad) - Calculate risk score

  1. Remediation Plan

- Critical: immediate action - High: fix before release - Medium: schedule in sprint - Low: backlog or accept

Update todos as you progress. Use review-checklist.md for verification.

Finding Format

## {SEVERITY} {VULN_NAME}

**Category**: {OWASP} | **CWE**: {ID} | **File**: {PATH}:{LINES}

### Issue
{CLEAR_EXPLANATION}

### Impact
{WHAT_ATTACKER_COULD_DO}

### Fix
{SPECIFIC_REMEDIATION_WITH_CODE}

Summary Format

# Security Audit: {SCOPE}

| Severity | Count |
|----------|-------|
| Critical | N |
| High | N |
| Medium | N |
| Low | N |

## Key Findings
1. {TOP_CRITICAL}
2. {SECOND}
3. {THIRD}

## Recommendations
- Immediate: {CRITICAL_FIXES}
- Short-term: {HIGH_MEDIUM}
- Long-term: {HARDENING}

See report-templates.md for full templates.

ALWAYS:

  • Start with threat modeling before code review
  • Map complete attack surface
  • Check against all OWASP Top 10 categories
  • Use severity indicators consistently
  • Provide specific remediation with code
  • Verify fixes don't introduce new vulnerabilities
  • Document security assumptions
  • Update todos when transitioning stages

NEVER:

  • Skip threat modeling for "simple" features
  • Assume input is trustworthy
  • Rely on client-side security
  • Use deprecated crypto (MD5, SHA1, DES)
  • Log sensitive data
  • Disable security checks "temporarily"
  • Mark complete without remediation plan

Deep dives:

Related skills:

  • codebase-recon - evidence-based investigation foundation
  • debugging - when security issues manifest as bugs

External:

平台分布

github-copilot

29.57%
按下载量换算51

droid

20.4%
按下载量换算35

Antigravity

18.18%
按下载量换算31

kilo

11.62%
按下载量换算20

command-code

7.92%
按下载量换算14

windsurf

3.24%
按下载量换算6

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

接触敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。

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