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Agent Skill · 研究检索

mobile-application-security-testing(移动应用安全测试)

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

mobile-application-security-testing 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为执行命令;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描有未通过项,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 10,251。

总安装 12,893周安装 608GitHub Stars 28下载 8,128核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:mobile-application-security-testing(移动应用安全测试)
来源仓库:https://github.com/zebbern/secops-cli-guides
仓库路径:skills/mobile-application-security-testing
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/zebbern/secops-cli-guides --skill 'Mobile Application Security Testing'
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/zebbern/secops-cli-guides --skill 'Mobile Application Security Testing'

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

用于辅助移动应用安全审计、权限检查和常见漏洞排查。适合梳理敏感配置、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时需结合项目实际环境,不能将工具输出直接作为最终结论。涉及密钥或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限和操作边界。建议配合本地测试和脱敏方式验证操作安全性。

mobile-application-security-testing 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

来源仓库内路径:skills/mobile-application-security-testing

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/zebbern/secops-cli-guides --skill 'Mobile Appl…;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要执行命令,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

mobile-application-security-testing 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/zebbern/secops-cli-guides --skill 'Mobile Application Se…。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

mobile-application-security-testing 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

mobile-application-security-testing 需要什么权限?

权限级别是执行命令。安装流程涉及命令执行,可能通过 npx skills add https://github.com/zebbern/secops-cli-guides --skill 'Mobile Application Security Testing' 联网下载 Skill 或依赖。用户安装前应确认命令来源、仓库内容和执行环境。

mobile-application-security-testing 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

mobile-application-security-testing 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 12,893 次,近一周安装 608 次,下载 8,128 次,GitHub 28 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

mobile-application-security-testing 安全吗?

第三方扫描有未通过项,风险较高。除非你确认过源码,否则不建议直接安装到常用环境。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。

先想清楚的地方

  • 需要执行命令,装到常用环境前要先评估影响面。
  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方扫描存在提醒项或未通过项,需要人工逐条确认。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 不能接受 Skill 在你机器上执行命令的人。
  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
mobile-application-security-testing

移动应用安全测试 · 本页

12,89328执行命令未明确未通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Mobile Application Security Testing

Purpose

Conduct comprehensive security assessments of Android mobile applications through static and dynamic analysis. This skill covers APK reverse engineering, code analysis, runtime manipulation, SSL pinning bypass, root detection bypass, and identification of OWASP Mobile Top 10 vulnerabilities.

Prerequisites

Required Tools

# Android Debug Bridge
sudo apt-get install adb

# Jadx-GUI (Java Decompiler)
wget https://github.com/skylot/jadx/releases/download/v1.4.7/jadx-1.4.7.zip
unzip jadx-1.4.7.zip

# Apktool
sudo apt-get install apktool

# Frida
pip3 install frida-tools

# Objection
pip3 install objection

# MobSF (Docker)
docker pull opensecurity/mobile-security-framework-mobsf

# Drozer
docker pull fsecurelabs/drozer

Required Hardware

  • Android device or emulator (Genymotion recommended)
  • USB debugging cable
  • Computer with 8GB+ RAM for emulation

Required Knowledge

  • Android application architecture
  • Java/Kotlin programming basics
  • HTTP/HTTPS protocols
  • Basic reverse engineering concepts

Required Access

  • Target APK file
  • Written authorization for testing
  • Root access on test device (for some tests)

Outputs and Deliverables

  1. Mobile Security Assessment Report - Comprehensive vulnerability findings
  2. Static Analysis Results - Hardcoded secrets, misconfigurations, code issues
  3. Dynamic Analysis Results - Runtime vulnerabilities, API issues
  4. Proof of Concept Exploits - Demonstrated vulnerabilities with evidence

Core Workflow

Phase 1: Lab Setup

Configure the testing environment:

# Verify ADB connection
adb devices

# Enable USB debugging on device
# Settings > Developer Options > USB Debugging

# Connect over network
adb tcpip 5555
adb connect DEVICE_IP:5555

# Install Frida server on device
wget https://github.com/frida/frida/releases/download/16.0.8/frida-server-16.0.8-android-x86.xz
unxz frida-server-16.0.8-android-x86.xz
mv frida-server-16.0.8-android-x86 frida-server
adb push frida-server /data/local/tmp/
adb shell chmod +x /data/local/tmp/frida-server
adb shell /data/local/tmp/frida-server &

# Verify Frida connection
frida-ps -U

Phase 2: Reconnaissance

Gather information about the target application:

# App store research
- Developer information
- Version history and patch notes
- User reviews (bug reports)
- Required permissions
- Related apps from same developer

# Extract APK from device
adb shell pm list packages | grep target
adb shell pm path com.target.app
adb pull /data/app/com.target.app-1/base.apk target.apk

# Basic APK info
aapt dump badging target.apk

Phase 3: APK Structure Analysis

Understand APK file contents:

# APK is a ZIP archive containing:
# - AndroidManifest.xml (app configuration)
# - classes.dex (compiled code)
# - resources.arsc (compiled resources)
# - res/ (resource files)
# - lib/ (native libraries)
# - META-INF/ (signatures)
# - assets/ (raw assets)

# Extract APK contents
unzip target.apk -d target_extracted/

# View manifest with aapt
aapt dump xmltree target.apk AndroidManifest.xml

Phase 4: Static Analysis with Jadx

Decompile and analyze source code:

# Launch Jadx-GUI
./jadx-gui

# Open APK file and analyze:
# 1. AndroidManifest.xml - permissions, components, settings
# 2. Source code - hardcoded secrets, API keys
# 3. Resources - strings.xml, configuration files

# Search for sensitive data
# - API keys: grep -r "api_key\|apikey\|API_KEY"
# - Passwords: grep -r "password\|passwd\|secret"
# - URLs: grep -r "http://\|https://"
# - Firebase: grep -r "firebaseio.com"

Key areas to analyze:

// AndroidManifest.xml checks
android:debuggable="true"     // Debuggable app - VULNERABLE
android:allowBackup="true"    // Backup allowed - DATA EXPOSURE
android:exported="true"       // Exported components - ACCESS CONTROL

// Hardcoded credentials
String apiKey = "AIzaSyAB1234567890";  // VULNERABLE
String password = "admin123";           // VULNERABLE

// Insecure HTTP
URL url = new URL("http://api.example.com");  // VULNERABLE

// Weak cryptography
Cipher.getInstance("DES");     // WEAK
Cipher.getInstance("AES/ECB"); // WEAK

Phase 5: Static Analysis with MobSF

Automated static analysis:

# Start MobSF
docker run -it --rm -p 8000:8000 opensecurity/mobile-security-framework-mobsf:latest

# Access at http://127.0.0.1:8000
# Upload APK for analysis

# MobSF checks:
# - Security score
# - Permissions analysis
# - Code analysis
# - Manifest analysis
# - Binary analysis
# - Hardcoded secrets
# - Insecure configurations

Phase 6: Reverse Engineering with Apktool

Decompile, modify, and recompile APK:

# Decompile APK
apktool d target.apk -o target_decompiled/

# Analyze smali code
ls target_decompiled/smali/

# Modify smali code (example: disable root detection)
# Find and modify relevant smali files

# Recompile APK
apktool b target_decompiled/ -o modified.apk

# Sign the APK
keytool -genkey -v -keystore my-release-key.keystore -alias alias_name -keyalg RSA -keysize 2048 -validity 10000
jarsigner -verbose -sigalg SHA1withRSA -digestalg SHA1 -keystore my-release-key.keystore modified.apk alias_name

# Install modified APK
adb install modified.apk

Phase 7: Dynamic Analysis Setup

Configure traffic interception:

# Install Burp CA certificate on device
# 1. Export Burp CA certificate
# 2. Push to device: adb push burp-ca.cer /sdcard/
# 3. Install: Settings > Security > Install from storage

# Configure proxy on device
# Settings > Wi-Fi > Modify Network > Proxy > Manual
# Host: Your IP, Port: 8080

# For apps targeting API 24+
# System CA certificates are not trusted
# Use Frida/Objection for SSL bypass

Phase 8: SSL Pinning Bypass

Bypass certificate pinning:

# Using Objection
objection -g com.target.app explore

# Disable SSL pinning
objection> android sslpinning disable

# Using Frida with codeshare script
frida -U -f com.target.app -l ssl_pinning_bypass.js --no-pause

# Universal SSL bypass script
# https://codeshare.frida.re/@pcipolloni/universal-android-ssl-pinning-bypass-with-frida/
frida -U --codeshare pcipolloni/universal-android-ssl-pinning-bypass-with-frida -f com.target.app

Phase 9: Root Detection Bypass

Bypass root/jailbreak detection:

# Using Objection
objection -g com.target.app explore
objection> android root disable

# Using Frida
frida -U -f com.target.app -l root_bypass.js --no-pause

# Common root detection methods:
# - Check for su binary
# - Check for root management apps
# - Check for modified system files
# - SafetyNet attestation

Example Frida script for root bypass:

Java.perform(function() {
    var RootCheck = Java.use("com.target.app.RootCheck");
    RootCheck.isRooted.implementation = function() {
        console.log("Root check bypassed");
        return false;
    };
});

Phase 10: Vulnerability Testing with Drozer

Test Android components:

# Start Drozer agent on device
# Forward port
adb forward tcp:31415 tcp:31415

# Connect Drozer console
drozer console connect

# List attack surface
dz> run app.package.attacksurface com.target.app

# Enumerate activities
dz> run app.activity.info -a com.target.app

# Start exported activity
dz> run app.activity.start --component com.target.app com.target.app.HiddenActivity

# Enumerate content providers
dz> run app.provider.info -a com.target.app

# Query content providers
dz> run app.provider.query content://com.target.app.provider/users

# SQL injection in content provider
dz> run app.provider.query content://com.target.app.provider/users --projection "* FROM users--"

# Enumerate broadcast receivers
dz> run app.broadcast.info -a com.target.app

# Send broadcast
dz> run app.broadcast.send --action com.target.app.CUSTOM_ACTION --extra string message "test"

Quick Reference

OWASP Mobile Top 10 Tests

VulnerabilityTest Method
M1: Improper Platform UsageCheck exported components, permissions
M2: Insecure Data StorageCheck SharedPrefs, SQLite, files, logs
M3: Insecure CommunicationCheck for HTTP, weak TLS, missing pinning
M4: Insecure AuthenticationTest auth bypass, session handling
M5: Insufficient CryptographyAnalyze crypto implementations
M6: Insecure AuthorizationTest privilege escalation, IDOR
M7: Client Code QualityStatic analysis for code issues
M8: Code TamperingTest integrity checks, repackaging
M9: Reverse EngineeringAssess obfuscation, anti-tampering
M10: Extraneous FunctionalityFind debug code, hidden features

Data Storage Locations

LocationPathRisk
SharedPreferences/data/data/<pkg>/shared_prefs/Plaintext storage
SQLite Databases/data/data/<pkg>/databases/Unencrypted DB
Internal Storage/data/data/<pkg>/files/Accessible with root
External Storage/sdcard/World-readable
Logsadb logcatSensitive data in logs

Essential Frida Commands

# List running apps
frida-ps -Ua

# Attach to running app
frida -U com.target.app

# Spawn and attach
frida -U -f com.target.app --no-pause

# Load script
frida -U -f com.target.app -l script.js

# Use codeshare script
frida -U --codeshare author/script-name -f com.target.app

Essential Objection Commands

# Start objection
objection -g com.target.app explore

# Common commands
objection> android sslpinning disable
objection> android root disable
objection> android hooking list classes
objection> android hooking list class_methods <class>
objection> android hooking watch class <class>
objection> android intent launch_activity <activity>
objection> sqlite connect <database>
objection> env

ADB Commands

CommandPurpose
adb devicesList connected devices
adb shellOpen device shell
adb install app.apkInstall APK
adb pull /path/fileDownload file
adb push file /path/Upload file
adb logcatView device logs
adb shell pm list packagesList installed packages
adb shell dumpsys activityDump activity info

Constraints and Limitations

Legal Requirements

  • Only test applications you own or have authorization to test
  • Do not distribute modified APKs
  • Respect app store terms of service
  • Document all testing activities

Technical Limitations

  • Some obfuscation may prevent static analysis
  • Anti-tampering may detect modifications
  • SafetyNet can detect rooted/modified devices
  • iOS requires different tooling (not covered here)

Environmental Factors

  • Emulators may behave differently than real devices
  • Some apps detect emulator environments
  • API behavior may differ in production vs staging

Examples

Example 1: Insecure Data Storage

Scenario: Check for sensitive data in local storage

# Access app data directory
adb shell
su
cd /data/data/com.target.app/

# Check SharedPreferences
cat shared_prefs/*.xml
# Look for: passwords, tokens, PII

# Check SQLite databases
sqlite3 databases/app.db
.tables
SELECT * FROM users;
# Look for: unencrypted credentials

# Check internal files
ls -la files/
cat files/config.json
# Look for: API keys, secrets

Example 2: Exported Activity Exploitation

Scenario: Access hidden admin activity

# Using Drozer
dz> run app.package.attacksurface com.target.app
# Attack Surface:
#   3 activities exported
#   1 content providers exported

dz> run app.activity.info -a com.target.app
# com.target.app.AdminActivity (exported)

dz> run app.activity.start --component com.target.app com.target.app.AdminActivity
# Admin panel opened without authentication!

Example 3: API Key Extraction

Scenario: Find hardcoded API keys

# Decompile with jadx
jadx -d output/ target.apk

# Search for API keys
grep -rn "api_key\|API_KEY\|apiKey" output/
# Found: String API_KEY = "sk_live_1234567890abcdef"

grep -rn "firebase" output/
# Found: google-services.json with Firebase config

# Check strings.xml
cat output/resources/res/values/strings.xml | grep -i key

Troubleshooting

Frida Connection Failed

Problem: Cannot connect Frida to device

Solutions:

  1. Verify Frida server is running: adb shell ps | grep frida
  2. Check architecture match (ARM vs x86)
  3. Verify USB debugging is enabled
  4. Try: adb kill-server && adb start-server
  5. Use correct Frida version matching server

SSL Pinning Bypass Fails

Problem: SSL bypass not working

Solutions:

  1. Try multiple bypass scripts
  2. App may use custom pinning implementation
  3. Check for certificate transparency
  4. Analyze pinning code and create custom bypass
  5. Use Frida to hook specific pinning functions

App Crashes on Modified APK

Problem: Recompiled APK crashes

Solutions:

  1. Check for integrity verification
  2. Verify signing is correct
  3. Look for anti-tampering mechanisms
  4. Use zipalign: zipalign -v 4 modified.apk aligned.apk
  5. Try different signing method

Root Detection Bypass Fails

Problem: App still detects root

Solutions:

  1. Use Magisk Hide
  2. Combine multiple bypass techniques
  3. Analyze detection method and create custom bypass
  4. Check for SafetyNet attestation
  5. Use virtual environment like VMOS

平台分布

Codex

33.33%
按下载量换算2,709

Claude

32.2%
按下载量换算2,617

Cursor

16.73%
按下载量换算1,360

Gemini CLI

9.6%
按下载量换算780

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

未通过

权限和风险

执行命令

安装流程涉及命令执行,可能通过 npx skills add https://github.com/zebbern/secops-cli-guides --skill 'Mobile Application Security Testing' 联网下载 Skill 或依赖。用户安装前应确认命令来源、仓库内容和执行环境。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在提醒或未通过项,安装前请自行复核。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

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