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MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Skill

Post-analysis enrichment tool that maps existing security findings to the MITRE ATT&CK framework. This skill does NOT discover new vulnerabilities. It takes findings produced by other skills (OWASP, STRIDE, SANS/CWE Top 25) and enriches them with ATT&CK tactics, techniques, attack chain analysis, and threat actor TTP cross-references.

This skill operates on findings, not on source code directly.

Supported Flags

Read ../../shared/schemas/flags.md for the full flag specification. This skill supports the following flags.

Framework Reference

Read ../../shared/frameworks/mitre-attck.md for the full MITRE ATT&CK specification including tactic definitions, technique descriptions, code-level patterns, cross-framework mapping tables, and kill chain construction guidance.

Workflow

Step 1: Acquire Findings

Collect existing findings from one or more sources, checked in priority order:

1. Current conversation context: If findings are present from a prior analysis step (e.g., /appsec:owasp or /appsec:stride), use those.
2. Findings file: Check .appsec/findings.json for persisted findings.
3. User-specified file: If the user provides a path, read and parse it.

If no findings are available, inform the user and suggest running /appsec:owasp, /appsec:stride, or /appsec:sans25 first.

Step 2: Validate and Normalize Findings

Verify each finding conforms to shared/schemas/findings.md. Ensure required fields are present (id, title, severity, location.file, description). Discard malformed entries with a warning.

Normalize existing cross-references for mapping priority:

• references.cwe — primary key for ATT&CK mapping.
• references.owasp — secondary, via OWASP-to-ATT&CK table.
• references.stride — tertiary, via STRIDE-to-ATT&CK table.

Step 3: Map Findings to ATT&CK Techniques

For each finding, determine applicable ATT&CK techniques using the cross-framework mapping tables in mitre-attck.md:

1. CWE-based: "ATT&CK Techniques to CWE" table (e.g., CWE-89 maps to T1190, T1059).
2. OWASP-based: "ATT&CK Techniques to OWASP Top 10" table (when CWE unavailable).
3. STRIDE-based: "ATT&CK Techniques to STRIDE" table (tertiary source).
4. Pattern-based: Analyze description and title keywords against technique descriptions.

For each mapped technique, record technique_id, technique_name, tactic_id, and tactic_name. Update references.mitre_attck with the primary technique ID.

Step 4: Build Tactic Coverage Matrix

Each technique belongs to one or more tactics. Produce a matrix showing which tactics each finding touches:

Step 5: Build Attack Chains

Group findings that chain into multi-step attack scenarios from reconnaissance through impact. For each chain:

1. Entry point: A finding enabling Initial Access (TA0001) or Reconnaissance (TA0043).
2. Lateral steps: Trace technique-to-technique transitions through the kill chain.
3. Terminal impact: Map to Impact tactics (TA0040): data destruction (T1485), manipulation (T1565), ransomware (T1486), or DoS (T1498).
4. Chain severity: Maximum terminal impact severity, elevated one level if 3+ findings compound.

CHAIN-001: SQL Injection to Data Exfiltration
  Severity: critical
  Steps:
    1. [INJ-001] SQL injection in /api/users (T1190 -> Initial Access)
    2. [INJ-001] Database dump via UNION SELECT (T1005 -> Collection)
    3. [CRYPT-002] Credentials stored in plaintext (T1552 -> Credential Access)
    4. [AUTH-003] No MFA on admin portal (T1078 -> Privilege Escalation)
  Impact: Full database compromise, credential theft, admin takeover

Step 6: Kill Chain Visualization

Produce a text-based kill chain diagram mapping findings onto Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain stages aligned with ATT&CK tactics:

Reconnaissance   Initial Access    Execution        Collection       Exfiltration
     |                |                |                |                |
     v                v                v                v                v
[T1595 Scan] -> [T1190 SQLi] --> [T1059 Cmd] -> [T1005 Dump] -> [T1041 Exfil]
                 INJ-001           INJ-001        INJ-001
                                                     |
                                                     v
                                   [T1552 Creds] -> [T1078 Acct] -> [T1548 Priv]
                                    CRYPT-002        AUTH-003        AUTH-003

For --format json, produce a structured chain object with nodes and edges.

Step 7: Cross-Reference Threat Actor TTPs

Available at --depth deep and --depth expert. For each technique, note which threat actor groups commonly use it:

This is NOT a threat intelligence assessment. It shows that identified techniques are actively used in real-world attacks.

Step 8: Produce Output

{
  "tool": "mitre",
  "input_findings": 12,
  "mapped_findings": 10,
  "unmapped_findings": 2,
  "techniques_identified": 8,
  "tactics_covered": 6,
  "attack_chains": 2,
  "tactic_coverage": {
    "reconnaissance": ["T1595"],
    "initial_access": ["T1190", "T1078"],
    "execution": ["T1059"],
    "credential_access": ["T1552", "T1110"],
    "collection": ["T1005"],
    "exfiltration": ["T1041"],
    "impact": ["T1485"]
  },
  "chains": [ ... ],
  "enriched_findings": [ ... ]
}

Step 9: Present Results

Output the report in the requested --format. Include:

• Mapping summary: findings mapped, techniques identified, tactics covered.
• Tactic coverage matrix: ATT&CK tactics represented and gaps.
• Technique breakdown: findings per technique with parent tactic.
• Attack chains: step-by-step narrative with kill chain visualization.
• Coverage gaps: tactics with no mapped findings flagged as areas needing further analysis.

Expert Mode

If --depth expert is set, additionally:

1. Read ../../shared/frameworks/dread.md for DREAD scoring criteria. Assign a DREAD score to each attack chain.
2. Threat actor profiling: For each chain, identify the most likely threat actor class (opportunistic, insider, APT, nation-state) based on complexity and resources required.
3. Detection gap analysis: For each technique in a chain, assess whether the codebase has logging or alerting to detect the attack at that stage. Cross-reference with OWASP A09 findings if available. Flag chains where multiple stages lack detection as highest priority.
4. Mitigation roadmap: For each chain, produce a prioritized list of mitigations that break the chain at the earliest stage. Prefer mitigations that break multiple chains simultaneously.
5. Append expert findings with prefix ATK and metadata.tool set to "mitre-attck".