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Agent Skill · 研究检索

security-audit(安全审计)

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

security-audit 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为需要联网;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描有未通过项,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 39,337。

总安装 1,430周安装 59GitHub Stars 6下载 467核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:security-audit(安全审计)
来源仓库:https://github.com/mgd34msu/goodvibes-plugin
仓库路径:skills/security-audit
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/mgd34msu/goodvibes-plugin --skill security-audit
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/mgd34msu/goodvibes-plugin --skill security-audit

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查和常见漏洞排查。适合梳理敏感配置、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。不能将工具输出直接当作最终结论,需人工复核关键操作。涉及密钥、令牌或生产系统时应先确认最小权限和操作边界。security-audit 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

来源仓库内路径:skills/security-audit

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/mgd34msu/goodvibes-plugin --skill security-aud…;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要需要联网,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

security-audit 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/mgd34msu/goodvibes-plugin --skill security-audit。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

security-audit 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

security-audit 需要什么权限?

权限级别是需要联网。该 Skill 可能需要联网访问来源站点、仓库或外部 API;具体网络访问范围需要结合源码和 README 复核。

security-audit 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

security-audit 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 1,430 次,近一周安装 59 次,下载 467 次,GitHub 6 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

security-audit 安全吗?

第三方扫描有未通过项,风险较高。除非你确认过源码,否则不建议直接安装到常用环境。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。

先想清楚的地方

  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方扫描存在提醒项或未通过项,需要人工逐条确认。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
security-audit

安全审计 · 本页

1,4306需要联网未明确未通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Resources

scripts/
  validate-security-audit.sh
references/
  security-patterns.md

Security Audit

This skill guides you through performing comprehensive security audits on codebases to identify vulnerabilities, insecure patterns, and configuration issues. Use this when conducting security reviews, preparing for production deployments, or responding to security incidents.

When to Use This Skill

  • Conducting pre-deployment security reviews
  • Responding to security incidents or vulnerability reports
  • Performing periodic security audits on existing codebases
  • Validating security controls after major feature additions
  • Preparing for security compliance audits (SOC 2, ISO 27001)
  • Onboarding new team members to security standards

Audit Methodology

A systematic security audit follows these phases:

Phase 1: Reconnaissance

Objective: Understand the application architecture, tech stack, and attack surface.

Use precision_grep to map the codebase:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: auth_patterns
      pattern: "(session|token|auth|login|password|jwt)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
    - id: api_endpoints
      pattern: "(router\\.(get|post|put|delete)|export.*GET|export.*POST)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
    - id: database_queries
      pattern: "(prisma\\.|db\\.|query\\(|execute\\()"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
    - id: env_usage
      pattern: "process\\.env\\."
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: minimal

Identify critical components:

  • Authentication flows (login, registration, password reset)
  • Authorization middleware and guards
  • API endpoints (public vs authenticated)
  • Database access patterns
  • File upload/download handlers
  • Payment processing logic
  • Admin panels or privileged operations

Phase 2: Authentication Audit

Objective: Verify secure authentication implementation.

Check for Weak Session Management

Search for session configuration issues:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: session_config
      pattern: "(session|cookie).*secure.*false|httpOnly.*false|sameSite.*(none|lax)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
    - id: jwt_secrets
      pattern: "jwt\\.sign.*secret.*[\"'][^\"']{1,20}[\"']|new.*JwtStrategy"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: standard

Common vulnerabilities:

  • Session cookies without httpOnly flag (exposes to XSS)
  • Session cookies without secure flag (allows HTTP transmission)
  • Weak JWT secrets (under 32 bytes entropy)
  • Sessions without expiration (immortal sessions)
  • No session invalidation on logout

Secure session example:

import { cookies } from 'next/headers';

export async function createSession(userId: string) {
  const sessionToken = await generateSecureToken();
  const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000); // 7 days

  await db.session.create({
    data: {
      token: sessionToken,
      userId,
      expiresAt,
    },
  });

  cookies().set('session', sessionToken, {
    httpOnly: true,
    secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
    sameSite: 'strict',
    expires: expiresAt,
    path: '/',
  });
}

export async function invalidateSession(sessionToken: string) {
  await db.session.delete({ where: { token: sessionToken } });
  cookies().delete('session');
}
Check for Password Security Issues

Search for weak password handling:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: password_storage
      pattern: "password.*=.*(req\\.body|params|query)|password.*toString|password.*text"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
    - id: password_hashing
      pattern: "(bcrypt|argon2|scrypt|pbkdf2)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: verbose

Common vulnerabilities:

  • Passwords stored in plain text
  • Weak hashing algorithms (MD5, SHA1, SHA256 without salt)
  • No password complexity requirements
  • Password hints or recovery questions
  • Passwords logged or exposed in error messages

Secure password hashing:

import { hash, verify } from '@node-rs/argon2';

export async function hashPassword(password: string): Promise<string> {
  return await hash(password, {
    memoryCost: 19456, // 19 MB
    timeCost: 2,
    outputLen: 32,
    parallelism: 1,
  });
}

export async function verifyPassword(
  hash: string,
  password: string
): Promise<boolean> {
  try {
    return await verify(hash, password);
  } catch {
    return false;
  }
}
Check for MFA Implementation

Search for MFA patterns:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: mfa_usage
      pattern: "(totp|authenticator|2fa|mfa|otp)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: minimal

MFA best practices:

  • TOTP (Time-based One-Time Password) using authenticator apps
  • Backup codes for account recovery
  • SMS OTP as fallback (not primary)
  • WebAuthn/FIDO2 for hardware keys
  • Rate limiting on OTP verification

Phase 3: Authorization Audit

Objective: Ensure proper access controls and permission checks.

Check for Missing Authorization Checks

Identify API endpoints:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: api_routes
      pattern: "export async function (GET|POST|PUT|DELETE|PATCH)"
      glob: "**/api/**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
    - id: auth_middleware
      pattern: "(requireAuth|withAuth|authorize|checkPermission)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: locations

Manual review checklist:

  • Do all authenticated endpoints verify user identity?
  • Do endpoints check resource ownership (user can only access their own data)?
  • Are admin routes protected by role checks?
  • Is authorization checked server-side (not just client-side)?

Common vulnerabilities:

  • Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR): /api/users/123 returns any user
  • Privilege escalation: Regular user can access admin functions
  • Missing authorization: Endpoints rely on client-side checks only

Secure authorization pattern:

import { auth } from '@/lib/auth';
import { db } from '@/lib/db';
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server';

export async function GET(
  req: Request,
  { params }: { params: { id: string } }
) {
  const session = await auth();

  if (!session) {
    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 });
  }

  const post = await db.post.findUnique({
    where: { id: params.id },
    select: { id: true, title: true, content: true, authorId: true },
  });

  if (!post) {
    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Not found' }, { status: 404 });
  }

  // Check ownership
  if (post.authorId !== session.user.id) {
    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Forbidden' }, { status: 403 });
  }

  return NextResponse.json(post);
}
Check for Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)

Search for role definitions:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: role_checks
      pattern: "(role.*===|role.*includes|hasRole|checkRole|permissions)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: matches

RBAC implementation:

type Role = 'user' | 'admin' | 'moderator';

type Permission =
  | 'posts:read'
  | 'posts:write'
  | 'posts:delete'
  | 'users:manage'
  | 'settings:admin';

const rolePermissions: Record<Role, Permission[]> = {
  user: ['posts:read', 'posts:write'],
  moderator: ['posts:read', 'posts:write', 'posts:delete'],
  admin: ['posts:read', 'posts:write', 'posts:delete', 'users:manage', 'settings:admin'],
};

export function hasPermission(role: Role, permission: Permission): boolean {
  return rolePermissions[role].includes(permission);
}

export function requirePermission(permission: Permission) {
  return async (req: Request) => {
    const session = await auth();

    if (!session || !hasPermission(session.user.role, permission)) {
      throw new Error('Insufficient permissions');
    }
  };
}

Phase 4: Input Validation Audit

Objective: Prevent injection attacks and malicious input.

Check for SQL Injection

Search for unsafe database queries:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: raw_sql
      pattern: "(\\$executeRaw|\\$queryRaw|db\\.query|connection\\.query).*\\$\\{|.*`.*\\$\\{"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
    - id: string_concatenation
      pattern: "(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE).*\\+.*req\\.(body|query|params)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: verbose

Common vulnerabilities:

  • String concatenation in SQL queries
  • Unsanitized user input in raw SQL
  • Dynamic table/column names from user input

Secure database queries:

// UNSAFE - SQL injection vulnerable
export async function getUserByEmail(email: string) {
  const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '${email}'`;
  return await db.$queryRawUnsafe(query);
}

// SAFE - Parameterized query
export async function getUserByEmail(email: string) {
  return await db.user.findUnique({
    where: { email },
  });
}

// SAFE - Raw query with parameters
export async function searchUsers(query: string) {
  return await db.$queryRaw`
    SELECT id, name, email
    FROM users
    WHERE name ILIKE ${'%' + query + '%'}
    LIMIT 20
  `;
}
Check for XSS (Cross-Site Scripting)

Search for unsafe rendering:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: dangerous_html
      pattern: "(dangerouslySetInnerHTML|innerHTML|outerHTML)"
      glob: "**/*.{tsx,jsx}"
    - id: unescaped_output
      pattern: "(v-html|\\[innerHTML\\])"
      glob: "**/*.{vue,html}"
  output:
    format: locations

Common vulnerabilities:

  • Rendering unsanitized user input with dangerouslySetInnerHTML
  • Using innerHTML to insert user-provided content
  • Disabling auto-escaping in template engines

Secure rendering:

import DOMPurify from 'isomorphic-dompurify';

// UNSAFE - XSS vulnerable
export function UnsafeComment({ content }: { content: string }) {
  return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: content }} />;
}

// SAFE - Auto-escaped by React
export function SafeComment({ content }: { content: string }) {
  return <div>{content}</div>;
}

// SAFE - Sanitized HTML if needed
export function SafeRichComment({ html }: { html: string }) {
  const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, {
    ALLOWED_TAGS: ['p', 'br', 'strong', 'em', 'a'],
    ALLOWED_ATTR: ['href'],
  });
  return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: sanitized }} />;
}
Check for Command Injection

Search for shell command execution:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: shell_exec
      pattern: "(exec|spawn|execSync|spawnSync|execFile).*req\\.(body|query|params)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: verbose

Common vulnerabilities:

  • User input passed directly to shell commands
  • Unsanitized file paths in file operations

Secure command execution:

import { spawn } from 'child_process';
import { z } from 'zod';

const allowedCommands = ['convert', 'resize', 'compress'] as const;
const commandSchema = z.enum(allowedCommands);

// UNSAFE - Command injection vulnerable
export async function processImage(filename: string) {
  exec(`convert ${filename} output.png`);
}

// SAFE - Validated input and array arguments
export async function processImage(command: string, filename: string) {
  const validCommand = commandSchema.parse(command);
  const sanitizedFilename = filename.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9._-]/g, '');

  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    const child = spawn('imagemagick', [validCommand, sanitizedFilename, 'output.png']);
    child.on('exit', (code) => {
      if (code === 0) resolve(undefined);
      else reject(new Error('Processing failed'));
    });
  });
}
Check for Path Traversal

Search for file operations:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: file_operations
      pattern: "(readFile|writeFile|unlink|stat|createReadStream).*req\\.(body|query|params)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: locations

Common vulnerabilities:

  • User-controlled file paths without validation
  • Missing path normalization (allowing ../ sequences)

Secure file handling:

import path from 'path';
import fs from 'fs/promises';

const UPLOADS_DIR = path.join(process.cwd(), 'uploads');

// UNSAFE - Path traversal vulnerable
export async function getFile(filename: string) {
  return await fs.readFile(`./uploads/${filename}`);
}

// SAFE - Path validation with defense against encoded traversals
export async function getFile(filename: string) {
  // Decode URL-encoded sequences (e.g., %2e%2e%2f -> ../)
  const decoded = decodeURIComponent(filename);
  const safePath = path.normalize(decoded).replace(/^(\.\.\/)+/, '');
  const fullPath = path.resolve(path.join(UPLOADS_DIR, safePath));

  // Ensure resolved path is within UPLOADS_DIR (prevents prefix collision)
  if (!fullPath.startsWith(UPLOADS_DIR + path.sep) && fullPath !== UPLOADS_DIR) {
    throw new Error('Invalid file path');
  }

  return await fs.readFile(fullPath);
}

Phase 5: Data Protection Audit

Objective: Ensure sensitive data is encrypted and properly handled.

Check for Encryption at Rest

Search for sensitive data storage:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: sensitive_fields
      pattern: "(ssn|credit.*card|bank.*account|passport|drivers.*license)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx,prisma}"
    - id: encryption_usage
      pattern: "(encrypt|decrypt|cipher|crypto)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: minimal

Encryption best practices:

  • Use AES-256-GCM for symmetric encryption
  • Store encryption keys in secure key management (AWS KMS, HashiCorp Vault)
  • Never commit encryption keys to version control
  • Rotate encryption keys periodically

Secure encryption implementation:

import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes } from 'crypto';

const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm';
const ENCRYPTION_KEY = process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY;
if (!ENCRYPTION_KEY) throw new Error('ENCRYPTION_KEY environment variable is required');
const KEY = Buffer.from(ENCRYPTION_KEY, 'hex'); // 32 bytes

export function encrypt(plaintext: string): string {
  const iv = randomBytes(16);
  const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, KEY, iv);

  let encrypted = cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8', 'hex');
  encrypted += cipher.final('hex');

  const authTag = cipher.getAuthTag();

  // Return: iv:authTag:ciphertext
  return `${iv.toString('hex')}:${authTag.toString('hex')}:${encrypted}`;
}

export function decrypt(ciphertext: string): string {
  const [ivHex, authTagHex, encrypted] = ciphertext.split(':');

  const iv = Buffer.from(ivHex, 'hex');
  const authTag = Buffer.from(authTagHex, 'hex');

  const decipher = createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, KEY, iv);
  decipher.setAuthTag(authTag);

  let decrypted = decipher.update(encrypted, 'hex', 'utf8');
  decrypted += decipher.final('utf8');

  return decrypted;
}
Check for PII Handling

Search for personally identifiable information:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: pii_fields
      pattern: "(email|phone|address|name|dob|birth.*date)"
      glob: "**/*.prisma"
    - id: logging_pii
      pattern: "(console\\.log|logger\\.(info|debug|warn)).*\\.(email|phone|ssn)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: locations

PII protection checklist:

  • Minimize PII collection (only collect what's necessary)
  • Redact PII in logs and error messages
  • Implement data retention policies (auto-delete old data)
  • Provide user data export (GDPR/CCPA compliance)
  • Provide user data deletion (right to be forgotten)
Check for Secrets Management

Search for hardcoded secrets:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: hardcoded_secrets
      pattern: "(api.*key.*=.*[\"'][a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}|secret.*=.*[\"'][a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}|password.*=.*[\"'][^\"']{8,})"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
    - id: committed_env
      pattern: ".*"
      glob: ".env"
  output:
    format: verbose

Common vulnerabilities:

  • API keys hardcoded in source code
  • .env files committed to version control
  • Secrets exposed in client-side code
  • Default credentials not changed

Secure secrets management:

import { z } from 'zod';

const envSchema = z.object({
  DATABASE_URL: z.string().url(),
  NEXTAUTH_SECRET: z.string().min(32),
  STRIPE_SECRET_KEY: z.string().startsWith('sk_'),
  OPENAI_API_KEY: z.string().startsWith('sk-'),
});

export const env = envSchema.parse({
  DATABASE_URL: process.env.DATABASE_URL,
  NEXTAUTH_SECRET: process.env.NEXTAUTH_SECRET,
  STRIPE_SECRET_KEY: process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY,
  OPENAI_API_KEY: process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY,
});

// Ensure .env is in .gitignore
// Use .env.example (without values) to document required variables
// Use secrets management in production (Vercel Env Vars, AWS Secrets Manager)

Phase 6: Dependency Audit

Objective: Identify and remediate vulnerable dependencies.

Run Automated Vulnerability Scanners

Use npm audit:

precision_exec:
  commands:
    - cmd: "npm audit --json"
      timeout_ms: 30000
  verbosity: standard

Check for outdated packages:

precision_exec:
  commands:
    - cmd: "npm outdated --json"
      timeout_ms: 10000
  verbosity: minimal

Prioritize fixes:

  • Critical/High: Fix immediately before deployment
  • Moderate: Fix within 30 days
  • Low: Fix during regular maintenance
Check for Supply Chain Attacks

Verify lockfile integrity:

precision_exec:
  commands:
    - cmd: "npm audit signatures"
      timeout_ms: 30000
  verbosity: standard

Checklist:

  • Commit lockfiles (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml)
  • Review dependency changes in PRs
  • Use npm ci in CI/CD (not npm install)
  • Pin dependency versions in critical projects
  • Use tools like Socket.dev for dependency analysis

Phase 7: API Security Audit

Objective: Secure API endpoints against common attacks.

Check for Rate Limiting

Search for rate limiting implementation:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: rate_limit_usage
      pattern: "(rateLimit|rate.*limiter|Ratelimit|upstash.*ratelimit)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: minimal

Implement rate limiting:

import { Ratelimit } from '@upstash/ratelimit';
import { Redis } from '@upstash/redis';
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server';

const ratelimit = new Ratelimit({
  redis: Redis.fromEnv(),
  limiter: Ratelimit.slidingWindow(10, '10 s'), // 10 requests per 10 seconds
  analytics: true,
});

export async function POST(req: Request) {
  const ip = req.headers.get('x-forwarded-for') ?? 'unknown';
  const { success, limit, reset, remaining } = await ratelimit.limit(ip);

  if (!success) {
    return NextResponse.json(
      { error: 'Too many requests' },
      {
        status: 429,
        headers: {
          'X-RateLimit-Limit': limit.toString(),
          'X-RateLimit-Remaining': remaining.toString(),
          'X-RateLimit-Reset': new Date(reset).toISOString(),
        },
      }
    );
  }

  // Process request
  return NextResponse.json({ success: true });
}
Check for CORS Configuration

Search for CORS setup:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: cors_config
      pattern: "(Access-Control-Allow-Origin|cors\\(|corsOptions)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: matches

Common vulnerabilities:

  • Wildcard CORS (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *) with credentials
  • Overly permissive origin whitelist
  • Missing preflight request handling

Secure CORS configuration:

import { NextResponse } from 'next/server';

const ALLOWED_ORIGINS = [
  'https://example.com',
  'https://app.example.com',
];

export async function GET(req: Request) {
  const origin = req.headers.get('origin');

  const headers: Record<string, string> = {
    'Content-Type': 'application/json',
  };

  if (origin && ALLOWED_ORIGINS.includes(origin)) {
    headers['Access-Control-Allow-Origin'] = origin;
    headers['Access-Control-Allow-Credentials'] = 'true';
  }

  return NextResponse.json({ data: 'response' }, { headers });
}
Webhook Signature Verification

Best practice: Use crypto.timingSafeEqual() for comparing webhook signatures to prevent timing attacks:

import crypto from 'crypto';

export function verifyWebhookSignature(payload: string, signature: string, secret: string): boolean {
  const expectedSignature = crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret).update(payload).digest('hex');
  const signatureBuffer = Buffer.from(signature);
  const expectedBuffer = Buffer.from(expectedSignature);

  // Prevent timing attacks - constant-time comparison
  if (signatureBuffer.length !== expectedBuffer.length) return false;
  return crypto.timingSafeEqual(signatureBuffer, expectedBuffer);
}
CORS Preflight Handling
export async function OPTIONS(req: Request) {
  const origin = req.headers.get('origin');

  const headers: Record<string, string> = {
    'Access-Control-Allow-Methods': 'GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS',
    'Access-Control-Allow-Headers': 'Content-Type, Authorization',
    'Access-Control-Max-Age': '86400', // 24 hours
  };

  if (origin && ALLOWED_ORIGINS.includes(origin)) {
    headers['Access-Control-Allow-Origin'] = origin;
    headers['Access-Control-Allow-Credentials'] = 'true';
  }

  return new NextResponse(null, { status: 204, headers });
}
Check for CSRF Protection

Search for CSRF implementation:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: csrf_tokens
      pattern: "(csrf|csrfToken|xsrf)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  output:
    format: minimal

CSRF protection strategies:

  • Use SameSite cookies (sameSite: 'strict' or 'lax')
  • Implement CSRF tokens for state-changing operations
  • Require custom headers for API requests (e.g., X-Requested-With)
  • Verify Origin and Referer headers
Check for Content Security Policy (CSP)

Search for CSP headers:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: csp_headers
      pattern: "Content-Security-Policy"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx,json}"
  output:
    format: locations

Implement CSP:

// next.config.js
const ContentSecurityPolicy = `
  default-src 'self';
  // WARNING: 'unsafe-eval' and 'unsafe-inline' significantly weaken CSP. Use nonces or hashes instead.
  script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.vercel-insights.com;
  style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
  img-src 'self' data: https:;
  font-src 'self' data:;
  connect-src 'self' https://api.example.com;
  frame-ancestors 'none';
  base-uri 'self';
  form-action 'self';
`;

module.exports = {
  async headers() {
    return [
      {
        source: '/(.*)',
        headers: [
          {
            key: 'Content-Security-Policy',
            value: ContentSecurityPolicy.replace(/\n/g, ''),
          },
          {
            key: 'X-Frame-Options',
            value: 'DENY',
          },
          {
            key: 'X-Content-Type-Options',
            value: 'nosniff',
          },
          {
            key: 'Referrer-Policy',
            value: 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin',
          },
          {
            key: 'Permissions-Policy',
            value: 'camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()',
          },
        ],
      },
    ];
  },
};

Phase 8: Infrastructure Security Audit

Objective: Harden deployment infrastructure.

Check Docker Security

Search for Dockerfile:

precision_read:
  files:
    - path: "Dockerfile"
      extract: content
  verbosity: minimal

Docker security checklist:

  • Use minimal base images (alpine, distroless)
  • Run as non-root user
  • Multi-stage builds to reduce attack surface
  • No secrets in image layers (use build args)
  • Pin base image versions (avoid latest tag)
  • Scan images for vulnerabilities (docker scan, Trivy)

Secure Dockerfile:

FROM node:20-alpine AS base

FROM base AS deps
RUN apk add --no-cache libc6-compat
WORKDIR /app
COPY package*.json ./
RUN npm ci --only=production

FROM base AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=deps /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY . .
RUN npm run build

FROM base AS runner
WORKDIR /app

ENV NODE_ENV=production

# Create non-root user
RUN addgroup --system --gid 1001 nodejs && \
    adduser --system --uid 1001 nextjs

COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/standalone ./
COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/static ./.next/static
COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/public ./public

USER nextjs

EXPOSE 3000
ENV PORT=3000
ENV HOSTNAME="0.0.0.0"

HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
  CMD node -e "require('http').get('http://localhost:3000/api/health', (r) => process.exit(r.statusCode === 200 ? 0 : 1))"

CMD ["node", "server.js"]
Check Environment Variable Security

Search for env file usage:

precision_glob:
  patterns:
    - ".env*"
    - "*.env"
  verbosity: count_only

Verify.gitignore:

precision_read:
  files:
    - path: ".gitignore"
      extract: content
  verbosity: minimal

Environment security checklist:

  • .env files in .gitignore
  • Use .env.example (without values) to document variables
  • Use secrets management in production (not .env files)
  • Separate environments (development, staging, production)
  • Rotate secrets regularly
Check TLS Configuration

Verify HTTPS enforcement:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    - id: https_redirect
      pattern: "(https|ssl|tls|hsts|Strict-Transport-Security)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx,json}"
  output:
    format: minimal

TLS best practices:

  • Enforce HTTPS (redirect HTTP to HTTPS)
  • Enable HSTS (Strict-Transport-Security)
  • Use TLS 1.2+ (disable TLS 1.0, 1.1)
  • Use strong cipher suites
  • Implement certificate pinning for mobile apps

Audit Reporting

Structure your audit findings in this format:

Executive Summary

## Security Audit Report

**Application:** [Name]
**Audit Date:** [Date]
**Auditor:** [Name/Team]
**Scope:** [Components audited]

### Summary
- Total findings: X
- Critical: Y
- High: Z
- Medium: A
- Low: B

### Risk Assessment
[Overall risk level: Critical/High/Medium/Low]

Detailed Findings

For each vulnerability:

### [SEVERITY] Finding #X: [Title]

**Category:** [Authentication/Authorization/Input Validation/etc.]
**Severity:** [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
**CWE:** [CWE-XXX if applicable]

**Description:**
[Clear description of the vulnerability]

**Location:**
- File: `path/to/file.ts`
- Lines: 42-58

**Impact:**
[What can an attacker do? What data is at risk?]

**Proof of Concept:**

// Example exploit code or reproduction steps


**Remediation:**

// Secure code example


**References:**

- [OWASP Link]
- [CWE Link]

Severity Classification

SeverityCriteria
CriticalRemote code execution, authentication bypass, sensitive data exposure
HighPrivilege escalation, SQL injection, XSS in critical flows
MediumInformation disclosure, CSRF, weak authentication
LowMinor information leaks, missing security headers

Precision Tool Workflows

Full Security Scan Workflow

Run a comprehensive security scan using precision_grep:

precision_grep:
  queries:
    # Authentication issues
    - id: weak_auth
      pattern: "(password.*plain|password.*clear|md5|sha1)\\("
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"

    # SQL injection
    - id: sql_injection
      pattern: "(\\$queryRaw|\\$executeRaw).*\\$\\{|query.*\\+.*params"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"

    # XSS
    - id: xss
      pattern: "(dangerouslySetInnerHTML|innerHTML|v-html)"
      glob: "**/*.{tsx,jsx,vue}"

    # Command injection
    - id: command_injection
      pattern: "(exec|spawn).*\\(.*req\\.(body|query)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"

    # Path traversal
    - id: path_traversal
      pattern: "(readFile|writeFile).*req\\.(body|query|params)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"

    # Hardcoded secrets
    - id: hardcoded_secrets
      pattern: "(api.*key.*=.*[\"'][a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}|sk_live)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"

    # Insecure cookies
    - id: insecure_cookies
      pattern: "(httpOnly.*false|secure.*false|sameSite.*none)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"

  output:
    format: locations

Batch Security Audit

Use discover + batch for efficient auditing:

discover:
  queries:
    - id: auth_files
      type: glob
      patterns: ["**/auth/**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}", "**/api/auth/**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"]
    - id: api_routes
      type: glob
      patterns: ["**/api/**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"]
    - id: db_files
      type: grep
      pattern: "(prisma|db|database)"
      glob: "**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}"
  verbosity: files_only

Then batch read and analyze:

precision_read:
  files: [/* Use discovered files */]
  extract: symbols
  symbol_filter: ["function", "class"]
  verbosity: standard

Automated Security Testing

Integrate security checks into CI/CD:

# .github/workflows/security.yml
name: Security Scan

on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
  pull_request:
    branches: [main]

jobs:
  security:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Run npm audit
        run: npm audit --audit-level=high

      - name: Run Snyk security scan
        uses: snyk/actions/node@master
        env:
          SNYK_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SNYK_TOKEN }}

      - name: Run Trivy vulnerability scanner
        uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master
        with:
          scan-type: 'fs'
          scan-ref: '.'
          severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'

      - name: Run OWASP ZAP scan
        uses: zaproxy/action-baseline@v0.7.0
        with:
          target: 'http://localhost:3000'

Common Security Mistakes

1. Trusting Client-Side Validation

Problem: Relying on client-side checks for security.

Solution: Always validate on the server.

// UNSAFE - Client-side only
export function ClientForm() {
  const [email, setEmail] = useState('');

  const isValid = email.includes('@');

  return (
    <form onSubmit={() => fetch('/api/subscribe', {
      method: 'POST',
      body: JSON.stringify({ email }),
    })}>
      <input value={email} onChange={(e) => setEmail(e.target.value)} />
      <button disabled={!isValid}>Subscribe</button>
    </form>
  );
}

// SAFE - Server-side validation
export async function POST(req: Request) {
  const body = await req.json();

  const schema = z.object({
    email: z.string().email(),
  });

  const result = schema.safeParse(body);

  if (!result.success) {
    return NextResponse.json(
      { error: result.error.flatten() },
      { status: 400 }
    );
  }

  // Process valid email
  await subscribeUser(result.data.email);
  return NextResponse.json({ success: true });
}

2. Exposing Sensitive Data in API Responses

Problem: Returning more data than needed.

Solution: Use explicit select to limit fields.

// UNSAFE - Returns password hash
export async function GET(req: Request) {
  const user = await db.user.findUnique({ where: { id: userId } });
  return NextResponse.json(user);
}

// SAFE - Excludes sensitive fields
export async function GET(req: Request) {
  const user = await db.user.findUnique({
    where: { id: userId },
    select: {
      id: true,
      name: true,
      email: true,
      avatar: true,
      // passwordHash excluded
    },
  });
  return NextResponse.json(user);
}

3. Logging Sensitive Data

Problem: Writing PII or secrets to logs.

Solution: Redact sensitive data before logging.

// UNSAFE - Logs password
export async function login(email: string, password: string) {
  console.log('Login attempt:', { email, password });
  // ...
}

// SAFE - Redacts password
export async function login(email: string, password: string) {
  console.log('Login attempt:', { email, password: '[REDACTED]' });
  // ...
}

Post-Audit Actions

After completing the audit:

  1. Prioritize findings by severity and exploitability
  2. Create tickets for each finding (link to audit report)
  3. Fix critical/high issues immediately
  4. Run validation script to verify remediations
  5. Schedule follow-up audit after fixes
  6. Update security documentation with lessons learned
  7. Train team on common vulnerabilities found

Validation

Run the validation script after audit remediation:

./scripts/validate-security-audit.sh /path/to/project

The script checks for:

  • Common vulnerability patterns
  • Secure authentication implementation
  • Input validation coverage
  • Secrets management
  • Security headers configuration
  • Dependency vulnerabilities

Further Reading

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安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

未通过

权限和风险

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