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Agent Skill · 研究检索

irify-sast(伊里弗·萨斯特)

irify-sast 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

irify-sast 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为调用外部服务;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描已通过,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 51,212。

总安装 588周安装 24GitHub Stars 2下载 190核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:irify-sast(伊里弗·萨斯特)
来源仓库:https://github.com/yaklang/irify-sast-skill
仓库路径:skills/irify-sast
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/yaklang/irify-sast-skill --skill irify-sast
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/yaklang/irify-sast-skill --skill irify-sast

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

irify-sast 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合快速定位候选结果。适用于需要根据关键词或任务场景从来源线索中筛选信息的场景。通过 npx skills add 命令安装,需结合原始 README 核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态及是否会触发联网或文件读写操作。

irify-sast 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

来源仓库内路径:skills/irify-sast

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/yaklang/irify-sast-skill --skill irify-sast;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要调用外部服务,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

irify-sast 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/yaklang/irify-sast-skill --skill irify-sast。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

irify-sast 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

irify-sast 需要什么权限?

权限级别是调用外部服务。该 Skill 可能调用第三方服务、云服务或外部模型 API,使用前需要确认账号、额度、数据发送范围和服务条款。

irify-sast 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

irify-sast 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 588 次,近一周安装 24 次,下载 190 次,GitHub 2 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

irify-sast 安全吗?

第三方扫描结果为通过,但这只覆盖已知的静态检查项,不能替代自己读一遍源码和安装命令。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。
  • 第三方扫描已通过,常见的高风险行为没有命中。

先想清楚的地方

  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
irify-sast

伊里弗·萨斯特 · 本页

5882调用外部服务未明确通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

IRify SAST

Deep static analysis skill powered by IRify's SSA compiler and SyntaxFlow query engine.

Prerequisites

This skill requires the yaklang MCP server. Configure it in your agent's MCP settings:

# Codex: ~/.codex/config.toml
[mcp_servers.yaklang-ssa]
command = "yak"
args = ["mcp", "-t", "ssa"]
// Claude Code / Cursor / others
{ "command": "yak", "args": ["mcp", "-t", "ssa"] }

Workflow: Engine-First (sf → read → rg)

CRITICAL: Always follow the Engine-First funnel model. The SSA engine sees cross-procedure data flow across all files simultaneously — grep cannot. Do NOT use grep/rg to build a "candidate file pool" before querying. Instead, let the engine be your radar first.

Step 1: Compile (once per project, auto-cached)

ssa_compile(target="/path/to/project", language="java", program_name="MyProject")
→ full compilation, returns program_name

Auto Cache: If the program was already compiled and source files haven't changed, the engine returns [Cache Hit] instantly — no recompilation. Always provide a program_name to enable caching.

Step 2: Query — use SyntaxFlow as the global radar

Directly compose and execute SyntaxFlow rules against the compiled IR. Do NOT pre-scan with grep to find candidates.

ssa_query(program_name="MyProject", rule="<SyntaxFlow rule>")

The engine traverses the entire SSA graph in memory, crossing all file boundaries. One query covers what would take dozens of grep commands, with zero false positives on data flow.

Step 3: Read — use Read as the microscope

After ssa_query returns concrete file paths and line numbers, use Read to examine surrounding context (±20 lines). Verify whether the hit is real business code or dead/test code.

Step 4: Grep — use Grep/Glob only for non-code files

Use Grep/Glob only for content that the SSA engine does not process:

  • Configuration files (.yml, .xml, .properties, logback.xml)
  • Static resources, templates, build scripts
  • Quick name/path lookups when you already know the exact string

NEVER use Grep to search for data flow patterns in source code — that is what ssa_query is for.

Incremental Compile (when code changes)

ssa_compile(target="/path/to/project", language="java", base_program_name="MyProject")
→ only changed files recompiled, ProgramOverLay merges base + diff layers
→ returns NEW program_name for subsequent queries

IMPORTANT: Use base_program_name for incremental compilation. re_compile=true is a full recompile that discards all data — only use it to start completely fresh.

Self-Healing Query (auto-retry on syntax error)

When ssa_query returns a SyntaxFlow parsing error:

  1. DO NOT apologize to the user or ask for help
  2. Read the error message — it contains the exact parse error position and expected tokens
  3. Fix the SyntaxFlow rule based on the error
  4. Re-invoke ssa_query with the corrected rule
  5. Repeat up to 3 times before reporting failure
  6. If all retries fail, show the user: the original rule, each attempted fix, and the final error

Critical: Follow User Intent

DO NOT automatically construct source→sink vulnerability rules unless the user explicitly asks for vulnerability detection.

  • User asks "find user inputs" → write a source-only rule, list all input endpoints
  • User asks "find SQL injection" → write a source→sink taint rule
  • User asks "where does this value go" → write a forward trace (-->) rule
  • User asks "what calls this function" → write a call-site rule

Source-Only Query Examples (Java)

When the user asks about user inputs, HTTP endpoints, or controllable parameters:

// Find all Spring MVC controller handler methods
*Mapping.__ref__?{opcode: function} as $endpoints;
alert $endpoints;
// Find all user-controllable parameters in Spring controllers
*Mapping.__ref__?{opcode: function}<getFormalParams>?{opcode: param && !have: this} as $params;
alert $params;
// Find GetMapping vs PostMapping endpoints separately
GetMapping.__ref__?{opcode: function} as $getEndpoints;
PostMapping.__ref__?{opcode: function} as $postEndpoints;
alert $getEndpoints;
alert $postEndpoints;

Source→Sink Query Examples (only when user asks for vulnerability detection)

// RCE: trace user input to exec()
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(* #-> * as $source) as $sink;
alert $sink for {title: "RCE", level: "high"};
// SQL Injection (MyBatis): detect ${} unsafe interpolation in XML mappers / annotations
// <mybatisSink> is a dedicated NativeCall that finds all MyBatis ${} injection points
<mybatisSink> as $sink;
$sink#{
    until: `* & $source`,
}-> as $result;
alert $result for {title: "SQLi-MyBatis", level: "high"};

Proactive Security Insights

After running a query and finding results, proactively raise follow-up questions and suggestions. Do NOT just dump results and stop.

When vulnerabilities are found:

  1. Suggest fix: "This exec() call receives unsanitized user input. Consider using a whitelist or ProcessBuilder with explicit argument separation."
  2. Ask related questions:

- "Should I check if there are other endpoints that also call Runtime.exec()?" - "Want me to trace whether any input validation/sanitization exists between the source and sink?" - "Should I look for similar patterns in other controllers?"

  1. Cross-reference: If one vulnerability type is found, proactively scan for related types:

- Found RCE → "I also checked for SSRF and found 2 potential issues. Want details?"

When no results are found:

  1. Don't just say "no results" — explain WHY:

- "No direct exec() calls found, but I see ProcessBuilder usage. Want me to check those instead?" - "The query matched 0 sinks. This could mean the code uses a framework abstraction — want me to search for framework-specific patterns?"

  1. Suggest alternative queries

When results are ambiguous:

  1. Ask for clarification: "I found 8 data flow paths to executeQuery(), but 5 use parameterized queries (safe). Want me to filter to only the 3 using string concatenation?"

Companion Reference Files

When writing SyntaxFlow rules, read these files using the Read tool for syntax help and real-world examples:

FileWhen to ReadPath (relative to this file)
NativeCall ReferenceWhen writing rules that need <nativeCallName()> functions — all 40+ NativeCall functions with syntax and examplesnativecall-reference.md
SyntaxFlow ExamplesWhen writing new rules — 20+ production rules covering Java/Go/PHP/C, organized by vulnerability typesyntaxflow-examples.md

Workflow:

  1. Read syntaxflow-examples.md to find a similar rule pattern
  2. Need a NativeCall? Read nativecall-reference.md
  3. Compose and execute via ssa_query

SyntaxFlow Quick Reference

Search & Match

documentBuilder          // variable name
.parse                   // method name (dot prefix)
documentBuilder.parse    // chain
*config*                 // glob pattern
/(get[A-Z].*)/           // regex pattern

Function Call & Parameters

.exec()                           // match any call
.exec(* as $params)               // capture all params
.parse(*<slice(index=1)> as $a1)  // capture by index

Data Flow Operators

OperatorDirectionUse
#>Up 1 levelDirect definition
#->Up recursiveTrace to origin — "where does this COME FROM?"
->Down 1 levelDirect usage
-->Down recursiveTrace to final usage — "where does this GO TO?"
.exec(* #-> * as $source)            // trace param origin
$userInput --> as $sinks              // trace where value goes
$sink #{depth: 5}-> as $source       // depth-limited trace
$val #{
  include: `*?{opcode: const}`
}-> as $constSources                  // filter during trace
$sink #{
  until: `* & $source`,              // stop when reaching source
}-> as $reachable

Filters ?{...}

$vals?{opcode: call}                // by opcode: call/const/param/phi/function/return
$vals?{have: 'password'}            // by string content
$vals?{!opcode: const}              // negation
$vals?{opcode: call && have: 'sql'} // combined
$factory?{!(.setFeature)}           // method NOT called on value

Variable, Check & Alert

.exec() as $sink;                                      // assign
check $sink then "found" else "not found";             // assert
alert $sink for { title: "RCE", level: "high" };       // mark finding
$a + $b as $merged;                                    // union
$all - $safe as $vuln;                                 // difference

NativeCall (40+ built-in functions)

Most commonly used — see nativecall-reference.md for full list:

<include('rule-name')>         // import lib rule
<typeName()>                   // get short type name
<fullTypeName()>               // get full qualified type name
<getReturns>                   // function return values
<getFormalParams>              // function parameters
<getFunc>                      // enclosing function
<getCall>                      // find call sites
<getCallee>                    // get called function
<getObject>                    // parent object
<getMembers>                   // object members
<name>                         // get name
<slice(index=N)>               // extract by index
<mybatisSink>                  // MyBatis SQL injection sinks
<dataflow(include=`...`)>      // filter data flow paths

Tips

  1. #-> = "where does this come from?", --> = "where does this go?"
  2. Use * for params, don't hardcode names
  3. SSA resolves assignments: a = getRuntime(); a.exec(cmd) = getRuntime().exec(cmd)
  4. Use opcode filters to distinguish constants / parameters / calls
  5. Combine check + alert for actionable results
  6. After code changes, use base_program_name (not re_compile) for fast incremental updates
  7. Before writing a new rule, read syntaxflow-examples.md to find similar patterns
  8. When unsure about a NativeCall, read nativecall-reference.md for usage and examples

平台分布

Codex

36.02%
按下载量换算68

Claude

28.49%
按下载量换算54

Cursor

17.64%
按下载量换算34

Gemini CLI

9.55%
按下载量换算18

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

调用外部服务

该 Skill 可能调用第三方服务、云服务或外部模型 API,使用前需要确认账号、额度、数据发送范围和服务条款。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

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