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Agent Skill · 研究检索

headless-bff-architecture(无头 BFF 架构)

headless-bff-architecture 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

headless-bff-architecture 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为接触敏感数据;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描有提醒项,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 37,859。

总安装 1,656周安装 67GitHub Stars 25下载 520核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:headless-bff-architecture(无头 BFF 架构)
来源仓库:https://github.com/vtexdocs/ai-skills
仓库路径:skills/headless-bff-architecture
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/vtexdocs/ai-skills --skill headless-bff-architecture
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/vtexdocs/ai-skills --skill headless-bff-architecture

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

headless-bff-architecture 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。适用于无头 BFF 架构相关的信息检索与筛选,帮助开发者快速获取技术方案、实现细节或最佳实践。

通过 npx skills add 命令从指定 GitHub 仓库安装,需结合原始 README 了解具体调用方式。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写操作。适用宿主包括 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,接入前应确认版本、权限和运行环境要求。

来源仓库内路径:skills/headless-bff-architecture

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/vtexdocs/ai-skills --skill headless-bff-archit…;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要接触敏感数据,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

headless-bff-architecture 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/vtexdocs/ai-skills --skill headless-bff-architecture。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

headless-bff-architecture 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

headless-bff-architecture 需要什么权限?

权限级别是接触敏感数据。该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

headless-bff-architecture 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

headless-bff-architecture 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 1,656 次,近一周安装 67 次,下载 520 次,GitHub 25 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

headless-bff-architecture 安全吗?

第三方扫描有提醒项,说明存在需要人工确认的行为。安装前请打开源码看清它读了什么、联网到哪里。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。

先想清楚的地方

  • 需要接触敏感数据,装到常用环境前要先评估影响面。
  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方扫描存在提醒项或未通过项,需要人工逐条确认。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 环境里有大量密钥、凭证,不方便给第三方 Skill 读取的人。
  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
headless-bff-architecture

无头 BFF 架构 · 本页

1,65625接触敏感数据未明确有提醒

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

BFF Layer Design & Security

When this skill applies

Use this skill when building or modifying any headless VTEX storefront that communicates with VTEX APIs — whether a custom storefront, mobile app, or kiosk.

  • Setting up a BFF (Backend-for-Frontend) layer for a new headless project
  • Deciding which VTEX APIs need server-side proxying vs direct frontend calls
  • Implementing credential management (VTEX_APP_KEY, VTEX_APP_TOKEN, VtexIdclientAutCookie)
  • Reviewing a headless architecture for security compliance

Do not use this skill for:

Decision rules

  • A BFF layer is mandatory for every headless VTEX project. There is no scenario where a headless storefront can safely operate without one.
  • Route all VTEX API calls through the BFF except Intelligent Search, which is the only API safe to call directly from the frontend.
  • Use VtexIdclientAutCookie (stored server-side) for shopper-scoped API calls. Use X-VTEX-API-AppKey/X-VTEX-API-AppToken for machine-to-machine calls.
  • Treat client-side exposure of VTEX_APP_KEY, VTEX_APP_TOKEN, VtexIdclientAutCookie, checkout cookies, or shopper/session tokens as a security violation — not as a recommendation or tradeoff. Use explicit wording such as “must not”, “never expose”, and “server-side only”, and avoid softer language such as “avoid”, “prefer”, or “ideally”.
  • Classify APIs by their path: /pub/ endpoints are public but most still need BFF proxying for session management; /pvt/ endpoints are private and must go through BFF.
  • Even public Checkout endpoints (/api/checkout/pub/) must be proxied through BFF for security — they handle sensitive personal data.
  • Create separate API keys with minimal permissions for different BFF modules rather than sharing one key with broad access.

Hard constraints

Constraint: A BFF layer is mandatory for headless VTEX — no exceptions

Every headless VTEX storefront MUST have a server-side BFF layer. Client-side code MUST NOT make direct HTTP requests to private VTEX API endpoints. All private API calls must be routed through the BFF.

Why this matters

Private VTEX APIs require X-VTEX-API-AppKey and X-VTEX-API-AppToken headers. If the frontend calls these APIs directly, the credentials must be embedded in client-side code or transmitted to the browser, exposing them to any user who opens browser DevTools. Stolen API keys can be used to access order data, modify pricing, or perform destructive administrative actions.

Detection

If you see fetch or axios calls to vtexcommercestable.com.br/api/checkout, /api/oms, /api/profile, or any /pvt/ endpoint in client-side code (files under src/, public/, app/, or any browser-executed bundle) → STOP immediately. These calls must be moved to the BFF.

Correct

// Frontend code — calls BFF, not VTEX directly
async function getOrderDetails(orderId: string): Promise<Order> {
  const response = await fetch(`/api/bff/orders/${orderId}`, {
    credentials: "include", // sends session cookie to BFF
  });

  if (!response.ok) {
    throw new Error(`Failed to fetch order: ${response.status}`);
  }

  return response.json();
}

Wrong

// Frontend code — calls VTEX OMS API directly (SECURITY VULNERABILITY)
async function getOrderDetails(orderId: string): Promise<Order> {
  const response = await fetch(
    `https://mystore.vtexcommercestable.com.br/api/oms/pvt/orders/${orderId}`,
    {
      headers: {
        "X-VTEX-API-AppKey": "vtexappkey-mystore-ABCDEF", // EXPOSED!
        "X-VTEX-API-AppToken": "eyJhbGciOi...", // EXPOSED!
      },
    }
  );
  return response.json();
}

Constraint: VtexIdclientAutCookie MUST be managed server-side

The VtexIdclientAutCookie token MUST be stored in a secure server-side session (e.g., encrypted cookie, Redis session store) and MUST NOT be stored in localStorage, sessionStorage, or any client-accessible JavaScript variable.

Why this matters

The VtexIdclientAutCookie is a bearer token that authenticates all actions on behalf of a shopper — placing orders, viewing profile data, accessing payment information. If stored client-side, it can be stolen via XSS attacks, browser extensions, or shared/public computers. An attacker with this token can impersonate the shopper.

Detection

If you see VtexIdclientAutCookie referenced in localStorage.setItem, sessionStorage.setItem, or assigned to a JavaScript variable in client-side code → STOP immediately. The token must be managed exclusively server-side.

Correct

// BFF route — stores VtexIdclientAutCookie in server-side session
import { Router, Request, Response } from "express";
import session from "express-session";

const router = Router();

// After VTEX login callback, extract and store token server-side
router.get("/auth/callback", async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
  const vtexAuthToken = req.cookies["VtexIdclientAutCookie"];

  if (!vtexAuthToken) {
    return res.status(401).json({ error: "Authentication failed" });
  }

  // Store in server-side session — never sent to frontend
  req.session.vtexAuthToken = vtexAuthToken;

  // Clear the cookie from the browser response
  res.clearCookie("VtexIdclientAutCookie");

  // Redirect to frontend with a secure session cookie
  res.redirect("/account");
});

// BFF proxy uses session token for VTEX API calls
router.get("/api/bff/profile", async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
  const vtexToken = req.session.vtexAuthToken;

  if (!vtexToken) {
    return res.status(401).json({ error: "Not authenticated" });
  }

  const response = await fetch(
    `https://${process.env.VTEX_ACCOUNT}.vtexcommercestable.com.br/api/checkout/pub/profiles`,
    {
      headers: {
        Cookie: `VtexIdclientAutCookie=${vtexToken}`,
      },
    }
  );

  const profile = await response.json();
  res.json(profile);
});

Wrong

// Frontend code — stores auth token in localStorage (SECURITY VULNERABILITY)
function handleLoginCallback() {
  const params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
  const vtexToken = params.get("authToken");

  // WRONG: token is now accessible to any JS on the page, including XSS payloads
  localStorage.setItem("VtexIdclientAutCookie", vtexToken!);
}

// Later, reads from localStorage and sends in header
async function getProfile() {
  const token = localStorage.getItem("VtexIdclientAutCookie"); // EXPOSED!
  return fetch("https://mystore.vtexcommercestable.com.br/api/checkout/pub/profiles", {
    headers: { Cookie: `VtexIdclientAutCookie=${token}` },
  });
}

Constraint: API keys MUST NOT appear in client-side code

VTEX_APP_KEY and VTEX_APP_TOKEN values MUST only exist in server-side environment variables and MUST NOT be present in any file that is bundled, served, or accessible to the browser.

Why this matters

API keys grant programmatic access to the VTEX platform with the permissions of their associated role. Exposing them in frontend bundles, public directories, or client-side environment variables (e.g., NEXT_PUBLIC_*, VITE_*) allows anyone to extract them and make unauthorized API calls.

Detection

If you see VTEX_APP_KEY, VTEX_APP_TOKEN, X-VTEX-API-AppKey, or X-VTEX-API-AppToken in files under src/, public/, app/ directories, or in environment variables prefixed with NEXT_PUBLIC_, VITE_, or REACT_APP_ → STOP immediately. Move these to server-side-only environment variables.

Correct

// BFF server code — reads keys from server-side env vars only
// File: server/vtex-client.ts (never bundled for browser)
import { Router, Request, Response } from "express";

const VTEX_ACCOUNT = process.env.VTEX_ACCOUNT!;
const VTEX_APP_KEY = process.env.VTEX_APP_KEY!;
const VTEX_APP_TOKEN = process.env.VTEX_APP_TOKEN!;

const router = Router();

router.get("/api/bff/orders/:orderId", async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
  const { orderId } = req.params;

  const response = await fetch(
    `https://${VTEX_ACCOUNT}.vtexcommercestable.com.br/api/oms/pvt/orders/${orderId}`,
    {
      headers: {
        "X-VTEX-API-AppKey": VTEX_APP_KEY,
        "X-VTEX-API-AppToken": VTEX_APP_TOKEN,
        Accept: "application/json",
      },
    }
  );

  if (!response.ok) {
    return res.status(response.status).json({ error: "Failed to fetch order" });
  }

  const order = await response.json();
  res.json(order);
});

export default router;

Wrong

// .env file with NEXT_PUBLIC_ prefix — exposed to browser bundle!
// NEXT_PUBLIC_VTEX_APP_KEY=vtexappkey-mystore-ABCDEF
// NEXT_PUBLIC_VTEX_APP_TOKEN=eyJhbGciOi...

// Frontend code reads exposed env vars
async function fetchOrders() {
  const response = await fetch(
    `https://mystore.vtexcommercestable.com.br/api/oms/pvt/orders`,
    {
      headers: {
        "X-VTEX-API-AppKey": process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_VTEX_APP_KEY!, // EXPOSED IN BUNDLE!
        "X-VTEX-API-AppToken": process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_VTEX_APP_TOKEN!, // EXPOSED IN BUNDLE!
      },
    }
  );
  return response.json();
}

Preferred pattern

Architecture overview — how requests flow through the BFF:

Frontend (Browser/App)
    │
    ├── Direct call (OK): Intelligent Search API (public, read-only)
    │
    └── All other requests → BFF Layer (Node.js/Express)
                                │
                                ├── Injects VtexIdclientAutCookie from session
                                ├── Injects X-VTEX-API-AppKey / X-VTEX-API-AppToken
                                ├── Validates & sanitizes input
                                └── Proxies to VTEX APIs
                                        │
                                        ├── Checkout API (/api/checkout/pub/...)
                                        ├── OMS API (/api/oms/pvt/...)
                                        ├── Profile API (/api/profile-system/pvt/...)
                                        └── Other VTEX services

Minimal BFF server setup with session management:

// server/index.ts
import express from "express";
import session from "express-session";
import cookieParser from "cookie-parser";
import cors from "cors";
import { checkoutRoutes } from "./routes/checkout";
import { profileRoutes } from "./routes/profile";
import { ordersRoutes } from "./routes/orders";

const app = express();

app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use(
  cors({
    origin: process.env.FRONTEND_URL,
    credentials: true,
  })
);
app.use(
  session({
    secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET!,
    resave: false,
    saveUninitialized: false,
    cookie: {
      secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === "production",
      httpOnly: true,
      sameSite: "strict",
      maxAge: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000, // 24 hours (matches VtexIdclientAutCookie TTL)
    },
  })
);

// Mount BFF routes
app.use("/api/bff/checkout", checkoutRoutes);
app.use("/api/bff/profile", profileRoutes);
app.use("/api/bff/orders", ordersRoutes);

const PORT = process.env.PORT || 3001;
app.listen(PORT, () => {
  console.log(`BFF server running on port ${PORT}`);
});

VTEX API client with credential injection for both auth types:

// server/vtex-api-client.ts
const VTEX_ACCOUNT = process.env.VTEX_ACCOUNT!;
const VTEX_ENVIRONMENT = process.env.VTEX_ENVIRONMENT || "vtexcommercestable";
const VTEX_APP_KEY = process.env.VTEX_APP_KEY!;
const VTEX_APP_TOKEN = process.env.VTEX_APP_TOKEN!;

const BASE_URL = `https://${VTEX_ACCOUNT}.${VTEX_ENVIRONMENT}.com.br`;

interface VtexRequestOptions {
  path: string;
  method?: string;
  body?: unknown;
  authType: "app-key" | "user-token";
  userToken?: string;
}

export async function vtexRequest<T>(options: VtexRequestOptions): Promise<T> {
  const { path, method = "GET", body, authType, userToken } = options;

  const headers: Record<string, string> = {
    Accept: "application/json",
    "Content-Type": "application/json",
  };

  if (authType === "app-key") {
    headers["X-VTEX-API-AppKey"] = VTEX_APP_KEY;
    headers["X-VTEX-API-AppToken"] = VTEX_APP_TOKEN;
  } else if (authType === "user-token" && userToken) {
    headers["Cookie"] = `VtexIdclientAutCookie=${userToken}`;
  }

  const response = await fetch(`${BASE_URL}${path}`, {
    method,
    headers,
    body: body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,
  });

  if (!response.ok) {
    throw new Error(
      `VTEX API error: ${response.status} ${response.statusText} for ${method} ${path}`
    );
  }

  return response.json() as Promise<T>;
}

BFF route handler with session-based auth and input validation:

// server/routes/orders.ts
import { Router, Request, Response } from "express";
import { vtexRequest } from "../vtex-api-client";

export const ordersRoutes = Router();

// Get order details — requires API key auth (private endpoint)
ordersRoutes.get("/:orderId", async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
  try {
    const { orderId } = req.params;

    // Validate input
    if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9-]+$/.test(orderId)) {
      return res.status(400).json({ error: "Invalid order ID format" });
    }

    // Optionally check user session for authorization
    const vtexToken = req.session.vtexAuthToken;
    if (!vtexToken) {
      return res.status(401).json({ error: "Authentication required" });
    }

    const order = await vtexRequest({
      path: `/api/oms/pvt/orders/${orderId}`,
      authType: "app-key",
    });

    res.json(order);
  } catch (error) {
    console.error("Error fetching order:", error);
    res.status(500).json({ error: "Failed to fetch order" });
  }
});

Authentication flow with server-side token management:

// server/routes/auth.ts
import { Router, Request, Response } from "express";

export const authRoutes = Router();

const VTEX_ACCOUNT = process.env.VTEX_ACCOUNT!;
const VTEX_LOGIN_URL = `https://${VTEX_ACCOUNT}.myvtex.com/login`;
const FRONTEND_URL = process.env.FRONTEND_URL!;

// Redirect shopper to VTEX login page
authRoutes.get("/login", (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
  const returnUrl = `${FRONTEND_URL}/auth/callback`;
  res.redirect(`${VTEX_LOGIN_URL}?returnUrl=${encodeURIComponent(returnUrl)}`);
});

// Handle login callback — extract VtexIdclientAutCookie and store server-side
authRoutes.get("/callback", (req: Request, res: Response) => {
  const vtexToken = req.cookies["VtexIdclientAutCookie"];

  if (!vtexToken) {
    return res.redirect(`${FRONTEND_URL}/login?error=auth_failed`);
  }

  // Store token in server-side session
  req.session.vtexAuthToken = vtexToken;

  // Clear the VTEX cookie from the browser
  res.clearCookie("VtexIdclientAutCookie");

  // Redirect to authenticated frontend page
  res.redirect(`${FRONTEND_URL}/account`);
});

// Logout — destroy session
authRoutes.post("/logout", (req: Request, res: Response) => {
  req.session.destroy((err) => {
    if (err) {
      return res.status(500).json({ error: "Logout failed" });
    }
    res.clearCookie("connect.sid");
    res.json({ success: true });
  });
});

// Check authentication status
authRoutes.get("/status", (req: Request, res: Response) => {
  res.json({
    authenticated: !!req.session.vtexAuthToken,
  });
});

Common failure modes

  • Proxying Intelligent Search through BFF: Routing every VTEX API call through the BFF, including Intelligent Search, adds unnecessary latency and server load. Intelligent Search is a public, read-only API designed for direct frontend consumption. Call it directly from the frontend. ` // Frontend code — call Intelligent Search directly (this is correct!) async function searchProducts(query: string, from: number = 0, to: number = 19): Promise<SearchResult> {const baseUrl = https://${STORE_ACCOUNT}.vtexcommercestable.com.br; const response = await fetch(${baseUrl}/api/io/_v/api/intelligent-search/product_search/?query=${encodeURIComponent(query)}&from=${from}&to=${to}&locale=en-US,); return response.json();} `
  • Sharing a single API key across all BFF operations: Using one API key with broad permissions (e.g., Owner role) for all BFF operations means a compromised key grants access to every VTEX resource. Create separate API keys for different BFF modules with minimal required permissions. // server/vtex-credentials.ts — separate keys per domain export const credentials = {oms: {appKey: process.env.VTEX_OMS_APP_KEY!, appToken: process.env.VTEX_OMS_APP_TOKEN!,}, checkout: {appKey: process.env.VTEX_CHECKOUT_APP_KEY!, appToken: process.env.VTEX_CHECKOUT_APP_TOKEN!,}, catalog: {appKey: process.env.VTEX_CATALOG_APP_KEY!, appToken: process.env.VTEX_CATALOG_APP_TOKEN!,},} as const;
  • Logging API credentials or auth tokens: Logging request headers or full request objects during debugging inadvertently writes API keys or VtexIdclientAutCookie values to log files, which may be accessible to multiple team members or attackers. Sanitize all log output to strip sensitive headers before logging. // server/middleware/request-logger.ts import {Request, Response, NextFunction} from "express"; const SENSITIVE_HEADERS = ["x-vtex-api-appkey", "x-vtex-api-apptoken", "cookie", "authorization",]; export function requestLogger(req: Request, _res: Response, next: NextFunction) {const sanitizedHeaders = Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(req.headers).map(([key, value]) => SENSITIVE_HEADERS.includes(key.toLowerCase())? [key, "[REDACTED]"]: [key, value])); console.log({method: req.method, path: req.path, headers: sanitizedHeaders, timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),}); next();}

Review checklist

  • Is a BFF layer present? Every headless VTEX project requires one — no exceptions.
  • Are all private VTEX API calls (/pvt/ endpoints) routed through the BFF?
  • Are VTEX_APP_KEY and VTEX_APP_TOKEN stored exclusively in server-side environment variables?
  • Are API keys absent from any NEXT_PUBLIC_*, VITE_*, or REACT_APP_* environment variables?
  • Is VtexIdclientAutCookie stored in a server-side session, not in localStorage or sessionStorage?
  • Is Intelligent Search called directly from the frontend (not unnecessarily proxied through BFF)?
  • Are separate API keys used for different BFF modules with minimal permissions?
  • Are sensitive headers redacted from all log output?

Reference

平台分布

Codex

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按下载量换算196

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28.55%
按下载量换算148

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安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

可疑

权限和风险

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