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Agent Skill · 研究检索

container-security(container 安全)

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

container-security 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为接触敏感数据;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描有未通过项,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 70,604。

总安装 210周安装 9GitHub Stars 39下载 73核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:container-security(container 安全)
来源仓库:https://github.com/hardw00t/ai-security-arsenal
仓库路径:skills/container-security
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/hardw00t/ai-security-arsenal --skill container-security
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/hardw00t/ai-security-arsenal --skill container-security

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

用于辅助容器安全审计、权限检查和常见漏洞排查。适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中梳理敏感配置、分析鉴权逻辑或生成复核清单。通过 GitHub 安装,需结合来源仓库和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥或生产系统时应先确认最小权限。

安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网或文件读写。

来源仓库内路径:skills/container-security

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/hardw00t/ai-security-arsenal --skill container…;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要接触敏感数据,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

container-security 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/hardw00t/ai-security-arsenal --skill container-security。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

container-security 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

container-security 需要什么权限?

权限级别是接触敏感数据。该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

container-security 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

container-security 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 210 次,近一周安装 9 次,下载 73 次,GitHub 39 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

container-security 安全吗?

第三方扫描有未通过项,风险较高。除非你确认过源码,否则不建议直接安装到常用环境。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。

先想清楚的地方

  • 需要接触敏感数据,装到常用环境前要先评估影响面。
  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方扫描存在提醒项或未通过项,需要人工逐条确认。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 环境里有大量密钥、凭证,不方便给第三方 Skill 读取的人。
  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
container-security

container 安全 · 本页

21039接触敏感数据未明确未通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Container Security Assessment

This skill enables comprehensive security testing of containerized environments including Docker image scanning, Kubernetes cluster security auditing, container runtime analysis, and orchestration security assessment using tools like Trivy, Grype, Kubescape, kube-bench, and Falco.

When to Use This Skill

This skill should be invoked when:

  • Scanning Docker/OCI images for vulnerabilities
  • Auditing Kubernetes cluster security posture
  • Testing container runtime configurations
  • Reviewing Dockerfile security practices
  • Checking CIS benchmarks for Docker/Kubernetes
  • Analyzing container escape possibilities
  • Implementing container security monitoring

Trigger Phrases

  • "scan this Docker image for vulnerabilities"
  • "audit Kubernetes cluster security"
  • "check container configuration"
  • "test container escape"
  • "review Dockerfile security"
  • "run kube-bench"

Prerequisites

Required Tools

ToolPurposeInstallation
TrivyImage/IaC vulnerability scannerbrew install trivy
GrypeImage vulnerability scannerbrew install grype
SyftSBOM generatorbrew install syft
KubescapeK8s security platform`curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kubescape/kubescape/master/install.sh \/bin/bash`
kube-benchCIS K8s benchmarkbrew install kube-bench
kube-hunterK8s penetration testingpip install kube-hunter
FalcoRuntime securityHelm chart or binary
Docker BenchDocker CIS benchmarkgit clone https://github.com/docker/docker-bench-security.git

Container Image Security

Trivy Image Scanning

# Scan image from registry
trivy image nginx:latest

# Scan local image
trivy image --input ./image.tar

# Filter by severity
trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL nginx:latest

# Output formats
trivy image -f json -o results.json nginx:latest
trivy image -f sarif -o results.sarif nginx:latest
trivy image -f table nginx:latest

# Ignore unfixed vulnerabilities
trivy image --ignore-unfixed nginx:latest

# Scan specific vulnerability types
trivy image --vuln-type os,library nginx:latest

# With SBOM
trivy image --format cyclonedx nginx:latest > sbom.json

# Exit code on findings
trivy image --exit-code 1 --severity CRITICAL nginx:latest

# Scan filesystem (for built images)
trivy fs --security-checks vuln,secret,config /path/to/project

Grype Scanning

# Scan image
grype nginx:latest

# Output formats
grype nginx:latest -o json > grype.json
grype nginx:latest -o table
grype nginx:latest -o cyclonedx > sbom.xml

# Fail on severity
grype nginx:latest --fail-on high

# Scan SBOM
syft nginx:latest -o json > sbom.json
grype sbom:./sbom.json

# Scan local directory
grype dir:/path/to/project

# Scan tarball
grype docker-archive:./image.tar

SBOM Generation with Syft

# Generate SBOM
syft nginx:latest

# Output formats
syft nginx:latest -o json > sbom.json
syft nginx:latest -o cyclonedx-json > sbom-cyclonedx.json
syft nginx:latest -o spdx-json > sbom-spdx.json

# Scan filesystem
syft dir:/app

# Include file metadata
syft nginx:latest -o json --file-metadata

Image Analysis Checklist

### Base Image
- [ ] Official/verified base image
- [ ] Minimal base (alpine, distroless, scratch)
- [ ] Pinned version (no :latest)
- [ ] Recently updated
- [ ] Known CVE status

### Vulnerabilities
- [ ] No CRITICAL vulnerabilities
- [ ] HIGH vulnerabilities remediated or accepted
- [ ] OS packages updated
- [ ] Application dependencies current

### Secrets
- [ ] No hardcoded credentials
- [ ] No API keys in layers
- [ ] No private keys
- [ ] Environment variables reviewed

### Configuration
- [ ] Non-root user defined
- [ ] Read-only filesystem where possible
- [ ] Minimal capabilities
- [ ] No unnecessary packages

Dockerfile Security

Dockerfile Best Practices

# Use specific version, not latest
FROM python:3.11-slim-bookworm

# Set labels for tracking
LABEL maintainer="security@company.com" \
      version="1.0" \
      description="Secure application container"

# Create non-root user early
RUN groupadd -r appgroup && useradd -r -g appgroup appuser

# Set working directory
WORKDIR /app

# Copy dependency files first (layer caching)
COPY requirements.txt .

# Install dependencies with no cache, minimal packages
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt && \
    apt-get update && \
    apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
        package1 \
        package2 && \
    apt-get clean && \
    rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

# Copy application code
COPY --chown=appuser:appgroup . .

# Remove unnecessary files
RUN rm -rf tests/ docs/ *.md

# Switch to non-root user
USER appuser

# Set read-only where possible
# Use HEALTHCHECK
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
    CMD curl -f http://localhost:8080/health || exit 1

# Expose only necessary ports
EXPOSE 8080

# Use exec form for signals
ENTRYPOINT ["python", "app.py"]

Dockerfile Linting with Hadolint

# Install
brew install hadolint

# Lint Dockerfile
hadolint Dockerfile

# Ignore specific rules
hadolint --ignore DL3008 --ignore DL3009 Dockerfile

# Output formats
hadolint -f json Dockerfile > hadolint.json
hadolint -f sarif Dockerfile > hadolint.sarif

# Strict mode
hadolint --strict Dockerfile

Dockerfile Security Checklist

### User & Permissions
- [ ] USER instruction present (non-root)
- [ ] Files owned by non-root user (COPY --chown)
- [ ] No sudo/su usage
- [ ] Minimal file permissions

### Base Image
- [ ] Official/trusted base image
- [ ] Pinned digest or specific version
- [ ] Minimal base (alpine, slim, distroless)
- [ ] Multi-stage build for smaller image

### Package Management
- [ ] Package versions pinned
- [ ] Package cache cleaned (rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*)
- [ ] --no-install-recommends used
- [ ] pip --no-cache-dir used

### Secrets
- [ ] No secrets in build args
- [ ] No secrets COPY'd into image
- [ ] .dockerignore excludes secrets
- [ ] Multi-stage build hides build secrets

### Network
- [ ] Only required ports EXPOSE'd
- [ ] No SSH server installed
- [ ] No unnecessary network tools

### Runtime
- [ ] HEALTHCHECK defined
- [ ] Exec form for ENTRYPOINT/CMD
- [ ] Signal handling correct
- [ ] Logging to stdout/stderr

Kubernetes Cluster Security

Kubescape Assessment

# Full cluster scan
kubescape scan

# Scan with specific framework
kubescape scan framework nsa
kubescape scan framework mitre
kubescape scan framework cis-v1.23-t1.0.1

# Scan specific namespace
kubescape scan --include-namespaces production

# Scan manifest files
kubescape scan *.yaml

# Output formats
kubescape scan -f json -o results.json
kubescape scan -f sarif -o results.sarif

# Compliance score threshold
kubescape scan --compliance-threshold 80

# Exception handling
kubescape scan --exceptions exceptions.json

# List available frameworks
kubescape list frameworks

kube-bench CIS Benchmark

# Run all checks (run inside cluster)
kube-bench run

# Target specific component
kube-bench run --targets master
kube-bench run --targets node
kube-bench run --targets etcd
kube-bench run --targets policies

# Output formats
kube-bench run --json > kube-bench.json
kube-bench run --junit > kube-bench.xml

# Specific version
kube-bench run --version 1.27

# As Kubernetes job
kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/kube-bench/main/job.yaml
kubectl logs -l app=kube-bench

kube-hunter Penetration Testing

# Remote scanning
kube-hunter --remote <cluster-ip>

# Pod scanning (run as pod in cluster)
kube-hunter --pod

# Active hunting (exploitation attempts)
kube-hunter --active

# Report formats
kube-hunter --report json > kube-hunter.json
kube-hunter --report yaml > kube-hunter.yaml

# Interface mode
kube-hunter --interface

# Specific CIDR
kube-hunter --cidr 10.0.0.0/8

Kubernetes Security Checklist

### Control Plane
- [ ] API server authentication enabled
- [ ] RBAC enabled (no ABAC)
- [ ] Admission controllers configured
- [ ] Audit logging enabled
- [ ] etcd encrypted and authenticated
- [ ] API server TLS configured

### Node Security
- [ ] Nodes hardened (CIS benchmark)
- [ ] kubelet authentication enabled
- [ ] kubelet authorization not AlwaysAllow
- [ ] Read-only port disabled (10255)
- [ ] Container runtime hardened

### Network
- [ ] Network policies enforced
- [ ] Pod-to-pod encryption (service mesh)
- [ ] Ingress TLS configured
- [ ] External access restricted
- [ ] Egress policies defined

### Workload Security
- [ ] Pod Security Standards enforced
- [ ] No privileged containers
- [ ] Read-only root filesystem
- [ ] Resource limits set
- [ ] Service account tokens managed

### RBAC
- [ ] Least privilege roles
- [ ] No cluster-admin for workloads
- [ ] Service accounts per workload
- [ ] Regular access review

Docker Host Security

Docker Bench for Security

# Clone and run
git clone https://github.com/docker/docker-bench-security.git
cd docker-bench-security
sudo sh docker-bench-security.sh

# With specific checks
sudo sh docker-bench-security.sh -c container_images

# Output to file
sudo sh docker-bench-security.sh -l /tmp/docker-bench.log

# JSON output
sudo sh docker-bench-security.sh -j > docker-bench.json

Docker Daemon Configuration

// /etc/docker/daemon.json
{
  "icc": false,
  "userns-remap": "default",
  "no-new-privileges": true,
  "seccomp-profile": "/etc/docker/seccomp-profile.json",
  "storage-driver": "overlay2",
  "log-driver": "json-file",
  "log-opts": {
    "max-size": "10m",
    "max-file": "3"
  },
  "live-restore": true,
  "userland-proxy": false,
  "tls": true,
  "tlscacert": "/etc/docker/ca.pem",
  "tlscert": "/etc/docker/server-cert.pem",
  "tlskey": "/etc/docker/server-key.pem",
  "tlsverify": true
}

Docker Security Checklist

### Daemon
- [ ] TLS enabled for remote access
- [ ] User namespaces enabled
- [ ] Live restore enabled
- [ ] Default ulimits configured
- [ ] Inter-container communication disabled
- [ ] Content trust enabled (DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=1)

### Images
- [ ] Base images from trusted registries
- [ ] Image signing verified
- [ ] Vulnerability scanning in place
- [ ] No secrets in image layers

### Containers
- [ ] Non-root user
- [ ] Read-only root filesystem
- [ ] No privileged containers
- [ ] Capabilities dropped
- [ ] Seccomp profile applied
- [ ] AppArmor/SELinux enabled
- [ ] Resource limits set
- [ ] Health checks defined

### Network
- [ ] User-defined networks (not default bridge)
- [ ] No --network=host
- [ ] Port mapping minimal
- [ ] Sensitive ports protected

### Storage
- [ ] No sensitive host mounts
- [ ] Read-only mounts where possible
- [ ] No /var/run/docker.sock mount
- [ ] Volume driver security reviewed

Container Runtime Security

Falco Runtime Monitoring

# Install via Helm
helm repo add falcosecurity https://falcosecurity.github.io/charts
helm install falco falcosecurity/falco \
  --set driver.kind=modern_ebpf \
  --set tty=true

# View alerts
kubectl logs -l app.kubernetes.io/name=falco -f

# Custom rules
# /etc/falco/rules.d/custom_rules.yaml

Falco Custom Rules

# custom_rules.yaml
- rule: Shell Spawned in Container
  desc: Detect shell spawned in container
  condition: >
    spawned_process and
    container and
    proc.name in (bash, sh, zsh, ksh, csh)
  output: >
    Shell spawned in container
    (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline container=%container.name
     image=%container.image.repository)
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [container, shell]

- rule: Sensitive File Access
  desc: Detect access to sensitive files
  condition: >
    open_read and
    container and
    fd.name pmatch (/etc/shadow, /etc/passwd, /etc/kubernetes/*)
  output: >
    Sensitive file accessed
    (user=%user.name file=%fd.name container=%container.name)
  priority: CRITICAL
  tags: [container, filesystem]

- rule: Unexpected Outbound Connection
  desc: Detect outbound connections from container
  condition: >
    outbound and
    container and
    not (fd.sip.name in (allowed.destinations))
  output: >
    Unexpected outbound connection
    (container=%container.name dest=%fd.sip.name port=%fd.sport)
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [container, network]

- rule: Container Escape Attempt
  desc: Detect potential container escape
  condition: >
    container and
    (evt.type in (ptrace, process_vm_readv, process_vm_writev) or
     fd.name startswith /proc/1/ or
     fd.name = /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern)
  output: >
    Potential container escape attempt
    (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline container=%container.name)
  priority: CRITICAL
  tags: [container, escape]

Seccomp Profiles

// seccomp-profile.json
{
  "defaultAction": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO",
  "architectures": ["SCMP_ARCH_X86_64"],
  "syscalls": [
    {
      "names": [
        "read", "write", "open", "close", "stat", "fstat",
        "mmap", "mprotect", "munmap", "brk", "ioctl",
        "access", "pipe", "select", "sched_yield",
        "dup", "dup2", "clone", "fork", "vfork",
        "execve", "exit", "wait4", "kill", "uname",
        "getcwd", "chdir", "getpid", "getuid", "getgid",
        "socket", "connect", "accept", "bind", "listen",
        "sendto", "recvfrom", "shutdown",
        "openat", "readlinkat", "newfstatat"
      ],
      "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW"
    }
  ]
}

Container Escape Testing

Common Escape Vectors

### Privileged Container

Check if privileged

cat /proc/self/status | grep CapEff

CapEff: 0000003fffffffff = privileged

Mount host filesystem

mkdir /mnt/host mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/host chroot /mnt/host


### Docker Socket Mount

If /var/run/docker.sock is mounted

docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run -v /:/host -it alpine chroot /host


### Kernel Exploits

- Check kernel version: uname -a
- Search for container escape CVEs
- CVE-2022-0185 (fsconfig)
- CVE-2022-0847 (Dirty Pipe)
- CVE-2020-15257 (containerd)

### Capabilities Abuse

Check capabilities

capsh --print

CAP_SYS_ADMIN - mount filesystems

CAP_NET_ADMIN - network manipulation

CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE - file permission bypass

Escape Prevention Checklist

- [ ] No privileged containers
- [ ] Capabilities dropped (--cap-drop=ALL)
- [ ] Only necessary capabilities added
- [ ] No Docker socket mount
- [ ] No host PID/network namespace
- [ ] Seccomp profile enabled
- [ ] AppArmor/SELinux enforcing
- [ ] User namespaces enabled
- [ ] Kernel patched and updated
- [ ] read-only root filesystem

CI/CD Integration

GitHub Actions

name: Container Security

on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
  pull_request:

jobs:
  trivy-scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Build image
        run: docker build -t myapp:${{ github.sha }} .

      - name: Run Trivy vulnerability scanner
        uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master
        with:
          image-ref: myapp:${{ github.sha }}
          format: 'sarif'
          output: 'trivy-results.sarif'
          severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'
          exit-code: '1'

      - name: Upload Trivy scan results
        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v2
        with:
          sarif_file: 'trivy-results.sarif'

  grype-scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Build image
        run: docker build -t myapp:${{ github.sha }} .

      - name: Scan image with Grype
        uses: anchore/scan-action@v3
        with:
          image: myapp:${{ github.sha }}
          fail-build: true
          severity-cutoff: high

  hadolint:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Lint Dockerfile
        uses: hadolint/hadolint-action@v3.1.0
        with:
          dockerfile: Dockerfile
          failure-threshold: error

Kubernetes Admission Control

# Gatekeeper constraint for image scanning
apiVersion: constraints.gatekeeper.sh/v1beta1
kind: K8sImageDigests
metadata:
  name: require-image-digests
spec:
  match:
    kinds:
      - apiGroups: [""]
        kinds: ["Pod"]
    namespaces: ["production"]
  parameters:
    exemptImages:
      - "gcr.io/distroless/*"

Reporting Template

# Container Security Assessment Report

## Executive Summary
- Assessment date: YYYY-MM-DD
- Scope: X images, Y clusters
- Critical vulnerabilities: X
- High vulnerabilities: Y
- Compliance score: Z%

## Image Scan Results

### Image: nginx:1.25
| CVE ID | Severity | Package | Fixed Version |
|--------|----------|---------|---------------|
| CVE-2023-XXXX | CRITICAL | openssl | 3.0.12 |

### Image: app:latest
| CVE ID | Severity | Package | Fixed Version |
|--------|----------|---------|---------------|
| CVE-2023-YYYY | HIGH | python | 3.11.6 |

## Kubernetes Findings

### CIS Benchmark Results
| Section | Pass | Fail | Score |
|---------|------|------|-------|
| Control Plane | 10 | 2 | 83% |
| Worker Nodes | 8 | 1 | 89% |
| Policies | 5 | 3 | 62% |

### Critical Findings
1. [CRITICAL] Privileged containers in production namespace
2. [HIGH] Missing network policies
3. [HIGH] Default service account used

## Recommendations
1. Update base images to patched versions
2. Implement Pod Security Standards
3. Enable network policies
4. Configure runtime monitoring with Falco

Bundled Resources

scripts/

  • scan_images.sh - Batch image scanning automation
  • k8s_audit.sh - Kubernetes security audit script
  • docker_bench_parser.py - Parse Docker Bench results

references/

  • escape_techniques.md - Container escape methodology
  • cis_docker.md - CIS Docker benchmark summary
  • cis_kubernetes.md - CIS Kubernetes benchmark summary

checklists/

  • image_security.md - Image security checklist
  • k8s_hardening.md - Kubernetes hardening checklist
  • docker_hardening.md - Docker daemon hardening checklist

平台分布

Codex

34.51%
按下载量换算25

Claude

30.82%
按下载量换算22

Cursor

20.84%
按下载量换算15

Gemini CLI

10.48%
按下载量换算8

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

未通过

Snyk

可疑

权限和风险

接触敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在提醒或未通过项,安装前请自行复核。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

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