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Agent Skill · 研究检索

mcp-gateway-security(MCP gateway 安全)

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

mcp-gateway-security 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为接触敏感数据;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描已通过,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 67,016。

总安装 256周安装 11GitHub Stars 7下载 90核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:mcp-gateway-security(MCP gateway 安全)
来源仓库:https://github.com/hack23/riksdagsmonitor
仓库路径:skills/mcp-gateway-security
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/hack23/riksdagsmonitor --skill mcp-gateway-security
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/hack23/riksdagsmonitor --skill mcp-gateway-security

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

mcp-gateway-security 用于辅助安全审计和凭据风险管理。适合分析网关认证流程和常见漏洞。不能将工具输出直接当作最终结论,需人工复核关键操作。涉及令牌或生产系统时应先确认最小权限和操作边界。适用宿主包括 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,接入前应确认版本、权限和运行环境要求。

来源仓库内路径:skills/mcp-gateway-security

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/hack23/riksdagsmonitor --skill mcp-gateway-sec…;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要接触敏感数据,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

mcp-gateway-security 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/hack23/riksdagsmonitor --skill mcp-gateway-security。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

mcp-gateway-security 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

mcp-gateway-security 需要什么权限?

权限级别是接触敏感数据。该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

mcp-gateway-security 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

mcp-gateway-security 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 256 次,近一周安装 11 次,下载 90 次,GitHub 7 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

mcp-gateway-security 安全吗?

第三方扫描结果为通过,但这只覆盖已知的静态检查项,不能替代自己读一遍源码和安装命令。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。
  • 第三方扫描已通过,常见的高风险行为没有命中。

先想清楚的地方

  • 需要接触敏感数据,装到常用环境前要先评估影响面。
  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 环境里有大量密钥、凭证,不方便给第三方 Skill 读取的人。
  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
mcp-gateway-security

MCP gateway 安全 · 本页

2567接触敏感数据未明确通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

MCP Gateway Security Skill

Purpose

This skill provides security patterns and best practices for securing MCP (Model Context Protocol) gateway communications in the Riksdagsmonitor platform. It covers token management, request validation, audit logging, and threat mitigation for AI-assisted development workflows.

When to Use This Skill

Apply this skill when:

  • ✅ Hardening MCP gateway configurations
  • ✅ Managing tokens and credentials for MCP servers
  • ✅ Implementing request validation for MCP tool calls
  • ✅ Setting up audit logging for MCP communications
  • ✅ Conducting security reviews of MCP configurations
  • ✅ Responding to security incidents involving MCP
  • ✅ Assessing risks of new MCP server integrations

Do NOT use for:

  • ❌ Initial MCP setup (use mcp-gateway-configuration)
  • ❌ Application-level security (use secure-code-review)
  • ❌ Infrastructure security (use security-architecture-validation)

Threat Model for MCP

Attack Surface

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                 Threat Vectors                │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                              │
│  ┌──────────┐    ┌──────────┐    ┌────────┐ │
│  │ Token     │    │ Prompt   │    │ Supply │ │
│  │ Theft     │    │ Injection│    │ Chain  │ │
│  └────┬─────┘    └────┬─────┘    └───┬────┘ │
│       │               │              │       │
│       ▼               ▼              ▼       │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│  │         MCP Gateway                      │ │
│  └────┬────────────┬────────────┬──────────┘ │
│       │            │            │            │
│  ┌────▼────┐  ┌────▼────┐  ┌───▼─────┐     │
│  │ Unauth  │  │ Data    │  │ Lateral │     │
│  │ Access  │  │ Exfil   │  │ Movement│     │
│  └─────────┘  └─────────┘  └─────────┘     │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Threat Matrix

ThreatLikelihoodImpactMitigation
Token theft from configMediumCriticalEnvironment variables, secret managers
Prompt injection via toolsMediumHighInput validation, output sanitization
Supply chain attack on MCP packagesLowCriticalVersion pinning, integrity checks
Unauthorized file accessMediumHighDirectory restrictions, least privilege
Data exfiltration via MCP toolsLowHighOutput monitoring, allowed destinations
Privilege escalationLowCriticalRole-based access, capability limits

Token Management

Token Security Requirements

RequirementImplementationPriority
No hardcoded tokensEnvironment variables onlyCritical
Token rotationRegular rotation scheduleHigh
Least privilege scopesMinimal required permissionsCritical
Token encryption at restOS keychain or secret managerHigh
Token audit trailLog token usage, not valuesMedium

Secure Token Configuration

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "github": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "github-mcp-server",
      "env": {
        "GITHUB_TOKEN": "${GITHUB_TOKEN}"
      }
    }
  }
}

Token Handling Rules:

✅ DO: Use environment variable references (${VAR_NAME} in MCP JSON config files; $VAR_NAME in shell scripts; ${{ secrets.VAR_NAME }} in GitHub Actions)
✅ DO: Use GitHub Actions secrets for CI/CD tokens
✅ DO: Rotate tokens at least quarterly
✅ DO: Use fine-grained PATs with minimal scopes
✅ DO: Revoke tokens immediately when compromised

❌ DON'T: Hardcode tokens in configuration files
❌ DON'T: Commit tokens to version control
❌ DON'T: Share tokens between environments
❌ DON'T: Use classic PATs with broad scopes
❌ DON'T: Log token values in any log output

GitHub Token Scopes (Principle of Least Privilege)

MCP OperationRequired ScopeJustification
Read codecontents:readCode search and file reading
Create PRspull_requests:writePR creation and updates
Manage issuesissues:writeIssue creation and updates
Read workflowsactions:readCI/CD status checking
Security alertssecurity_events:readCodeQL and Dependabot

Request Validation

Input Validation for MCP Tools

File Operations:

Validation Rules:
1. Path must be within allowed directories
2. Path must not contain traversal sequences (../)
3. File extension must be in allowed list
4. File size must not exceed limits
5. Content must not contain known malicious patterns

Code Operations:

Validation Rules:
1. Branch names must match allowed pattern
2. Commit messages must not contain secrets
3. File content must pass security scanning
4. PR descriptions must not leak sensitive data

Output Sanitization

Before Returning MCP Tool Output:
1. Strip any credential-like patterns
2. Remove internal IP addresses/hostnames
3. Truncate excessively large outputs
4. Validate JSON/structured output format
5. Log sanitization actions for audit

Dangerous Tool Patterns

ToolRiskMitigation
filesystem.write_fileOverwrite critical filesRestrict to project directories
filesystem.deleteData lossRequire confirmation, backup
github.push_filesInject malicious codeCode review before merge
playwright.evaluateExecute arbitrary JSSandbox, restrict domains
bash.executeSystem command executionAllowlist commands, sandbox

Audit Logging

What to Log

EventLog LevelData to Capture
MCP server start/stopINFOServer name, timestamp
Tool invocationINFOTool name, parameters (sanitized)
Authentication successINFOServer name, token type (not value)
Authentication failureWARNServer name, failure reason
Access deniedWARNTool, resource, reason
Configuration changeINFOWhat changed, who changed it
Error/exceptionERRORError details, stack trace

What NOT to Log

❌ Token values or API keys
❌ File contents containing secrets
❌ User passwords or credentials
❌ Full request/response bodies with PII
❌ Internal network topology details

Audit Log Format

{
  "timestamp": "2024-01-15T10:30:00Z",
  "event": "mcp.tool.invocation",
  "server": "github",
  "tool": "create_pull_request",
  "parameters": {
    "owner": "Hack23",
    "repo": "cia",
    "title": "[REDACTED]"
  },
  "result": "success",
  "duration_ms": 1250,
  "user": "copilot-agent"
}

Security Configuration Checklist

Pre-Deployment

□ All tokens use environment variables (never hardcoded)
□ Token scopes follow least privilege
□ Filesystem access restricted to project directory only
□ MCP package versions pinned to specific releases
□ Configuration file committed (without secrets)
□ No sensitive data in MCP server arguments
□ SSE server URLs use HTTPS only
□ Certificate validation enabled for remote servers

Periodic Review (Monthly)

□ Review token scopes — remove unnecessary permissions
□ Rotate tokens per schedule
□ Check for new MCP package versions and CVEs
□ Review audit logs for anomalies
□ Verify directory restrictions still appropriate
□ Test authentication failure handling
□ Review and update threat model
□ Check for deprecated MCP server versions

Incident Response

MCP Security Incident
    │
    ├─→ Token Compromise
    │   ├─→ Revoke token immediately
    │   ├─→ Rotate all related tokens
    │   ├─→ Review audit logs for unauthorized access
    │   └─→ Update token storage mechanism
    │
    ├─→ Unauthorized File Access
    │   ├─→ Review filesystem server configuration
    │   ├─→ Check for directory traversal attempts
    │   ├─→ Restrict filesystem paths
    │   └─→ Review accessed files for data exposure
    │
    ├─→ Supply Chain Attack
    │   ├─→ Pin to known-good version
    │   ├─→ Verify package integrity
    │   ├─→ Check for malicious tool behavior
    │   └─→ Report to MCP package maintainers
    │
    └─→ Prompt Injection
        ├─→ Review tool invocation logs
        ├─→ Identify injected content
        ├─→ Assess data exposure
        └─→ Update input validation rules

OWASP Agentic Security Alignment

OWASP Agentic RiskMCP Mitigation
Excessive AgencyRestrict tool capabilities, require confirmation
Tool MisuseInput validation, output monitoring
Privilege EscalationLeast privilege tokens, capability limits
Data LeakageOutput sanitization, logging controls
Insecure OutputValidate all MCP tool responses
Supply ChainPin versions, verify integrity

ISMS Alignment

Security AreaISO 27001NIST CSFCIS Controls
Token ManagementA.8.24, A.5.17PR.DS-1CIS 3.11
Access ControlA.8.3, A.8.5PR.AC-4CIS 6.1
Audit LoggingA.8.15DE.AE-3CIS 8.2
Input ValidationA.8.28PR.IP-12CIS 16.1
Configuration MgmtA.8.9PR.IP-1CIS 4.1
Incident ResponseA.5.24-A.5.27RS.MA-1CIS 17.1

References

平台分布

Codex

35.56%
按下载量换算32

Claude

32.76%
按下载量换算29

Cursor

17.62%
按下载量换算16

Gemini CLI

10.17%
按下载量换算9

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

接触敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

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