github-actions-oidc-aws（GitHub actions oidc AWS 开发）

GitHub Actions OIDC Authentication for AWS

This is a reference pattern. Learn from the approach, adapt to your context — don't copy verbatim.

Status: 🔴 CRITICAL PATTERN Category: CI/CD / Infrastructure Applies To: Any project using GitHub Actions to deploy to AWS

Overview

Secure authentication pattern for GitHub Actions workflows to access AWS resources using OpenID Connect (OIDC) instead of long-lived IAM credentials. Eliminates the need to store AWS access keys in GitHub secrets.

Key Benefits:

• No long-lived credentials to rotate or leak
• Temporary credentials with automatic expiration
• Repository-scoped access control
• Audit trail via AWS CloudTrail
• Industry best practice (AWS + GitHub recommended)

Problem

GitHub Actions workflows need to authenticate to AWS to deploy infrastructure, trigger pipelines, or manage resources. Traditional approaches have security issues:

Anti-Pattern: Static IAM Credentials

# ❌ Security risk: long-lived credentials in secrets
- uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
  with:
    aws-access-key-id: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
    aws-secret-access-key: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}

Problems:

• Credentials never expire (must be manually rotated)
• If leaked, attacker has persistent access
• No way to scope to specific repositories
• Difficult to audit which workflow used credentials
• Violates principle of least privilege

Solution

Use GitHub's OIDC provider to issue temporary credentials via AWS IAM role assumption.

Flow:

GitHub Actions → OIDC Token → AWS STS → Temporary Credentials → AWS Resources

How it works:

1. GitHub Actions requests OIDC token from GitHub
2. Workflow presents token to AWS STS
3. AWS validates token against IAM OIDC provider
4. AWS issues temporary credentials (valid 1 hour)
5. Workflow uses temporary credentials to access AWS

Components

1. AWS IAM OIDC Provider

Establishes trust between AWS and GitHub's OIDC issuer.

Configuration:

• URL: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
• Audience: sts.amazonaws.com
• Thumbprint: 1c58a3a8518e8759bf075b76b750d4f2df264fcd (GitHub root CA)

Why root CA thumbprint?

• More stable than intermediate certificate
• GitHub can rotate intermediate certs without breaking trust
• Recommended by AWS documentation

2. IAM Role with Trust Policy

Role that GitHub Actions can assume, with trust policy restricting access.

Trust Policy Structure:

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [{
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Principal": {
      "Federated": "arn:aws:iam::{account}:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
    },
    "Action": "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
    "Condition": {
      "StringEquals": {
        "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud": "sts.amazonaws.com"
      },
      "StringLike": {
        "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub": "repo:{owner}/{repo}:*"
      }
    }
  }]
}

Trust Policy Scoping Options:

# All branches and tags
"repo:owner/repo:*"

# Specific branch only
"repo:owner/repo:ref:refs/heads/main"

# Multiple branches
["repo:owner/repo:ref:refs/heads/main", "repo:owner/repo:ref:refs/heads/dev"]

# Pull requests
"repo:owner/repo:pull_request"

# Environment-specific
"repo:owner/repo:environment:production"

3. IAM Permissions Policy

Defines what the role can do in AWS (principle of least privilege).

Examples by use case:

Pipeline Trigger Only:

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [{
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": "codepipeline:StartPipelineExecution",
    "Resource": "arn:aws:codepipeline:*:{account}:pipeline-name-*"
  }]
}

Direct S3 Deployment:

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": ["s3:PutObject", "s3:DeleteObject", "s3:ListBucket"],
      "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::bucket-name", "arn:aws:s3:::bucket-name/*"]
    },
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "cloudfront:CreateInvalidation",
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}

Infrastructure Deployment (use with caution):

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [{
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": "*",
    "Resource": "*"
  }]
}

4. GitHub Actions Workflow Configuration

Workflow must request OIDC token and assume role.

Required Permissions:

permissions:
  id-token: write  # Required for OIDC token
  contents: read   # Required to checkout code

Authentication Step:

- uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
  with:
    role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::{account}:role/{role-name}
    aws-region: {region}

Implementation

Step 1: Create OIDC Provider (One-Time Setup)

Choose your infrastructure tool:

AWS CDK (TypeScript):

import * as iam from 'aws-cdk-lib/aws-iam';

const provider = new iam.OpenIdConnectProvider(this, 'GitHubProvider', {
  url: 'https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com',
  clientIds: ['sts.amazonaws.com'],
  thumbprints: ['1c58a3a8518e8759bf075b76b750d4f2df264fcd']
});

Terraform:

resource "aws_iam_openid_connect_provider" "github" {
  url = "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
  client_id_list = ["sts.amazonaws.com"]
  thumbprint_list = ["1c58a3a8518e8759bf075b76b750d4f2df264fcd"]
}

AWS CLI:

aws iam create-open-id-connect-provider \
  --url https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  --client-id-list sts.amazonaws.com \
  --thumbprint-list 1c58a3a8518e8759bf075b76b750d4f2df264fcd

CloudFormation:

GitHubOIDCProvider:
  Type: AWS::IAM::OIDCProvider
  Properties:
    Url: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
    ClientIdList:
      - sts.amazonaws.com
    ThumbprintList:
      - 1c58a3a8518e8759bf075b76b750d4f2df264fcd

Step 2: Create IAM Role

AWS CDK (TypeScript):

const role = new iam.Role(this, 'GitHubActionsRole', {
  roleName: 'GitHubActionsRole',
  assumedBy: new iam.WebIdentityPrincipal(provider.openIdConnectProviderArn, {
    StringEquals: {
      'token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud': 'sts.amazonaws.com'
    },
    StringLike: {
      'token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub': `repo:${owner}/${repo}:*`
    }
  }),
  inlinePolicies: {
    DeploymentPermissions: new iam.PolicyDocument({
      statements: [
        new iam.PolicyStatement({
          effect: iam.Effect.ALLOW,
          actions: ['codepipeline:StartPipelineExecution'],
          resources: [`arn:aws:codepipeline:*:${this.account}:pipeline-*`]
        })
      ]
    })
  }
});

Terraform:

resource "aws_iam_role" "github_actions" {
  name = "GitHubActionsRole"

  assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
    Version = "2012-10-17"
    Statement = [{
      Effect = "Allow"
      Principal = {
        Federated = aws_iam_openid_connect_provider.github.arn
      }
      Action = "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"
      Condition = {
        StringEquals = {
          "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud" = "sts.amazonaws.com"
        }
        StringLike = {
          "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub" = "repo:${var.github_owner}/${var.github_repo}:*"
        }
      }
    }]
  })
}

resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "github_actions" {
  name = "deployment-permissions"
  role = aws_iam_role.github_actions.id

  policy = jsonencode({
    Version = "2012-10-17"
    Statement = [{
      Effect = "Allow"
      Action = "codepipeline:StartPipelineExecution"
      Resource = "arn:aws:codepipeline:*:${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:pipeline-*"
    }]
  })
}

Step 3: Update GitHub Actions Workflow

Before (Static Credentials):

name: Deploy
on: [push]

jobs:
  deploy:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
        with:
          aws-access-key-id: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
          aws-secret-access-key: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
          aws-region: us-east-1

      - run: aws s3 sync ./dist s3://my-bucket

After (OIDC):

name: Deploy
on: [push]

permissions:
  id-token: write
  contents: read

jobs:
  deploy:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
        with:
          role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/GitHubActionsRole
          aws-region: us-east-1

      - run: aws s3 sync ./dist s3://my-bucket

Step 4: Remove Old Secrets (Cleanup)

# List current secrets
gh secret list

# Remove old credentials
gh secret remove AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID
gh secret remove AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY

Configuration Management

Avoid Hardcoding Account IDs

Anti-Pattern:

role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/GitHubActionsRole

Better: Use Repository Variables:

role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::${{ vars.AWS_ACCOUNT_ID }}:role/GitHubActionsRole

Best: Read from Configuration File:

- name: Load config
  id: config
  run: |
    echo "account=$(grep '^AWS_ACCOUNT_ID=' .env | cut -d'=' -f2)" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
    echo "region=$(grep '^AWS_REGION=' .env | cut -d'=' -f2)" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT

- uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
  with:
    role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::${{ steps.config.outputs.account }}:role/GitHubActionsRole
    aws-region: ${{ steps.config.outputs.region }}

Deployment Patterns

Pattern A: Pipeline Trigger

GitHub Actions triggers AWS CodePipeline, which handles actual deployment.

Use When:

• Complex multi-stage deployments
• Need AWS-native deployment history
• Want to trigger from multiple sources
• Build requires significant compute resources

Workflow:

permissions:
  id-token: write
  contents: read

jobs:
  trigger:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
        with:
          role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::${{ vars.AWS_ACCOUNT_ID }}:role/GitHubActionsRole
          aws-region: ${{ vars.AWS_REGION }}

      - run: aws codepipeline start-pipeline-execution --name my-pipeline

IAM Permissions:

{
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Action": "codepipeline:StartPipelineExecution",
  "Resource": "arn:aws:codepipeline:*:*:pipeline-name"
}

Pattern B: Direct Deployment

GitHub Actions performs full deployment (build + deploy).

Use When:

• Simple static site deployments
• Want fast feedback loops
• Prefer GitHub Actions native features
• Cost-conscious (avoid CodePipeline/CodeBuild costs)

Workflow:

permissions:
  id-token: write
  contents: read

jobs:
  deploy:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
        with:
          node-version: 20

      - run: npm ci && npm run build

      - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
        with:
          role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::${{ vars.AWS_ACCOUNT_ID }}:role/GitHubActionsRole
          aws-region: ${{ vars.AWS_REGION }}

      - run: |
          aws s3 sync dist/ s3://my-bucket/ --delete
          aws cloudfront create-invalidation --distribution-id ${{ vars.CF_DIST_ID }} --paths "/*"

IAM Permissions:

{
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": ["s3:PutObject", "s3:DeleteObject", "s3:ListBucket"],
      "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*", "arn:aws:s3:::bucket"]
    },
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "cloudfront:CreateInvalidation",
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}

Pattern C: Infrastructure Deployment

GitHub Actions deploys infrastructure changes (CDK, Terraform, CloudFormation).

Use When:

• Infrastructure as Code workflows
• Want PR-based infrastructure reviews
• Need to validate changes before merge

Workflow:

permissions:
  id-token: write
  contents: read
  pull-requests: write  # For PR comments

jobs:
  plan:
    if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
        with:
          role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::${{ vars.AWS_ACCOUNT_ID }}:role/GitHubActionsTerraformRole
          aws-region: ${{ vars.AWS_REGION }}

      - run: terraform plan -out=plan.tfplan

      - uses: actions/github-script@v7
        with:
          script: |
            // Post plan to PR comment

  apply:
    if: github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
        with:
          role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::${{ vars.AWS_ACCOUNT_ID }}:role/GitHubActionsTerraformRole
          aws-region: ${{ vars.AWS_REGION }}

      - run: terraform apply -auto-approve

IAM Permissions: Typically requires broad permissions (AdministratorAccess or PowerUserAccess). Consider using separate roles for plan (read-only) vs apply (write).

Multi-Environment Strategy

Separate Roles per Environment

Recommended: Create separate roles for dev/staging/prod with different permissions.

CDK Example:

['dev', 'prod'].forEach(env => {
  new iam.Role(this, `GitHubActionsRole-${env}`, {
    roleName: `GitHubActionsRole-${env}`,
    assumedBy: new iam.WebIdentityPrincipal(provider.openIdConnectProviderArn, {
      StringEquals: {
        'token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud': 'sts.amazonaws.com'
      },
      StringLike: {
        'token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub':
          env === 'prod'
            ? `repo:${owner}/${repo}:ref:refs/heads/main`
            : `repo:${owner}/${repo}:ref:refs/heads/dev`
      }
    })
  });
});

Workflow:

- name: Determine environment
  id: env
  run: |
    if [ "${{ github.ref }}" = "refs/heads/main" ]; then
      echo "name=prod" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
    else
      echo "name=dev" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
    fi

- uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
  with:
    role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::${{ vars.AWS_ACCOUNT_ID }}:role/GitHubActionsRole-${{ steps.env.outputs.name }}
    aws-region: ${{ vars.AWS_REGION }}

Security Considerations

1. Principle of Least Privilege

Always grant minimum permissions required:

// ❌ Too broad
{
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Action": "*",
  "Resource": "*"
}

// ✅ Specific
{
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Action": "codepipeline:StartPipelineExecution",
  "Resource": "arn:aws:codepipeline:us-east-1:123456789012:my-pipeline"
}

2. Repository Scoping

Always restrict to specific repository:

// ❌ Any repository in organization
"token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub": "repo:my-org/*"

// ✅ Specific repository
"token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub": "repo:my-org/my-repo:*"

// ✅ Even more specific (main branch only)
"token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub": "repo:my-org/my-repo:ref:refs/heads/main"

3. Audience Validation

Always validate audience:

{
  "StringEquals": {
    "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud": "sts.amazonaws.com"
  }
}

4. Session Duration

Default: 1 hour (sufficient for most workflows)

Custom duration (if needed):

- uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
  with:
    role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/GitHubActionsRole
    role-duration-seconds: 3600  # 1 hour (default)
    aws-region: us-east-1

5. CloudTrail Auditing

Monitor role assumptions:

aws cloudtrail lookup-events \
  --lookup-attributes AttributeKey=EventName,AttributeValue=AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity \
  --max-results 10

Key fields to monitor:

• userIdentity.principalId: GitHub repository and workflow
• requestParameters.roleArn: Which role was assumed
• sourceIPAddress: GitHub Actions IP range
• userAgent: GitHub Actions user agent

Troubleshooting

Error: "Not authorized to perform sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"

Cause: Trust policy doesn't match workflow context.

Check:

1. Repository name matches trust policy
2. Branch/tag matches trust policy condition
3. Workflow has id-token: write permission

Debug:

- name: Debug OIDC token
  run: |
    curl -H "Authorization: bearer $ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN" \
      "$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL&audience=sts.amazonaws.com" | jq

Error: "OpenIDConnect provider not found"

Cause: OIDC provider not created or wrong ARN.

Fix:

# List providers
aws iam list-open-id-connect-providers

# Check provider details
aws iam get-open-id-connect-provider \
  --open-id-connect-provider-arn arn:aws:iam::123456789012:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com

Error: "Access Denied" after successful authentication

Cause: Role lacks required permissions.

Fix: Update role's permissions policy to include required actions.

Workflow doesn't request OIDC token

Cause: Missing id-token: write permission.

Fix:

permissions:
  id-token: write  # Add this
  contents: read

Migration Checklist

Migrating from static credentials to OIDC:

• Create OIDC provider in AWS account
• Create IAM role with trust policy
• Attach permissions policy to role
• Test role assumption manually (optional)
• Update workflow to use OIDC
• Add permissions block to workflow
• Replace credential secrets with role ARN
• Test workflow in non-production environment
• Verify CloudTrail logs show role assumption
• Deploy to production
• Remove old AWS credential secrets from GitHub
• Revoke/delete old IAM user (if applicable)
• Document role ARN and permissions

References

• GitHub Actions OIDC Documentation
• AWS IAM OIDC Provider Documentation
• aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials
• GitHub OIDC Token Claims
• AWS Security Blog: Use IAM roles to connect GitHub Actions

Progressive Improvement

If the developer corrects a behavior that this skill should have prevented, suggest a specific amendment to this skill to prevent the same correction in the future.