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Agent Skill · 研究检索

fuzz(fuzz 搜索)

fuzz 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

fuzz 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为执行命令;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描有提醒项,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 69,522。

总安装 218周安装 9GitHub Stars 9下载 71核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:fuzz(fuzz 搜索)
来源仓库:https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code
仓库路径:skills/fuzz
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill fuzz
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill fuzz

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

fuzz 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息。适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中根据关键词快速定位候选结果。通过 npx skills add 命令从指定仓库安装,需确认权限和维护状态。使用前应核实是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写操作。

建议结合原始 README 和项目实际情况验证具体用法。

来源仓库内路径:skills/fuzz

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill fuzz;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要执行命令,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

fuzz 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill fuzz。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

fuzz 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

fuzz 需要什么权限?

权限级别是执行命令。安装流程涉及命令执行,可能通过 npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill fuzz 联网下载 Skill 或依赖。用户安装前应确认命令来源、仓库内容和执行环境。

fuzz 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

fuzz 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 218 次,近一周安装 9 次,下载 71 次,GitHub 9 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

fuzz 安全吗?

第三方扫描有提醒项,说明存在需要人工确认的行为。安装前请打开源码看清它读了什么、联网到哪里。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。

先想清楚的地方

  • 需要执行命令,装到常用环境前要先评估影响面。
  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方扫描存在提醒项或未通过项,需要人工逐条确认。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 不能接受 Skill 在你机器上执行命令的人。
  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
fuzz

fuzz 搜索 · 本页

2189执行命令未明确有提醒

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Fuzz Input Generation

Generate intelligent, context-aware fuzz test inputs by analyzing input parsing code. Produces boundary values, type confusion inputs, encoding edge cases, format-specific attacks, and injection payloads tailored to the specific parser and data types in scope. Output is structured JSON test case sets ready for integration with test harnesses.

Supported Flags

Read ../../shared/schemas/flags.md for the full flag specification.

FlagFuzz Behavior
--scopeIdentifies which input handlers to generate fuzz inputs for. Default changed.
--depth quickStandard boundary values and common injection strings only.
--depth standardContext-aware inputs based on code analysis of the parser.
--depth deepStandard + format-specific attacks, encoding mutations, and chained payloads.
--depth expertDeep + adversarial inputs designed to bypass specific validation logic found in code.
--severityGenerate inputs targeting vulnerabilities at or above this severity.
--formatDefault json. Use text for human-readable listing.

Workflow

Step 1: Identify Input Handlers

Locate input parsing and processing code in scope:

  1. API endpoint handlers: Functions that read request body, query params, headers.
  2. File parsers: Functions that parse uploaded files, config files, data imports.
  3. CLI argument parsers: Argument parsing with argparse, commander, cobra, clap.
  4. Message consumers: Functions processing messages from queues, WebSockets, SSE.
  5. Deserialization points: JSON.parse, XML parsing, YAML loading, protobuf decoding.
  6. Database query builders: Functions constructing queries from user input.

For each handler, identify:

  • Expected input type (string, number, array, object, file).
  • Validation rules (regex, schema, type checks, length limits).
  • How the input is used downstream (SQL, shell, HTML, file path, URL, regex).

Step 2: Analyze Input Constraints

Read the code to understand what the parser expects and what it guards against:

  1. Type expectations: What types does the code assume? Where are type coercions?
  2. Length limits: Are there explicit length checks? What happens at max length?
  3. Character restrictions: Are certain characters filtered or escaped? Which ones?
  4. Format requirements: Does the input need to match a pattern (email, URL, date)?
  5. Range constraints: Numeric bounds, enum values, allowed file extensions.
  6. Nested structure: How deep can objects/arrays nest? Are there recursion limits?

Step 3: Generate Boundary Value Inputs

For each input field, generate boundary value test cases:

Input TypeBoundary Values
StringEmpty "", single char "a", max length, max length + 1, unicode BOM, null bytes "\x00"
Number0, -1, MAX_INT, MIN_INT, MAX_INT+1, NaN, Infinity, -Infinity, float precision edge cases
ArrayEmpty [], single element, very large array (10000+), nested arrays, mixed types
ObjectEmpty {}, deeply nested (100+ levels), circular reference attempt, prototype keys
Booleantrue, false, 0, 1, "", "false", null, undefined
DateEpoch 0, negative timestamp, far future, invalid dates (Feb 30), timezone edge cases
FileEmpty file, 0-byte, huge file, wrong extension, polyglot file, symlink

Step 4: Generate Type Confusion Inputs

Inputs designed to exploit type coercion and type assumption bugs:

Generate inputs that send the wrong type: string where number expected, array where string expected, object with toString override, deeply nested arrays, null where required, boolean where string expected, numeric string where number expected, and prototype/constructor pollution objects (__proto__, constructor.prototype).

Step 5: Generate Encoding Edge Cases

Inputs exploiting encoding and character set handling:

  1. Unicode: Normalization forms (NFC, NFD, NFKC, NFKD), homoglyphs, right-to-left override, zero-width characters.
  2. URL encoding: Double encoding (%2527), mixed encoding, overlong UTF-8.
  3. HTML entities: Named (&), numeric (&), hex (&), surrogate pairs.
  4. Null bytes: Mid-string null bytes for truncation attacks.
  5. Line endings: \r\n, \r, \n, \x0b, \x0c, \x85, \u2028, \u2029.
  6. Case mapping: Turkish locale I/i dotless variants, German ß/SS.

Step 6: Generate Context-Aware Injection Payloads

Based on how the input is used downstream (identified in Step 1), generate targeted payloads:

Sink ContextPayload Category
SQL querySQL injection: UNION, boolean blind, time blind, stacked queries, comment-based
Shell commandCommand injection: semicolons, pipes, backticks, $(), newlines
HTML outputXSS: script tags, event handlers, SVG/MathML, template injection
File pathPath traversal: ../, null bytes, long paths, reserved names (CON, NUL)
URL constructionSSRF: localhost variants, IPv6, DNS rebinding, scheme confusion
Regex inputReDoS: catastrophic backtracking patterns, exponential quantifiers
XML parserXXE: external entity, parameter entity, SSRF via DTD
LDAP queryLDAP injection: wildcards, boolean operators, null bytes
Header valueHeader injection: CRLF, response splitting
JSON parserJSON interoperability: duplicate keys, large numbers, deep nesting

Step 7: Generate Format-Specific Attacks

At --depth deep and above, generate inputs targeting specific file/data formats:

  1. JSON: Duplicate keys (parser-dependent behavior), comments, trailing commas, BOM prefix.
  2. XML: Billion laughs, quadratic blowup, external entities, CDATA abuse.
  3. YAML: Anchor bombs, merge keys, tag deserialization (!!python/object).
  4. CSV: Formula injection (=CMD()), field separator in values, newlines in quoted fields.
  5. JWT: Algorithm none, key confusion (RS256/HS256), expired but valid signature.
  6. GraphQL: Deep nesting, alias flooding, batch query abuse, introspection.
  7. Multipart: Boundary manipulation, filename traversal, content-type mismatch.

Step 8: Output Test Case Sets

Organize all generated inputs into structured JSON test case sets:

{
  "target": {
    "file": "src/api/users.ts",
    "function": "createUser",
    "input_field": "email",
    "expected_type": "string",
    "downstream_use": ["sql_query", "html_email"]
  },
  "generated_at": "2026-02-14T10:30:00Z",
  "total_cases": 85,
  "test_cases": [
    {
      "id": "FUZZ-001",
      "category": "boundary",
      "label": "empty_string",
      "input": "",
      "expected_behavior": "validation_error",
      "targets_cwe": "CWE-20"
    },
    {
      "id": "FUZZ-002",
      "category": "injection_sql",
      "label": "union_select",
      "input": "test@test.com' UNION SELECT * FROM users--",
      "expected_behavior": "parameterized_query_prevents_injection",
      "targets_cwe": "CWE-89"
    }
  ]
}

Write test case files to .appsec/fuzz/ organized by target.

Output Format

Fuzz inputs are not findings themselves but may reference CWEs they target.

Finding ID prefix: FUZZ (e.g., FUZZ-001) for test case identification.

  • metadata.tool: "fuzz"

If fuzz testing reveals an actual vulnerability (input causes unexpected behavior), emit a finding using ../../shared/schemas/findings.md.

Pragmatism Notes

  • Generate inputs relevant to the actual technology. Do not generate SQL injection payloads for code that never touches a database.
  • Respect the --depth flag. Quick depth should produce 10-20 inputs. Expert depth can produce hundreds.
  • Label each input clearly so testers understand what it targets and what behavior to expect.
  • Mark intentionally dangerous inputs (e.g., billion laughs XML) with a warning about resource consumption.
  • These are test inputs, not exploit code. Frame output as defensive testing material.
  • If the code already has strong validation visible in the source, generate inputs that specifically test the validation boundaries.
  • Include both inputs that should be rejected (malicious) and inputs that should be accepted (edge case valid) to test for false positives in validation.

平台分布

Codex

36.38%
按下载量换算26

Claude

28.67%
按下载量换算20

Cursor

17.68%
按下载量换算13

Gemini CLI

8.12%
按下载量换算6

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

可疑

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

执行命令

安装流程涉及命令执行,可能通过 npx skills add https://github.com/florianbuetow/claude-code --skill fuzz 联网下载 Skill 或依赖。用户安装前应确认命令来源、仓库内容和执行环境。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在提醒或未通过项,安装前请自行复核。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

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