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Agent Skill · 研究检索

threat-modeling(威胁建模)

threat-modeling 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

threat-modeling 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为只读;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描有未通过项,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 66,424。

总安装 264周安装 11GitHub Stars 262下载 88核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:threat-modeling(威胁建模)
来源仓库:https://github.com/fr33d3m0n/threat-modeling
仓库路径:skills/threat-modeling
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/fr33d3m0n/threat-modeling --skill threat-modeling
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/fr33d3m0n/threat-modeling --skill threat-modeling

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

threat-modeling 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息。适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中根据关键词快速定位候选结果。可通过 npx skills add 命令从指定仓库安装并使用。安装前需确认权限范围、维护状态及是否触发联网或文件操作。

建议结合原始 README 核验具体用法和功能细节。

来源仓库内路径:skills/threat-modeling

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/fr33d3m0n/threat-modeling --skill threat-model…;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它标注为只读,先用只读任务试一次,确认行为符合预期再扩大使用范围。

常见问题

6 条

threat-modeling 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/fr33d3m0n/threat-modeling --skill threat-modeling。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

threat-modeling 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

threat-modeling 需要什么权限?

权限级别是只读。该 Skill 主要提供规则、说明或参考内容,本身偏只读;真正读写文件、联网或执行命令仍取决于宿主 Agent 的任务。

threat-modeling 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

threat-modeling 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 264 次,近一周安装 11 次,下载 88 次,GitHub 262 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

threat-modeling 安全吗?

第三方扫描有未通过项,风险较高。除非你确认过源码,否则不建议直接安装到常用环境。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。
  • 标注为只读权限,试用阶段不容易误改本地文件。

先想清楚的地方

  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方扫描存在提醒项或未通过项,需要人工逐条确认。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。
  • 只想先试试效果、不希望它改动本地文件的人。

不太适合

  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
threat-modeling

威胁建模 · 本页

264262只读未明确未通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Note: All relative paths in this skill are relative to SKILL_PATH / CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR (the directory containing this SKILL.md file). Use ${SKILL_PATH:-$CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR} in Bash commands for cross-runtime compatibility.

Threat Modeling Skill v3.1.1 (20260420a)

AI-native automated software risk analysis skill. LLM-driven, Code-First approach for comprehensive security risk assessment, threat modeling, security testing, penetration testing, and compliance checking.

Version Banner

━━━ 🛡️ Threat Modeling Skill v3.1.1 (20260420a) ━━━

Command Line Flags

FlagDescriptionDefault
--debugPublish internal YAML data files, KB queries, coverage validation, and evaluation reportOFF
--lang=xxSet output language (en, zh, ja, ko, es, fr, de, pt, ru)Auto-detect
--detailedAuto-trigger P8R (detailed per-VR analysis reports) after P8 completesOFF

Usage Examples:

# Default mode - 11 deliverable files only
/threat-model @my-project

# Debug mode - all internal files published
/threat-model @my-project --debug

# Chinese output with debug
/threat-model @my-project --lang=zh --debug

# Generate detailed per-VR analysis reports after P8
/threat-model @my-project --detailed

# Full options
/threat-model @my-project --detailed --debug --lang=zh

⚠️ CRITICAL: Data vs Report Separation

PRINCIPLE: Markdown is for reports (human-readable), YAML is for data (machine-readable). They MUST be separated!
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  DUAL OUTPUT MODEL - Each phase produces TWO files:                 │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                      │
│  1. DATA FILE (.yaml) - PRIMARY                                     │
│     • Written FIRST                                                  │
│     • Structured, machine-readable                                   │
│     • Used by NEXT phase as input                                    │
│     • Path: .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P{N}_*.yaml            │
│                                                                      │
│  2. REPORT FILE (.md) - SECONDARY                                   │
│     • Written AFTER data file                                        │
│     • Human-readable, formatted                                      │
│     • For review and documentation                                   │
│     • Path: .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/reports/P{N}-*.md           │
│                                                                      │
│  ❌ FORBIDDEN: Reading .md files for data extraction                │
│  ❌ FORBIDDEN: Embedding data as yaml blocks inside .md AS SOURCE   │
│  ✅ ALLOWED: YAML blocks in .md for schema documentation/examples   │
│  ✅ REQUIRED: Data flows via .yaml files only                       │
│                                                                      │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

§1 Execution Model

Mode: Full Assessment Only - All 8 phases executed sequentially.

Phase 1 ──► Phase 2 ──► Phase 3 ──► Phase 4 ──► Phase 5 ──► Phase 6 ──► Phase 7 ──► Phase 8
   │            │            │            │            │            │            │
   ▼            ▼            ▼            ▼            ▼            ▼            ▼
P1.yaml ──► P2.yaml ──► P3.yaml ──► P4.yaml ──► P5.yaml ──► P6.yaml ──► P7.yaml ──► P8.yaml

Rules:

  1. Phases execute strictly in order (1→8)
  2. Each phase reads previous phase's YAML, writes its own YAML
  3. Each phase also writes a human-readable.md report
  4. Validation runs on YAML files, not.md files
  5. Phase 6 = Risk Validation (NOT mitigation)
  6. Phase 7 = Mitigation Planning (AFTER validation)

Phase Gate Protocol:

FOR each phase N in [1..8]:
    1. Read: @phases/P{N}-*.md (instructions)
    2. Read: .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P{N-1}_*.yaml (input, except P1)
    3. Execute analysis per phase instructions
    4. Write: .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/P{N}_*.yaml (PRIMARY output)
    5. Write: .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/reports/P{N}-*.md (SECONDARY output)
    6. Hook validates YAML file
    7. IF exit != 0: Fix YAML and rewrite
    8. IF exit == 0: Update session meta, continue to N+1

§2 Output Convention

Output Modes

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  OUTPUT MODES - Control what files are generated                    │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                      │
│  DEFAULT MODE (Production)                                          │
│  ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  │
│  Only user-deliverable files are published:                         │
│  ✅ 4 Required Reports (RISK-ASSESSMENT, INVENTORY, MITIGATION,    │
│                         PENETRATION-TEST-PLAN)                      │
│  ✅ 7 Phase Reports (P1-P7-*.md) for audit trail                    │
│  ❌ .phase_working/ - NOT published (kept internally)               │
│  ❌ YAML data files - NOT published                                 │
│  ❌ EVALUATION-REPORT.md - NOT published                            │
│                                                                      │
│  DEBUG MODE (--debug flag)                                          │
│  ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────  │
│  All files are published including internal data:                   │
│  ✅ All default mode outputs                                        │
│  ✅ .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/data/*.yaml - Published             │
│  ✅ P5_knowledge_base_queries.yaml - Published                      │
│  ✅ P8_coverage_validation.yaml - Published                         │
│  ✅ EVALUATION-REPORT.md - Published                                │
│                                                                      │
│  Usage: /threat-model @project --debug                              │
│                                                                      │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Directory Structure

Default Mode (11 files published):

{PROJECT_ROOT}/
└── Risk_Assessment_Report/
    ├── {PROJECT}-RISK-ASSESSMENT-REPORT.md    ← Required (P8)
    ├── {PROJECT}-RISK-INVENTORY.md            ← Required (P6)
    ├── {PROJECT}-MITIGATION-MEASURES.md       ← Required (P7)
    ├── {PROJECT}-PENETRATION-TEST-PLAN.md     ← Required (P6)
    ├── P1-PROJECT-UNDERSTANDING.md            ← Phase reports
    ├── P2-DFD-ANALYSIS.md
    ├── P3-TRUST-BOUNDARY.md
    ├── P4-SECURITY-DESIGN-REVIEW.md
    ├── P5-STRIDE-THREATS.md
    ├── P6-RISK-VALIDATION.md
    ├── P7-MITIGATION-PLAN.md
    ├── detailed/                              ← P8R only (--detailed flag)
    │   ├── VR-001-{title-slug}.md
    │   └── ...
    └── html/                                  ← HTML output (report_generator.py)
        ├── index.html
        ├── {PROJECT}-RISK-ASSESSMENT-REPORT.html
        ├── ...
        └── detailed/
            └── VR-001-{slug}.html

Debug Mode (--debug, full structure):

{PROJECT_ROOT}/
└── Risk_Assessment_Report/
    ├── {PROJECT}-RISK-ASSESSMENT-REPORT.md    ← Main report (from P8)
    ├── {PROJECT}-RISK-INVENTORY.md            ← From P6 YAML
    ├── {PROJECT}-MITIGATION-MEASURES.md       ← From P7 YAML
    ├── {PROJECT}-PENETRATION-TEST-PLAN.md     ← From P6 YAML
    ├── {PROJECT}-ARCHITECTURE-ANALYSIS.md     ← From P1-P3 YAML
    ├── {PROJECT}-DFD-DIAGRAM.md               ← From P2 YAML
    ├── {PROJECT}-COMPLIANCE-REPORT.md         ← From P4+P7 YAML
    ├── {PROJECT}-ATTACK-PATH-VALIDATION.md    ← From P6 YAML
    ├── P1-PROJECT-UNDERSTANDING.md            ← Published phase reports
    ├── P2-DFD-ANALYSIS.md
    ├── P3-TRUST-BOUNDARY.md
    ├── P4-SECURITY-DESIGN-REVIEW.md
    ├── P5-STRIDE-THREATS.md
    ├── P6-RISK-VALIDATION.md
    ├── EVALUATION-REPORT.md                   ← DEBUG ONLY
    └── .phase_working/                        ← DEBUG ONLY
        ├── _sessions_index.yaml               ← Multi-session index (optional)
        └── {SESSION_ID}/                      ← Session isolated directory
            ├── _session_meta.yaml             ← Session state
            ├── data/                          ← STRUCTURED DATA
            │   ├── P1_project_context.yaml
            │   ├── P2_dfd_elements.yaml
            │   ├── P3_boundary_context.yaml
            │   ├── P4_security_gaps.yaml
            │   ├── P5_threat_inventory.yaml
            │   ├── P5_knowledge_base_queries.yaml  ← KB transparency
            │   ├── P6_validated_risks.yaml
            │   ├── P7_mitigation_plan.yaml
            │   ├── P8_report_manifest.yaml
            │   └── P8_coverage_validation.yaml     ← Coverage metrics
            ├── reports/                       ← WORKING REPORTS
            │   └── (phase reports during execution)
            └── data/P8R_manifest.yaml         ← P8R manifest (--detailed only)

Naming Convention

  • PROJECT: Uppercase, max 30 chars, format: ^[A-Z][A-Z0-9-]{0,29}$
  • Example: OPEN-WEBUI, MY-PROJECT, STRIDE-DEMO

Session ID Format

  • SESSION_ID: {PROJECT_NAME}_{YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS}
  • Example: OPEN-WEBUI_20260130_143022

Session Metadata

# .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/_session_meta.yaml
schema_version: "3.1.1 (20260420a)"
session_id: "OPEN-WEBUI_20260130_143022"  # {PROJECT}_{YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS}
project_name: "OPEN-WEBUI"
project_path: "/path/to/project"
started_at: "ISO8601 timestamp"
language: "en"
skill_version: "3.1.1 (20260420a)"

phases:
  P1:
    status: "completed"
    started_at: "2026-01-30T10:00:00Z"
    completed_at: "2026-01-30T10:30:00Z"
    data_file: "data/P1_project_context.yaml"
    report_file: "reports/P1-PROJECT-UNDERSTANDING.md"
  P2:
    status: "in_progress"
    # ...

§3 Core Data Model

See @assets/contracts/data-model.yaml for complete schema definitions.

Entity Types

EntityID FormatPhaseDescription
ModuleM-{Seq:03d}P1Code modules/components
FindingF-P{N}-{Seq:03d}P1-P3Security observations (factual)
GapGAP-{Seq:03d}P4Security control deficiencies
ThreatT-{STRIDE}-{Element}-{Seq}P5STRIDE threats
ValidatedRiskVR-{Seq:03d}P6Verified risks
MitigationMIT-{Seq:03d}P7Remediation measures
POCPOC-{Seq:03d}P6Proof of concept
AttackPathAP-{Seq:03d}P6Attack vectors (single path)
AttackChainAC-{Seq:03d}P6Multi-step attack sequences
TestCaseTC-{Seq:03d}P8Penetration test cases
DetailedRiskRpt(uses VR-{Seq:03d})P8RPer-VR analysis report

Finding vs Gap Semantic Boundary

  • Finding (F-P{N}-xxx): A factual observation from phases 1-3 that MAY have security implications. Findings are objective facts about architecture, data flows, or boundaries. Example: "API endpoint uses HTTP instead of HTTPS"
  • Gap (GAP-xxx): A security control deficiency identified in P4 after analyzing findings against security domains. Gaps represent missing or inadequate controls. Example: "Missing TLS enforcement (NETWORK domain)"

Transition Rule: Findings from P1-P3 feed into P4 analysis. P4 evaluates findings against 16 security domains and produces Gaps where controls are deficient.

DFD Element IDs

Element TypePrefixFormatExample
External InteractorEIEI-{NNN}EI-001
ProcessPP-{NNN}P-001
Data StoreDSDS-{NNN}DS-001
Data FlowDFDF-{NNN}DF-001
Trust BoundaryTBTB-{NNN}TB-001

Count Conservation (P5→P6 Threat Accounting)

P5.threat_count = P6.verified + P6.theoretical + P6.pending + P6.excluded

All threats from P5 must be accounted for in P6 (no threat loss).

Semantic Distinction:

  • Count Conservation: P5→P6 threat accounting (threats flow from P5 to P6 dispositions)
  • Element Coverage Verification: P2→P5 element coverage (every DFD element has STRIDE analysis)

§4 Security Knowledge Architecture

See @knowledge/ for complete reference materials (~11 MB, 113 files).

Three Knowledge Sets

  1. Security Control Set (What to do)

- 16 Security Domains (AUTHN, AUTHZ, INPUT, etc.) - Control Sets (18 files, 107 controls) - OWASP References (74 items) - Compliance Frameworks (14 frameworks)

  1. Threat Pattern Set (What to know)

- CWE Weaknesses (974) - CAPEC Attack Patterns (615) - ATT&CK Techniques (835) - CVE/KEV Vulnerabilities (323K+)

  1. Verification Set (How to test)

- WSTG Tests (121) - MASTG Tests (206) - ASVS Requirements (345)

Security Principles (11)

CodePrincipleDefinition
DIDDefense in DepthMultiple independent security controls
LPLeast PrivilegeMinimum permissions required
ZTZero TrustNever trust, always verify
FSFail SecureDefault to secure state on error
SODSeparation of DutiesCritical ops require multiple parties
SBDSecure by DefaultDefault config is secure
CMComplete MediationEvery access verified
EOMEconomy of MechanismSimple, auditable mechanisms
ODOpen DesignSecurity not dependent on secrecy
IVInput ValidationAll input validated
LALeast AgencyLimit AI agent autonomy

STRIDE Categories

STRIDENameCWEsCAPEC
SSpoofingCWE-287, 290, 307CAPEC-151, 194, 600
TTamperingCWE-20, 77, 78, 89CAPEC-66, 88, 248
RRepudiationCWE-117, 223, 778CAPEC-93
IInformation DisclosureCWE-200, 209, 311CAPEC-116, 157
DDenial of ServiceCWE-400, 770, 918CAPEC-125, 227
EElevation of PrivilegeCWE-269, 284, 862CAPEC-122, 233

§5 Knowledge Base Queries

kb Wrapper Usage

# Resolve skill path (works in Claude Code, Codex CLI, and manual testing)
SKILL_PATH=${SKILL_PATH:-${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR:-$(bash skill_path.sh)}}

# STRIDE queries
${SKILL_PATH:-$CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/kb --stride spoofing
${SKILL_PATH:-$CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/kb --stride-controls S

# CWE queries
${SKILL_PATH:-$CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/kb --cwe CWE-89
${SKILL_PATH:-$CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/kb --full-chain CWE-89

# Attack patterns
${SKILL_PATH:-$CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/kb --capec CAPEC-89
${SKILL_PATH:-$CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/kb --attack-technique T1078

# Verification tests
${SKILL_PATH:-$CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/kb --stride-tests S
${SKILL_PATH:-$CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/kb --wstg-category ATHN

# LLM/AI extensions
${SKILL_PATH:-$CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/kb --all-llm
${SKILL_PATH:-$CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/kb --ai-component

§6 Language Adaptation

Output language follows context language unless --lang=xx specified.

ContextFile NamesContent
ChineseP1-项目理解.md中文
EnglishP1-PROJECT-UNDERSTANDING.mdEnglish

Supported: en, zh, ja, ko, es, fr, de, pt, ru


§7 Progressive Context Loading

This skill uses progressive disclosure:

  1. Always Loaded: This file (SKILL.md) - ~5.5K tokens
  2. Session Start: @WORKFLOW.md - ~4.8K tokens
  3. Per Phase: @phases/P{N}-*.md - ~4K-10K tokens each (varies by phase)

Total per-phase context: ~12K-18K tokens per phase (vs 30K monolithic)

Loading Pattern:

Session Start:
  1. Load SKILL.md (global rules)
  2. Load WORKFLOW.md (orchestration)
  3. Create 8 phase todos

Per Phase:
  1. Read @phases/P{N}-*.md
  2. Execute phase instructions
  3. Write to .phase_working/{SESSION_ID}/reports/P{N}-*.md
  4. Hook validates and extracts data

Post-P8 (Optional):
  1. If --detailed flag OR user confirms: Load @phases/P8R-DETAILED-REPORT.md
  2. Generate per-VR detailed analysis reports
  3. Write to Risk_Assessment_Report/detailed/VR-{NNN}-{slug}.md

§8 Reference Files

PathPurpose
@WORKFLOW.mdOrchestration contracts, phase gates
@phases/P{1-8}-*.mdPhase-specific instructions
@assets/contracts/data-model.yamlEntity schemas
@knowledge/security-design.yaml16 security domains
@knowledge/security-principles.yaml11 security principles
@knowledge/sast-rules.yamlSAST tool configs and STRIDE mappings
@scripts/module_discovery.pyP1 three-layer module discovery
@scripts/phase_data.pyPhase validation and extraction
@scripts/unified_kb_query.pyKnowledge base queries
@scripts/report_generator.pyMD→HTML batch converter
@phases/P8R-DETAILED-REPORT.mdOptional per-VR detailed reports
@docs/REPORT-DESIGN.mdv3.0.3+ report enhancement design
@skill_path.shSKILL_PATH resolution helper

§9 Quick Start

# 1. Start new session (default mode - 11 deliverable files)
/threat-model @my-project

# 2. With debug mode (all internal files published)
/threat-model @my-project --debug

# 3. Session execution:
#    - Claude loads SKILL.md + WORKFLOW.md automatically
#    - For each phase N (1-8): Read → Execute → Write → Validate
#    - Generate final reports in Risk_Assessment_Report/

Output Summary

ModeFiles PublishedUse Case
Default11 (4 required + 7 phase reports)Production delivery
--detailed11 + per-VR detailed reportsComprehensive assessment
--debug11 + YAML data + evaluationDevelopment, audit

§10 Core Execution Constraints (Invariants)

PRINCIPLE: The quality of threat modeling depends on execution rigor. The following constraints are INVIOLABLE.

Three Absolute Prohibitions

ConstraintDescriptionViolation Consequence
❌ NO MOCK DATAAll analysis must be based on real code evidenceAnalysis results invalid
❌ NO SIMPLIFIED IMPLEMENTATIONSEach phase must be fully executedCoverage requirements not met
❌ NO BYPASSING PROBLEMSMust diagnose root cause when blockedData chain broken

Phase Execution Invariant

∀ Phase N ∈ [1..8]:
  - Input: P{N-1}_*.yaml (except P1)
  - Output: P{N}_*.yaml (PRIMARY) + P{N}-*.md (SECONDARY)
  - Gate: Hook validation must return exit 0
  - Transition: Only proceed to N+1 after gate passes
Execution Protocol Details: See WORKFLOW.md §2 Phase Execution Protocol

§11 Phase Isolation Constraints

INVARIANT: Each Phase is an independent execution unit. FSM state transitions MUST follow strict sequential order.

Forbidden State Transitions

Illegal TransitionReason
Pn → Pn+2 (skip)Violates FSM order invariant (S1)
Pn → Pn+1 (unvalidated)Violates data contract completeness (S2)
Parallel Phase executionData dependencies cannot be satisfied
Complete FSM Specification: See WORKFLOW.md §1 Formal Properties: See docs/SKILL-ARCHITECTURE-DESIGN.md §0.2

End of SKILL.md (~540 lines, ~5.5K tokens)

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