graphql（GraphQL 接口开发）

GraphQL Security (GQL)

Analyze GraphQL APIs for security vulnerabilities including introspection enabled in production, missing query depth limits, no complexity analysis, batching abuse, alias-based denial of service, and missing per-field authorization. GraphQL's flexibility makes it a rich attack surface when default configurations are deployed to production without hardening.

Supported Flags

Read ../../shared/schemas/flags.md for the full flag specification. This skill supports all cross-cutting flags. Key flags for this skill:

• --scope determines which files to analyze (default: changed)
• --depth standard reads code and checks GraphQL configuration
• --depth deep traces resolvers to data sources and maps authorization coverage
• --severity filters output (GraphQL issues range from medium to critical)

Framework Context

Key CWEs in scope:

• CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information (introspection)
• CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (depth/complexity)
• CWE-862: Missing Authorization (per-field auth)
• CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits (batching)
• CWE-284: Improper Access Control

Detection Patterns

Read references/detection-patterns.md for the full catalog of code patterns, search heuristics, language-specific examples, and false positive guidance.

Workflow

1. Determine Scope

Parse flags and resolve the file list per ../../shared/schemas/flags.md. Filter to files likely to contain GraphQL logic:

• Schema definitions (**/*.graphql, **/schema.*, **/typeDefs*)
• Resolver implementations (**/resolvers/**, **/graphql/**)
• GraphQL server configuration (**/server.*, **/app.*, **/index.*)
• Middleware and plugins (**/middleware/**, **/plugins/**)
• Authorization directives (**/directives/**, **/guards/**)

2. Check for Available Scanners

Detect scanners per ../../shared/schemas/scanners.md:

1. semgrep -- primary scanner for GraphQL patterns
2. graphql-cop -- specialized GraphQL security auditor (if available)

Record which scanners are available and which are missing.

3. Run Scanners (If Available)

If semgrep is available, run with rules targeting GraphQL:

semgrep scan --config auto --json --quiet <target>

Filter results to rules matching GraphQL security patterns. Normalize output to the findings schema.

4. Claude Code Analysis

Regardless of scanner availability, perform manual code analysis:

1. Introspection check: Find GraphQL server configuration and verify introspection is disabled in production environments.
2. Depth limiting: Check for depth limiting middleware (graphql-depth-limit, @graphql-tools/utils, custom validation rules).
3. Complexity analysis: Verify query complexity is calculated and limited before execution (graphql-query-complexity, cost analysis).
4. Batching controls: Check whether query batching is enabled and if there are limits on the number of operations per request.
5. Alias abuse: Verify aliases are counted toward rate limiting and complexity calculations.
6. Per-field authorization: Trace resolvers for sensitive fields and verify each checks the requesting user's permissions.

When --depth deep, additionally trace:

• Full resolver chain from query to data source
• Authorization directive/guard coverage across all types and fields
• Subscription authentication and authorization

5. Report Findings

Format output per ../../shared/schemas/findings.md using the GQL prefix (e.g., GQL-001, GQL-002).

Include for each finding:

• Severity and confidence
• Exact file location with code snippet
• Exploit scenario (example malicious query when applicable)
• Concrete fix with diff when possible
• CWE references

What to Look For

These are the high-signal patterns specific to GraphQL security. Each maps to a detection pattern in references/detection-patterns.md.

1. Introspection enabled in production -- __schema and __type queries are accessible, revealing the entire API schema to attackers.
2. No query depth limit -- Deeply nested queries can exhaust server resources (e.g., user {friends {friends {friends {...}}}}).
3. No query complexity limit -- Expensive queries with many fields or computed values can cause denial of service.
4. Batching abuse -- Multiple queries in a single request bypass per-request rate limiting and can brute-force authentication.
5. Alias-based denial of service -- Using aliases to repeat expensive fields/resolvers many times in a single query.
6. Missing per-field authorization -- Sensitive fields (email, SSN, balance) exposed to any authenticated user without field-level access checks.

Scanner Integration

Fallback (no scanner): Use Grep with patterns from references/detection-patterns.md to find GraphQL server configuration, depth/complexity middleware, resolver authorization, and batching settings. Report findings with confidence: medium.

Output Format

Use the findings schema from ../../shared/schemas/findings.md.

• ID prefix: GQL (e.g., GQL-001)
• metadata.tool: graphql
• metadata.framework: specialized
• metadata.category: GQL
• references.cwe: CWE-200, CWE-400, CWE-862
• references.owasp: A05:2021 (Security Misconfiguration)
• references.stride: I (Information Disclosure) or D (Denial of Service)

Severity guidance for this category:

• critical: Missing per-field auth on sensitive data, introspection exposing internal schemas
• high: No depth or complexity limits, batching with no limits on auth endpoints
• medium: Introspection enabled in prod (non-sensitive schema), alias abuse possible
• low: Overly permissive but rate-limited batching, minor information disclosure