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electric-proxy-auth电子 Agent 授权

Agent Skill

用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查。它适合让 Agent 梳理敏感配置、检查依赖风险、分析鉴权逻辑或生成安全复核清单。使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥、令牌、用户数据或生产系统时,应先确认最小权限、脱敏方式和操作边界。

总安装

635

周安装

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下载量

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安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:electric-proxy-auth(电子 Agent 授权)
来源仓库:https://github.com/electric-sql/electric
仓库路径:skills/electric-proxy-auth
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/electric-sql/electric --skill electric-proxy-auth
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/electric-sql/electric --skill electric-proxy-auth

简介

electric-proxy-auth 用于辅助安全审计、权限检查、凭据风险、认证流程和常见漏洞排查,适合梳理敏感配置和分析鉴权逻辑。

  • 适用于 Electric SQL 代理认证和安全模式配置场景。
  • 提供安全的代理路由配置和协议参数转发管理能力。
  • 安装命令:npx skills add https://github.com/electric-sql/electric --skill electric-proxy-auth
  • 使用时不能把工具输出直接当最终结论,涉及密钥或生产系统时应先确认最小权限。

SKILL.md

This skill builds on electric-shapes. Read it first for ShapeStream configuration.

Electric — Proxy and Auth

Setup

import { ELECTRIC_PROTOCOL_QUERY_PARAMS } from '@electric-sql/client'

// Server route (Next.js App Router example)
export async function GET(request: Request) {
  const url = new URL(request.url)
  const originUrl = new URL('/v1/shape', process.env.ELECTRIC_URL)

  // Only forward Electric protocol params — never table/where from client
  url.searchParams.forEach((value, key) => {
    if (ELECTRIC_PROTOCOL_QUERY_PARAMS.includes(key)) {
      originUrl.searchParams.set(key, value)
    }
  })

  // Server decides shape definition
  originUrl.searchParams.set('table', 'todos')
  originUrl.searchParams.set('secret', process.env.ELECTRIC_SOURCE_SECRET!)

  const response = await fetch(originUrl)
  const headers = new Headers(response.headers)
  headers.delete('content-encoding')
  headers.delete('content-length')

  return new Response(response.body, {
    status: response.status,
    statusText: response.statusText,
    headers,
  })
}

Client usage:

import { ShapeStream } from '@electric-sql/client'

const stream = new ShapeStream({
  url: '/api/todos', // Points to your proxy, not Electric directly
})

Core Patterns

Tenant isolation with WHERE params

// In proxy route — inject user context server-side
const user = await getAuthUser(request)
originUrl.searchParams.set('table', 'todos')
originUrl.searchParams.set('where', 'org_id = $1')
originUrl.searchParams.set('params[1]', user.orgId)

Auth token refresh on 401

const stream = new ShapeStream({
  url: '/api/todos',
  headers: {
    Authorization: async () => `Bearer ${await getToken()}`,
  },
  onError: async (error) => {
    if (error instanceof FetchError && error.status === 401) {
      const newToken = await refreshToken()
      return { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${newToken}` } }
    }
    return {}
  },
})

CORS configuration for cross-origin proxies

// In proxy response headers
headers.set(
  'Access-Control-Expose-Headers',
  'electric-offset, electric-handle, electric-schema, electric-cursor'
)

Subset security (AND semantics)

Electric combines the main shape WHERE (set in proxy) with subset WHERE (from POST body) using AND. Subsets can only narrow results, never widen them:

-- Main shape: WHERE org_id = $1 (set by proxy)
-- Subset: WHERE status = 'active' (from client POST)
-- Effective: WHERE org_id = $1 AND status = 'active'

Even WHERE 1=1 in the subset cannot bypass the main shape's WHERE.

Common Mistakes

CRITICAL Forwarding all client params to Electric

Wrong:

url.searchParams.forEach((value, key) => {
  originUrl.searchParams.set(key, value)
})

Correct:

import { ELECTRIC_PROTOCOL_QUERY_PARAMS } from '@electric-sql/client'

url.searchParams.forEach((value, key) => {
  if (ELECTRIC_PROTOCOL_QUERY_PARAMS.includes(key)) {
    originUrl.searchParams.set(key, value)
  }
})
originUrl.searchParams.set('table', 'todos')

Forwarding all params lets the client control table, where, and columns, accessing any Postgres table. Only forward ELECTRIC_PROTOCOL_QUERY_PARAMS.

Source: examples/proxy-auth/app/shape-proxy/route.ts

CRITICAL Not deleting content-encoding and content-length headers

Wrong:

return new Response(response.body, {
  status: response.status,
  headers: response.headers,
})

Correct:

const headers = new Headers(response.headers)
headers.delete('content-encoding')
headers.delete('content-length')
return new Response(response.body, { status: response.status, headers })

fetch() decompresses the response body but keeps the original content-encoding and content-length headers, causing browser decoding failures.

Source: examples/proxy-auth/app/shape-proxy/route.ts:49-56

CRITICAL Exposing ELECTRIC_SECRET or SOURCE_SECRET to browser

Wrong:

// Client-side code
const url = `/v1/shape?table=todos&secret=${import.meta.env.VITE_ELECTRIC_SOURCE_SECRET}`

Correct:

// Server proxy only
originUrl.searchParams.set('secret', process.env.ELECTRIC_SOURCE_SECRET!)

Bundlers like Vite expose VITE_* env vars to client code. The secret must only be injected server-side in the proxy.

Source: AGENTS.md:17-20

CRITICAL SQL injection in WHERE clause via string interpolation

Wrong:

originUrl.searchParams.set('where', `org_id = '${user.orgId}'`)

Correct:

originUrl.searchParams.set('where', 'org_id = $1')
originUrl.searchParams.set('params[1]', user.orgId)

String interpolation in WHERE clauses enables SQL injection. Use positional params ($1, $2).

Source: website/docs/guides/auth.md

HIGH Not exposing Electric response headers via CORS

Wrong:

// No CORS header configuration — browser strips custom headers
return new Response(response.body, { headers })

Correct:

headers.set(
  'Access-Control-Expose-Headers',
  'electric-offset, electric-handle, electric-schema, electric-cursor'
)
return new Response(response.body, { headers })

The client throws MissingHeadersError if Electric response headers are stripped by CORS. Expose electric-offset, electric-handle, electric-schema, and electric-cursor.

Source: packages/typescript-client/src/error.ts:109-118

CRITICAL Calling Electric directly from production client

Wrong:

new ShapeStream({
  url: 'https://my-electric.example.com/v1/shape',
  params: { table: 'todos' },
})

Correct:

new ShapeStream({
  url: '/api/todos', // Your proxy route
})

Electric's HTTP API is public by default with no auth. Always proxy through your server so the server controls shape definitions and injects secrets.

Source: AGENTS.md:19-20

See also: electric-shapes/SKILL.md — Shape URLs must point to proxy routes, not directly to Electric. See also: electric-deployment/SKILL.md — Production requires ELECTRIC_SECRET and proxy; dev uses ELECTRIC_INSECURE=true. See also: electric-postgres-security/SKILL.md — Proxy injects secrets that Postgres security enforces.

Version

Targets @electric-sql/client v1.5.10.

适合场景

01

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

02

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

03

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

32.97%
按下载量换算73

Claude

28.9%
按下载量换算64

Cursor

20.22%
按下载量换算45

Gemini CLI

10.47%
按下载量换算23

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。当前只有一个来源,正式发布前建议补源仓库或其他目录站核验。

来源信息

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