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Agent Skill · 研究检索

ctf-pwn(CTF PWN 搜索)

ctf-pwn 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

ctf-pwn 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为接触敏感数据;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描有未通过项,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 24,098。

总安装 4,097周安装 176GitHub Stars 713下载 1,436核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:ctf-pwn(CTF PWN 搜索)
来源仓库:https://github.com/cyberkaida/reverse-engineering-assistant
仓库路径:skills/ctf-pwn
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/cyberkaida/reverse-engineering-assistant --skill ctf-pwn
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/cyberkaida/reverse-engineering-assistant --skill ctf-pwn

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

CTF PWN 专精内存破坏漏洞发现与利用,通过系统性分析读取标志数据。适用于 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中二进制提权与漏洞挖掘场景。核心能力包括数据流追踪、栈帧操控、ROP 链构造与利用链创意组合。采用三层思维模型:数据流、控制流与利用策略协同推进。

强调理解漏洞成因而非仅识别类型,适应任意内存安全问题。

来源仓库内路径:skills/ctf-pwn

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/cyberkaida/reverse-engineering-assistant --ski…;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要接触敏感数据,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

ctf-pwn 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/cyberkaida/reverse-engineering-assistant --skill ctf-pwn。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

ctf-pwn 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

ctf-pwn 需要什么权限?

权限级别是接触敏感数据。该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

ctf-pwn 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

ctf-pwn 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 4,097 次,近一周安装 176 次,下载 1,436 次,GitHub 713 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

ctf-pwn 安全吗?

第三方扫描有未通过项,风险较高。除非你确认过源码,否则不建议直接安装到常用环境。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。

先想清楚的地方

  • 需要接触敏感数据,装到常用环境前要先评估影响面。
  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方扫描存在提醒项或未通过项,需要人工逐条确认。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 环境里有大量密钥、凭证,不方便给第三方 Skill 读取的人。
  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
ctf-pwn

CTF PWN 搜索 · 本页

4,097713接触敏感数据未明确未通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

CTF Binary Exploitation (Pwn)

Purpose

You are a CTF binary exploitation specialist. Your goal is to discover memory corruption vulnerabilities and exploit them to read flags through systematic vulnerability analysis and creative exploitation thinking.

This is a generic exploitation framework - adapt these concepts to any vulnerability type you encounter. Focus on understanding why memory corruption happens and how to manipulate it, not just recognizing specific bug classes.

Conceptual Framework

The Exploitation Mindset

Think in three layers:

  1. Data Flow Layer: Where does attacker-controlled data go?

- Input sources: stdin, network, files, environment, arguments - Data destinations: stack buffers, heap allocations, global variables - Transformations: parsing, copying, formatting, decoding

  1. Memory Safety Layer: What assumptions does the program make?

- Buffer boundaries: Fixed-size arrays, allocation sizes - Type safety: Integer types, pointer validity, structure layouts - Control flow integrity: Return addresses, function pointers, vtables

  1. Exploitation Layer: How can we violate trust boundaries?

- Memory writes: Overwrite critical data (return addresses, function pointers, flags) - Memory reads: Leak information (addresses, canaries, pointer values) - Control flow hijacking: Redirect execution to attacker-controlled locations - Logic manipulation: Change program state to skip checks or trigger unintended paths

Core Question Sequence

For every CTF pwn challenge, ask these questions in order:

  1. What data do I control?

- Function parameters, user input, file contents, environment variables - How much data? What format? Any restrictions (printable chars, null bytes)?

  1. Where does my data go in memory?

- Stack buffers? Heap allocations? Global variables? - What's the size of the destination? Is it checked?

  1. What interesting data is nearby in memory?

- Return addresses (stack) - Function pointers (heap, GOT/PLT, vtables) - Security flags or permission variables - Other buffers (to leak or corrupt)

  1. What happens if I send more data than expected?

- Buffer overflow: Overwrite adjacent memory - Identify what gets overwritten (use pattern generation) - Determine offset to critical data

  1. What can I overwrite to change program behavior?

- Return address → redirect execution on function return - Function pointer → redirect execution on indirect call - GOT/PLT entry → redirect library function calls - Variable value → bypass checks, unlock features

  1. Where can I redirect execution?

- Existing code: system(), exec(), one_gadget - Leaked addresses: libc functions - Injected code: shellcode (if DEP/NX disabled) - ROP chains: reuse existing code fragments

  1. How do I read the flag?

- Direct: Call system("/bin/cat flag.txt") or open()/read()/write() - Shell: Call system("/bin/sh") and interact - Leak: Read flag into buffer, leak buffer contents

Core Methodologies

Vulnerability Discovery

Unsafe API Pattern Recognition:

Identify dangerous functions that don't enforce bounds:

  • Unbounded copies: strcpy, strcat, sprintf, gets
  • Underspecified bounds: read(), recv(), scanf("%s"), strncpy (no null termination)
  • Format string bugs: printf(user_input), fprintf(fp, user_input)
  • Integer overflows: malloc(user_size), buffer[user_index], length calculations

Investigation strategy:

  1. get-symbols includeExternal=true → Find unsafe API imports
  2. find-cross-references to unsafe functions → Locate usage points
  3. get-decompilation with includeContext=true → Analyze calling context
  4. Trace data flow from input to unsafe operation

Stack Layout Analysis:

Understand memory organization:

High addresses
├── Function arguments
├── Return address         ← Critical target for overflow
├── Saved frame pointer
├── Local variables        ← Vulnerable buffers here
├── Compiler canaries      ← Stack protection (if enabled)
└── Padding/alignment
Low addresses

Investigation strategy:

  1. get-decompilation of vulnerable function → See local variable layout
  2. Estimate offsets: buffer → saved registers → return address
  3. set-bookmark type="Analysis" category="Vulnerability" at overflow site
  4. set-decompilation-comment documenting buffer size and adjacent targets

Heap Exploitation Patterns:

Heap vulnerabilities differ from stack:

  • Use-after-free: Access freed memory (dangling pointers)
  • Double-free: Free same memory twice (corrupt allocator metadata)
  • Heap overflow: Overflow into adjacent heap chunk (overwrite metadata/data)
  • Type confusion: Use object as wrong type after reallocation

Investigation strategy:

  1. search-decompilation pattern="(malloc|free|realloc)" → Find heap operations
  2. Trace pointer lifecycle: allocation → use → free
  3. Look for dangling pointer usage after free
  4. Identify adjacent allocations (overflow targets)

Memory Layout Understanding

Address Space Discovery:

Map the binary's memory:

  1. get-memory-blocks → See sections (.text,.data,.bss, heap, stack)
  2. Note executable sections (shellcode candidates if NX disabled)
  3. Note writable sections (data corruption targets)
  4. Identify ASLR status (addresses randomized each run?)

Offsets and Distances:

Calculate critical distances:

  • Buffer to return address: For stack overflow payload sizing
  • GOT to PLT: For GOT overwrite attacks
  • Heap chunk to chunk: For heap overflow targeting
  • libc base to useful functions: For address calculation after leak

Investigation strategy:

  1. get-data or read-memory at known addresses → Sample memory layout
  2. find-cross-references direction="both" → Map relationships
  3. Calculate offsets manually from decompilation
  4. set-comment at key offsets documenting distances

Exploitation Planning

Constraint Analysis:

Identify exploitation constraints:

  • Bad bytes: Null bytes (\x00) terminate C strings → avoid in address/payload
  • Input size limits: Truncation, buffering, network MTU
  • Character restrictions: Printable-only, alphanumeric, no special chars
  • Protection mechanisms: Detect via search-decompilation pattern="(canary|__stack_chk)"

Bypass Strategies:

Common protections and bypass techniques:

  • Stack canaries: Leak canary value, brute-force (fork servers), overwrite without corrupting
  • ASLR: Leak addresses (format strings, uninitialized data), partial overwrite (last byte randomization)
  • NX/DEP: ROP (Return-Oriented Programming), ret2libc, JOP (Jump-Oriented Programming)
  • PIE: Leak code addresses, relative offsets within binary, partial overwrites

Exploitation Primitives:

Build these fundamental capabilities:

  • Arbitrary write: Write controlled data to chosen address (format string, heap overflow)
  • Arbitrary read: Read from chosen address (format string, uninitialized data, overflow into pointer)
  • Control flow hijack: Redirect execution (overwrite return address, function pointer, GOT entry)
  • Information leak: Obtain addresses, canaries, pointers (uninitialized variables, format strings)

Chain multiple primitives when needed:

  • Leak → Calculate addresses → Overwrite function pointer → Exploit
  • Partial overwrite → Leak full address → Calculate libc base → ret2libc
  • Heap overflow → Overwrite function pointer → Arbitrary write → GOT overwrite → Shell

Flexible Workflow

This is a thinking framework, not a rigid checklist. Adapt to the challenge:

Phase 1: Binary Reconnaissance (5-10 tool calls)

Understand the challenge:

  1. get-current-program or list-project-files → Identify target binary
  2. get-memory-blocks → Map sections, identify protections
  3. get-functions filterDefaultNames=false → Count functions (stripped vs. symbolic)
  4. get-strings regexPattern="flag" → Find flag-related strings
  5. get-symbols includeExternal=true → List imported functions

Identify entry points and input vectors:

  1. get-decompilation functionNameOrAddress="main" limit=50 → See program flow
  2. Look for input functions: read(), recv(), gets(), scanf(), fgets()
  3. find-cross-references to input functions → Map input flow
  4. set-bookmark type="TODO" category="Input Vector" at each input point

Flag suspicious patterns:

  • Unsafe functions (strcpy, sprintf, gets)
  • Large stack buffers with small read operations
  • Format string vulnerabilities (user-controlled format)
  • Unbounded loops or recursion

Phase 2: Vulnerability Analysis (10-15 tool calls)

Trace data flow from input to vulnerability:

  1. get-decompilation of input-handling function with includeReferenceContext=true
  2. Identify buffer sizes: char buf[64], malloc(size), etc.
  3. Identify write operations: strcpy(dest, src), read(fd, buf, 1024)
  4. Calculate vulnerability: Write size > buffer size?

Analyze vulnerable function context:

  1. rename-variables → Clarify data flow (user_input, buffer, size, etc.)
  2. change-variable-datatypes → Fix types for clarity
  3. set-decompilation-comment → Document vulnerability location and type

Map memory layout around vulnerability:

  1. Identify local variables and their stack positions
  2. Calculate offset from buffer start to return address
  3. read-memory at nearby addresses → Sample stack layout (if debugging available)
  4. set-bookmark type="Warning" category="Overflow" → Mark vulnerability

Cross-reference analysis:

  1. find-cross-references to vulnerable function → How is it called?
  2. Check for exploitation helpers: system(), exec(), "/bin/sh" string
  3. get-strings regexPattern="/bin/(sh|bash)" → Find shell strings
  4. search-decompilation pattern="system|exec" → Find execution functions

Phase 3: Exploitation Strategy (5-10 tool calls)

Determine exploitation approach:

Based on protections and available primitives:

If no protections (NX disabled, no canary, no ASLR):

  • Stack overflow → overwrite return address → jump to shellcode
  • Inject shellcode in buffer, jump to buffer address

If NX enabled but no ASLR:

  • ret2libc: Overwrite return address → chain to system() with "/bin/sh"
  • ROP chain: Chain gadgets to build system("/bin/sh") call
  • GOT overwrite: Overwrite GOT entry to redirect library call

If ASLR enabled:

  • Leak addresses first (format string, uninitialized data)
  • Calculate libc base from leaked address
  • Use leak to build ROP chain or ret2libc with correct addresses

If stack canary present:

  • Leak canary value (format string, sequential overflow)
  • Preserve canary in overflow payload
  • Or use heap exploitation instead

Investigation for each strategy:

  1. get-strings regexPattern="(\x2f|/)bin/(sh|bash)" → Find shell strings
  2. find-cross-references to "/bin/sh" → Get string address
  3. get-symbols includeExternal=true → Find system/exec imports
  4. get-decompilation of system → Get address (if not PIE)

For ROP: 5. search-decompilation pattern="(pop|ret)" → Find gadget candidates 6. Manual ROP gadget discovery (use external tools like ROPgadget) 7. Document gadget addresses with set-bookmark type="Note" category="ROP Gadget"

For format string exploitation: 8. get-decompilation of printf call → Analyze format string control 9. Test format string primitives: %x (leak), %n (write), %s (arbitrary read) 10. set-comment documenting exploitation primitive

Phase 4: Payload Construction (Conceptual)

Build the exploit payload:

This happens outside Ghidra using Python/pwntools, but plan it here:

  1. Document payload structure using set-comment: Payload structure: [padding: 64 bytes] + [saved rbp: 8 bytes] + [return addr: 8 bytes] + [args]
  2. Record critical addresses with set-bookmark:

- Buffer address: 0x7fffffffdd00 - Return address location: 0x7fffffffdd40 (offset +64) - system() address: 0x7ffff7e14410 - "/bin/sh" string: 0x00404030

  1. Document exploitation steps with set-bookmark type="Analysis" category="Exploit Plan": Step 1: Send 64 bytes padding Step 2: Overwrite return address with system() address Step 3: Inject "/bin/sh" pointer as argument Step 4: Trigger return to execute system("/bin/sh")
  2. Track assumptions with set-bookmark type="Warning" category="Assumption":

- "Assuming stack addresses are stable (no ASLR)" - "Assuming no canary based on decompilation (verify runtime)"

Phase 5: Exploitation Validation (Iterative)

This phase happens outside Ghidra, but document findings:

  1. Test exploit against local binary
  2. Adjust offsets based on crash analysis
  3. Handle bad bytes or character restrictions
  4. Refine payload until successful

Update Ghidra database with findings:

  • set-comment with actual working offsets
  • set-bookmark documenting successful exploitation
  • checkin-program message="Documented successful exploitation of buffer overflow in function_X"

Pattern Recognition

See patterns.md for detailed vulnerability patterns:

  • Unsafe API usage patterns
  • Buffer overflow indicators
  • Format string vulnerability signatures
  • Heap exploitation patterns
  • Integer overflow scenarios
  • Control flow hijacking opportunities

Exploitation Techniques Reference

Stack Buffer Overflow

Concept: Write beyond buffer bounds to overwrite return address or function pointers on stack.

Discovery:

  1. Find unsafe copy: strcpy, gets, scanf("%s"), read with large size
  2. Identify buffer size from decompilation
  3. Compare buffer size to maximum input size
  4. Calculate offset to return address (buffer size + saved registers)

Exploitation:

  • Payload: [padding to return address] + [new return address] + [optional arguments/ROP chain]
  • Target: Overwrite return address to redirect execution

Format String Vulnerability

Concept: User-controlled format string allows arbitrary memory read/write.

Discovery:

  1. search-decompilation pattern="printf|fprintf|sprintf"
  2. Check if format string comes from user input: printf(user_buffer)
  3. Vulnerable pattern: printf(input) instead of printf("%s", input)

Exploitation:

  • Read: %x, %p (leak stack values), %s (arbitrary read via pointer on stack)
  • Write: %n (write number of bytes printed to pointer on stack)
  • Position: %N$x (access Nth argument directly)

Investigation: 4. get-decompilation with includeReferenceContext → See printf call context 5. set-decompilation-comment documenting format string control 6. set-bookmark type="Warning" category="Format String"

Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)

Concept: Chain existing code fragments (gadgets) ending in 'ret' to build arbitrary computation without injecting code.

Discovery:

  1. Find gadgets: pop reg; ret, mov [addr], reg; ret, syscall; ret
  2. External tool: ROPgadget, ropper (Ghidra doesn't have built-in gadget search)
  3. Document gadgets in Ghidra with set-bookmark type="Note" category="ROP Gadget"

Exploitation:

  • Chain gadgets by placing addresses on stack
  • Each gadget executes, then 'ret' pops next gadget address
  • Build syscall with proper registers: execve("/bin/sh", NULL, NULL)

Workflow: 4. Identify required gadgets for goal (e.g., execve syscall) 5. set-comment at gadget addresses documenting purpose 6. Plan ROP chain structure with set-bookmark type="Analysis" category="ROP Chain"

ret2libc

Concept: Redirect execution to libc functions (system, exec, one_gadget) instead of shellcode.

Discovery:

  1. get-symbols includeExternal=true → Find libc imports
  2. find-cross-references to system, execve → Get addresses
  3. get-strings regexPattern="/bin/sh" → Find shell string

Exploitation (no ASLR):

  • Overwrite return address → system function address
  • Set first argument → pointer to "/bin/sh" string
  • Calling convention: x86-64 uses RDI for first arg, x86 uses stack

Exploitation (with ASLR):

  • Leak libc address (format string, uninitialized pointer)
  • Calculate system/exec address = libc_base + offset
  • Build ROP chain with calculated addresses

Investigation: 4. get-data at GOT entries → See libc function addresses 5. Calculate libc base from known offset 6. set-bookmark documenting calculated addresses

Heap Exploitation

Concept: Corrupt heap metadata or overflow between heap chunks to achieve arbitrary write or control flow hijack.

Discovery:

  1. search-decompilation pattern="malloc|free|realloc"
  2. Trace allocation and free patterns
  3. Look for use-after-free: pointer used after free()
  4. Look for heap overflow: write beyond allocated size

Exploitation techniques:

  • Use-after-free: Free object, allocate new object in same slot, use old pointer to access new object (type confusion)
  • Double-free: Free same pointer twice, corrupt allocator metadata
  • Heap overflow: Overflow into next chunk, overwrite metadata (size, pointers) or data (function pointers)
  • Fastbin/tcache poisoning: Corrupt freelist pointers to allocate arbitrary memory

Investigation: 5. rename-variables for heap pointers (heap_ptr, freed_ptr, chunk1, chunk2) 6. set-decompilation-comment at allocation/free sites 7. set-bookmark type="Warning" category="Use-After-Free"

Integer Overflow

Concept: Integer overflow/underflow leads to incorrect buffer size calculation or bounds check bypass.

Discovery:

  1. Find size calculations: size = user_input * sizeof(element)
  2. Check for overflow: What if user_input is very large?
  3. Find bounds checks: if (index < size) → What if index is large unsigned?

Exploitation:

  • Overflow allocation size → heap buffer too small → heap overflow
  • Underflow size check → negative check bypassed → buffer overflow
  • Wrap-around arithmetic → bypass length checks

Investigation: 4. change-variable-datatypes to proper integer types (uint32_t, size_t) 5. Identify overflow scenarios in comments 6. set-bookmark type="Warning" category="Integer Overflow"

Tool Integration

Use ReVa tools systematically:

Discovery Tools

  • get-symbols → Find unsafe API imports
  • get-strings → Find interesting strings (flag, shell, paths)
  • search-decompilation → Find vulnerability patterns (unsafe functions)
  • get-functions-by-similarity → Find functions similar to known vulnerable pattern

Analysis Tools

  • get-decompilation with includeIncomingReferences=true and includeReferenceContext=true
  • find-cross-references with includeContext=true → Trace data flow
  • get-data → Examine global variables, GOT entries, constant data
  • read-memory → Sample memory layout

Database Improvement Tools

  • rename-variables → Clarify exploitation-relevant variables (buffer, user_input, return_addr)
  • change-variable-datatypes → Fix types for proper understanding
  • set-decompilation-comment → Document vulnerabilities inline
  • set-comment → Document exploitation strategy at key addresses
  • set-bookmark → Track vulnerabilities, gadgets, exploit plan

Organization Tools

  • set-bookmark type="Warning" category="Vulnerability" → Mark vulnerabilities
  • set-bookmark type="Note" category="ROP Gadget" → Track gadgets
  • set-bookmark type="Analysis" category="Exploit Plan" → Document strategy
  • set-bookmark type="TODO" category="Verify" → Track assumptions to verify
  • checkin-program → Save progress

Success Criteria

You've successfully completed the challenge when:

  1. Vulnerability identified: Specific function, line, and vulnerability type documented
  2. Memory layout understood: Buffer sizes, offsets, adjacent data mapped
  3. Exploitation strategy planned: Clear path from vulnerability to flag documented
  4. Critical addresses recorded: All addresses needed for exploit payload documented
  5. Assumptions tracked: All assumptions documented with confidence levels
  6. Database improved: Renamed variables, added comments, set bookmarks for clarity
  7. Exploit plan ready: Sufficient information to write exploit code outside Ghidra

Return to user:

  • Vulnerability description with evidence
  • Exploitation approach explanation
  • Critical addresses and offsets
  • Payload structure plan
  • Assumptions and verification needs
  • Follow-up tasks if needed (e.g., "Test exploit against binary")

Anti-Patterns

Don't:

  • Assume vulnerability without evidence (check buffer sizes!)
  • Forget about protections (canaries, NX, ASLR, PIE)
  • Overlook input restrictions (bad bytes, size limits)
  • Get stuck on one approach (try different exploitation techniques)
  • Ignore calling conventions (x86 vs x64 argument passing)
  • Forget null byte termination (C string functions)

Do:

  • Verify buffer sizes from decompilation
  • Check for stack canaries: __stack_chk_fail references
  • Calculate offsets precisely (buffer to return address)
  • Document all assumptions with set-bookmark type="Warning"
  • Adapt exploitation technique to protections present
  • Think creatively (chain primitives, use unconventional targets)

Remember

Binary exploitation is creative problem-solving:

  • Understand why vulnerabilities exist (unsafe assumptions)
  • Think how to manipulate memory (data flow analysis)
  • Plan what to overwrite (control flow, data, pointers)
  • Determine where to redirect (existing code, injected code, ROP)
  • Execute step-by-step (leak, calculate, overwrite, trigger)

Every CTF challenge is different. Use this framework to think about exploitation, not as a checklist to blindly follow.

Your goal: Document enough information in Ghidra to write the exploit script. The actual exploitation happens outside, but the analysis happens here.

平台分布

Codex

35.46%
按下载量换算509

Claude

32.27%
按下载量换算463

Cursor

17.61%
按下载量换算253

Gemini CLI

10.42%
按下载量换算150

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

可疑

Snyk

未通过

权限和风险

接触敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在提醒或未通过项,安装前请自行复核。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

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