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Agent Skill · 研究检索

correlating-threat-campaigns(关联威胁活动)

correlating-threat-campaigns 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

correlating-threat-campaigns 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为只读;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描有提醒项,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 62,606。

总安装 329周安装 14GitHub Stars 5,885下载 115核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:correlating-threat-campaigns(关联威胁活动)
来源仓库:https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills
仓库路径:skills/correlating-threat-campaigns
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill correlating-threat-campaigns
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill correlating-threat-campaigns

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

correlating-threat-campaigns 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。它在多个孤立事件共享 IOC 或 TTP 时启用,识别跨周/月的高级持续性威胁活动。

依赖 MISP 或 SIEM 历史数据,避免基于弱信号强行关联导致误判。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。适用宿主包括 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,接入前应确认版本、权限和运行环境要求。

来源仓库内路径:skills/correlating-threat-campaigns

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skil…;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它标注为只读,先用只读任务试一次,确认行为符合预期再扩大使用范围。

常见问题

6 条

correlating-threat-campaigns 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill correlat…。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

correlating-threat-campaigns 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

correlating-threat-campaigns 需要什么权限?

权限级别是只读。该 Skill 主要提供规则、说明或参考内容,本身偏只读;真正读写文件、联网或执行命令仍取决于宿主 Agent 的任务。

correlating-threat-campaigns 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

correlating-threat-campaigns 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 329 次,近一周安装 14 次,下载 115 次,GitHub 5,885 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

correlating-threat-campaigns 安全吗?

第三方扫描有提醒项,说明存在需要人工确认的行为。安装前请打开源码看清它读了什么、联网到哪里。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。
  • 来源仓库有 5,885 星,维护活跃度相对可查。
  • 标注为只读权限,试用阶段不容易误改本地文件。

先想清楚的地方

  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方扫描存在提醒项或未通过项,需要人工逐条确认。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。
  • 只想先试试效果、不希望它改动本地文件的人。

不太适合

  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
correlating-threat-campaigns

关联威胁活动 · 本页

3295,885只读未明确有提醒

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Correlating Threat Campaigns

When to Use

Use this skill when:

  • Multiple unrelated-appearing incidents share IOCs (same C2 IP, same malware hash, similar TTPs)
  • An ISAC partner shares indicators from an incident that match your own historical events
  • Building a campaign report linking adversary activity over weeks or months to a single operation

Do not use this skill to force correlation based on weak signals — false campaign attribution misleads defenders and wastes resources on incorrect threat models.

Prerequisites

  • TIP or SIEM with historical indicator and event data (90+ days recommended)
  • MISP correlation engine enabled with event sharing configured
  • Graph analysis tool (Maltego, Neo4j, or OpenCTI) for relationship visualization
  • Reference to MITRE ATT&CK intrusion set and campaign objects for structuring output

Workflow

Step 1: Collect and Normalize Events

Gather all candidate events for correlation from:

  • Internal SIEM (raw events, alert history)
  • TIP (historical indicators and events)
  • ISAC sharing (partner-submitted events in MISP or TAXII)
  • Commercial intelligence (Recorded Future, Mandiant, CrowdStrike reports)

Normalize all events to STIX 2.1 schema with consistent timestamp (UTC), indicator types, and confidence scores. Ensure all indicators have source attribution and collection date.

Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points

Apply systematic pivot analysis across four dimensions:

Infrastructure pivots:

  • Same IP address or /24 subnet across events
  • Same domain registrant email or WHOIS organization
  • Same ASN or hosting provider with same account fingerprint
  • Same SSL certificate fingerprint or serial number across C2 domains

Capability pivots:

  • Same malware hash or YARA signature match
  • Same C2 communication protocol (Cobalt Strike beacon config, Sliver implant parameters)
  • Same exploit code or weaponized document template
  • Same obfuscation method or packer fingerprint

Temporal pivots:

  • Events occurring within same time window (operational hours suggesting same timezone)
  • Sequential events with logical kill chain progression
  • Malware compilation timestamps clustering in same date range

Victimology pivots:

  • Same target sector (healthcare, energy, financial)
  • Same target geography
  • Same targeted technology (specific ERP vendor, VPN appliance brand)

Step 3: Calculate Correlation Confidence

Apply weighted scoring for campaign attribution:

def calculate_campaign_confidence(events: list) -> float:
    scores = []

    # Infrastructure overlap (highest weight — most discriminating)
    infra_overlap = count_shared_infra(events) / len(events)
    scores.append(infra_overlap * 40)

    # Capability overlap (high weight — TTPs are durable)
    capability_overlap = count_shared_ttps(events) / len(events)
    scores.append(capability_overlap * 35)

    # Temporal proximity (moderate weight)
    temporal_score = assess_temporal_clustering(events)
    scores.append(temporal_score * 15)

    # Victimology alignment (lower weight — many actors target same sector)
    victim_score = assess_victim_pattern(events)
    scores.append(victim_score * 10)

    total = sum(scores)
    if total >= 70: return "HIGH"
    elif total >= 45: return "MEDIUM"
    else: return "LOW"

Step 4: Build Campaign Graph

In OpenCTI or Maltego, construct campaign graph:

  • Campaign object (STIX) as central node
  • Intrusion Set → uses → Malware objects
  • Intrusion Set → uses → Infrastructure objects
  • Intrusion Set → targets → Identity objects (victim organizations/sectors)
  • Campaign → attributed-to → Threat Actor (if attribution achieved)
  • Indicators → indicates → Malware (linking technical observables to capabilities)

Label each relationship with evidence reference and confidence.

Step 5: Produce Campaign Intelligence Report

Structure the campaign report:

  1. Campaign name: Assign descriptive codename based on targeting theme or tooling
  2. Timeline: First/last observed dates with activity phases
  3. Attribution: Suspected threat actor with confidence level
  4. Target profile: Industry verticals, geographies, organization sizes
  5. TTPs summary: ATT&CK Navigator heatmap for campaign-specific techniques
  6. Shared indicators: IOCs that span multiple incidents (highest confidence for blocking)
  7. Detection guidance: Sigma/YARA rules specific to this campaign

Key Concepts

TermDefinition
CampaignSTIX object representing a grouping of adversarial behaviors with common objectives over a defined time period
Intrusion SetSTIX object grouping related intrusion activity by common objectives, even when actor identity is uncertain
PivotUsing a single data point (IOC, infrastructure, TTP) to discover related events or adversary artifacts
ClusteringMachine learning or manual grouping of incidents based on feature similarity to identify campaign boundaries
False CorrelationIncorrect linking of unrelated incidents due to shared infrastructure (CDNs, shared hosting) or common tools

Tools & Systems

  • MISP Correlation Engine: Automatic correlation of events sharing attribute values across the MISP instance and federated instances
  • OpenCTI Graph: Interactive relationship graph for visualizing campaign linkages with STIX object types
  • Maltego: Link analysis for infrastructure and capability pivoting across multiple data sources
  • Neo4j: Graph database with Cypher queries for large-scale campaign correlation (millions of events)

Common Pitfalls

  • CDN/Shared hosting false positives: Cloudflare, AWS CloudFront, and bulletproof hosters serve multiple threat actors. Shared IP alone does not establish campaign linkage.
  • Common malware conflation: Multiple threat actors use Cobalt Strike. Shared capability does not indicate same actor without additional corroboration.
  • Premature attribution: Forcing campaign-to-actor attribution before evidence threshold is reached produces incorrect intelligence that persists in reports.
  • Missing temporal analysis: Events from different years may share infrastructure that was recycled by a different actor, not the same campaign.

平台分布

Codex

36.67%
按下载量换算42

Claude

28.38%
按下载量换算33

Cursor

16.98%
按下载量换算20

Gemini CLI

9.51%
按下载量换算11

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

可疑

权限和风险

只读

该 Skill 主要提供规则、说明或参考内容,本身偏只读;真正读写文件、联网或执行命令仍取决于宿主 Agent 的任务。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在提醒或未通过项,安装前请自行复核。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

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