- name
- cisco-firewall-audit
- description
- >-
- license
- Apache-2.0
- metadata
- safety
- read-only
- author
- network-security-skills-suite
- version
- 1.0.0
- openclaw
- {"emoji":"🛡️","safetyTier":"read-only","requires":{"bins":["ssh"],"env":[]},"tags":["cisco","asa","ftd","firewall"],"mcpDependencies":[],"egressEndpoints":[]}
Cisco ASA / FTD Firewall Security Policy Audit
Policy-audit-driven analysis covering both Cisco ASA (classic) and Firepower Threat Defense (FTD). Unlike generic firewall checklists that check for open ports and default-deny, this skill evaluates the platform-specific security architecture: ASA security levels with interface-bound ACLs and Modular Policy Framework, or FTD Access Control Policy with Snort IPS integration and Firepower Management Center (FMC) orchestration.
Where platforms diverge, sections use [ASA] and [FTD] labels. Shared concepts apply to both platforms unlabeled. Covers ASA 9.x+ and FTD 6.x+ / 7.x+ managed by FMC or FDM. Reference references/policy-model.md for the ASA security-level model and FTD ACP evaluation chain, and references/cli-reference.md for dual-platform read-only commands.
When to Use
- ACL review after rule changes or migration from ASA to FTD
- Annual or quarterly compliance audit requiring per-rule justification
- Post-incident rule assessment to identify how traffic was permitted
- [ASA] Security level and interface ACL gap analysis
- [ASA] Modular Policy Framework audit — verifying inspection maps
- [FTD] Access Control Policy rule ordering and IPS coverage review
- [FTD] Snort IPS policy tuning assessment — false positive vs detection gap balance
- NAT policy validation after network re-addressing or migration
- VPN configuration security review — site-to-site and remote access
- Failover / HA posture verification
- Pre-migration baseline before ASA-to-FTD conversion
Prerequisites
- [ASA] Privilege level 5+ (read-only
showcommands) or ASDM read-only access - [FTD] Read-only analyst access to FMC web UI or FMC REST API; Expert shell access for Snort-level diagnostics
- Understanding of the interface topology — which interfaces exist, their security levels ([ASA]), and network segment assignments
- Knowledge of expected access policies per interface pair or zone
- For multi-context ASA: access to system and each security context
- [FTD] Knowledge of IPS policy baseline — which Snort ruleset and network analysis policy are expected
- Active configuration — audit evaluates the running configuration, not pending changes
Procedure
Follow this audit flow sequentially. Each step builds on prior findings. The procedure moves from platform identification through access policy, NAT, inspection/IPS, VPN, and logging.
Step 1: Platform Identification and Architecture Inventory
Determine the platform and collect architectural baseline.
show versionIdentify: ASA vs FTD, software version, hardware platform (ASA 5500-X, Firepower 1000/2100/4100/9300, virtual), licensed features.
[ASA] Inventory interfaces, security levels, and context mode:
show interface ip brief
show nameif
show modeSecurity levels (0–100) determine implicit traffic flow: traffic from a higher security level to a lower is permitted by default (unless ACLs override); lower-to-higher is denied by default. Record each interface name, security level, and IP address.
For multi-context ASA:
show context
changeto context <name>
show interface ip brief[FTD] Identify management model and registered devices:
show managersFTD managed by FMC: policy is pushed from FMC — audit via FMC UI/API. FTD managed by FDM (local): policy configured on-device — audit via FDM web UI or REST API.
Check failover/HA status on both platforms:
show failover
show failover stateRecord active/standby status, failover interface, and last failover time.
Step 2: Access Policy Analysis
[ASA] ACL-based access control:
show access-list
show running-config access-list
show running-config access-groupASA uses interface-bound ACLs. Each ACL is applied inbound or outbound on an interface via access-group. Evaluate:
- ACL evaluation order: Top-down within each ACL. First matching ACE
(Access Control Entry) is applied. Implicit deny at the bottom.
- Global ACL: If configured, applies to all interfaces. Interface ACLs
are evaluated before the global ACL.
- Overly permissive ACEs:
permit ip any anyorpermit tcp any any
entries are Critical findings — they permit all traffic of that protocol.
- Unused ACEs: ACEs with zero hit counts (check
show access-list
output for hitcnt=0) over 90+ days are cleanup candidates.
- EtherType ACLs: Used on transparent firewall interfaces. Review for
overly broad EtherType permits.
show access-list <acl-name> brief[FTD] Access Control Policy (ACP):
Access the ACP via FMC UI or REST API. The ACP evaluates traffic through a defined chain (see references/policy-model.md). Evaluate:
- Prefilter policy: Hardware-level rules that bypass Snort. Overly
broad prefilter Trust rules skip all inspection.
- SSL policy: Determines which TLS flows are decrypted for inspection.
- Access Control rules: Top-down evaluation. Actions: Allow (with or
without IPS), Trust (bypass Snort), Block, Monitor. - Rules with Action=Allow and no Intrusion Policy pass traffic without IPS inspection. - Rules with Action=Trust bypass all further inspection including IPS and file/malware — use only for verified trusted flows.
- Default action: Applied when no rule matches. Should be Block with
logging, not Allow.
- Intrusion Policy binding: Each Allow rule can bind an Intrusion
Policy (Snort ruleset). Rules without one pass traffic uninspected.
system support diagnostic-cli
show access-control-configStep 3: NAT Policy Audit
[ASA] NAT order of operations:
show nat
show nat detail
show running-config nat
show xlateASA NAT evaluates in three sections:
- Section 1 (Manual NAT / Twice NAT): Explicit rules, top-down. Highest
priority. Used for fine-grained control.
- Section 2 (Auto NAT / Object NAT): Per-object NAT definitions.
Evaluated after Section 1. Ordering: static rules first, then dynamic.
- Section 3 (Manual NAT after-auto): Low-priority manual rules evaluated
after auto NAT. Used for catch-all translations.
Check for NAT rule conflicts — a Section 1 rule that matches the same traffic as a Section 2 object NAT always wins. Verify that static NAT entries for published servers have corresponding ACL entries restricting access.
[FTD] NAT rules in FMC:
FTD NAT follows the same three-section model as ASA but is configured via FMC. Review NAT rules in the FMC NAT policy. Verify:
- Manual NAT rules take precedence over auto NAT
- NAT rules align with ACP rules — ensure translated addresses match ACP
source/destination references
- No unnecessary identity NAT rules consuming processing
Cross-reference NAT entries with access policy on both platforms — static NAT that exposes internal servers must have restrictive access rules.
Step 4: Inspection and IPS Assessment
[ASA] Modular Policy Framework (MPF):
show running-config class-map
show running-config policy-map
show running-config service-policy
show service-policyASA inspection uses MPF: class-maps define traffic → policy-maps bind inspections → service-policies apply to interfaces. Evaluate:
- Default inspection: ASA enables inspection for common protocols
(HTTP, DNS, FTP, etc.) via the global_policy. Verify the global policy is applied (service-policy global_policy global).
- Custom inspections: Additional class-maps/policy-maps for specific
traffic patterns. Verify they are applied to correct interfaces.
- Missing inspections: Traffic not matching any class-map in the
service-policy receives no application-layer inspection — only ACL enforcement.
- Connection limits: MPF can set connection limits and timeouts.
Review for overly permissive or missing connection limits on internet-facing interfaces.
[FTD] Snort IPS and File/Malware policies:
- Intrusion Policy: Each ACP Allow rule can reference an Intrusion
Policy that determines the Snort ruleset. Check that internet-facing Allow rules bind an Intrusion Policy.
- Snort rule sets: Verify the base policy (Balanced Security and
Connectivity, Connectivity Over Security, Security Over Connectivity, Maximum Detection). For production environments, "Balanced Security and Connectivity" is the minimum recommended baseline.
- Network Analysis Policy (NAP): Controls protocol decoder settings
and preprocessor configuration. Misconfigured NAP can cause Snort detection gaps.
- File and Malware Policy: Detects and blocks malware file transfers.
Verify binding on rules permitting file-carrying protocols (HTTP, SMTP, FTP, SMB).
- Snort deployment mode: Inline (can block) vs passive (alert only).
Production deployments should use inline mode for active prevention.
system support diagnostic-cli
show snort statisticsStep 5: VPN and Remote Access Audit
Evaluate VPN configuration security on both platforms.
show crypto ipsec sa
show crypto ikev2 sa
show vpn-sessiondbCheck:
- Site-to-site tunnels: Verify IKE version (IKEv2 preferred over
IKEv1), encryption algorithms (AES-256-GCM recommended; DES/3DES are findings), DH groups (group 14+ recommended; groups 1/2/5 are weak), and PFS settings.
- Crypto maps / tunnel groups: [ASA] Review crypto map entries
and tunnel group definitions. [FTD] Review site-to-site VPN topology in FMC.
- AnyConnect / remote access VPN: If configured, evaluate:
- Authentication method (certificate + MFA preferred over password-only) - Split tunneling settings (full tunnel recommended for security; split tunnel for performance — document the choice) - Connection profiles and group policies - Client certificate validation settings - Banner and session timeout configuration
show running-config tunnel-group
show running-config group-policy- IKE/IPSec SA lifetimes: Very long lifetimes (>24h IKE, >8h IPSec)
increase exposure if keys are compromised.
Step 6: Logging and Monitoring
Evaluate logging configuration and coverage.
[ASA] Syslog configuration:
show logging
show running-config logging- Syslog severity: Verify logging level is set to at least
"informational" (level 6) for security-relevant events. Level 5 (notifications) misses connection teardown events. Level 7 (debugging) generates excessive volume.
- Syslog destinations: Verify syslog server(s) are configured and
reachable. Check for encrypted syslog (TCP/TLS) for log integrity.
- SNMP: If configured, verify community strings are not defaults and
SNMP v3 is used for authentication/encryption.
[FTD] Firepower event logging:
- Connection events: In FMC, verify connection logging is enabled on
ACP rules. "Log at End of Connection" is standard; "Log at Beginning" adds volume but provides immediate visibility.
- Intrusion events: Automatically logged by Snort when rules trigger.
Verify events are forwarded to the SIEM.
- eStreamer: The Firepower event streaming API for SIEM integration.
Verify eStreamer client connectivity if in use.
- Security Analytics / SecureX: If integrated, verify telemetry
forwarding is active.
show logging
show running-config loggingVerify logging covers: denied connections (ACL denials), permitted connections (for audit trail), VPN events, failover events, and administrative access.
Threshold Tables
Policy Rule Severity Classification
| Finding | Severity | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
[ASA] permit ip any any in interface ACL | Critical | Permits all IP traffic — no access restriction |
| [FTD] ACP default action set to Allow | Critical | All unmatched traffic permitted without inspection |
| [FTD] Prefilter Trust rule with broad match (any/any) | Critical | Traffic bypasses all Snort inspection |
| [ASA] No global service-policy applied | High | No application-layer inspection on any traffic |
| [FTD] Allow rule without Intrusion Policy binding | High | Traffic permitted without IPS inspection |
| [FTD] SSL policy not decrypting internet-bound traffic | High | Snort inspects only metadata on encrypted flows |
| VPN using DES/3DES or DH group 1/2/5 | High | Weak cryptographic algorithms — vulnerable to attack |
| Static NAT with no restricting ACL | High | Published server accessible on all ports |
| Failover configured but standby not monitoring | High | HA not providing redundancy |
| [FTD] Snort in passive mode (production) | High | IPS detects but cannot block threats |
| [ASA] ACE with hitcnt=0 for >90 days | Medium | Unused rule — cleanup candidate |
| [FTD] File/Malware policy not bound on file-carrying rules | Medium | Malware detection gap on HTTP/SMTP/FTP |
| VPN split tunneling enabled | Medium | Remote user traffic may bypass corporate security controls |
| Logging severity below informational (level 6) | Medium | Security events not captured in logs |
| [ASA] Security levels equal with same-security-traffic disabled | Low | Traffic between equal interfaces blocked (may be intentional) |
IPS / Inspection Maturity
| Coverage | Maturity | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| [FTD] All Allow rules have Intrusion + File/Malware policies | Mature | Maintain; tune Snort rules quarterly |
| [FTD] Most Allow rules have Intrusion Policy, some gaps | Developing | Bind Intrusion Policy to remaining Allow rules |
| [ASA] Global inspection policy active, custom maps defined | Developing | Evaluate FTD migration for deeper inspection |
| [ASA] Default global_policy only, no custom inspections | Immature | Add custom inspection maps for critical protocols |
Decision Trees
Access Policy Gap Remediation
Overly permissive access rule identified
├── Platform?
│ ├── [ASA] permit ip any any in ACL
│ │ ├── Is ACL applied to an interface?
│ │ │ ├── Yes → CRITICAL: All traffic permitted on that interface
│ │ │ │ └── Analyze connections: show conn [interface]
│ │ │ │ → Replace with specific permit entries
│ │ │ └── No → ACL exists but not applied; verify intent
│ │ └── Global ACL?
│ │ └── Applies to all interfaces → assess scope of exposure
│ │
│ └── [FTD] Allow rule without Intrusion Policy
│ ├── What traffic does the rule match?
│ │ ├── Internet-bound → Bind Intrusion Policy (Balanced minimum)
│ │ │ └── Also bind File/Malware policy
│ │ ├── Inter-zone → Bind Intrusion Policy
│ │ └── Trusted internal → Evaluate risk; bind at minimum
│ │
│ └── Is it a Trust rule?
│ ├── Yes → Bypasses ALL inspection
│ │ └── Verify traffic is truly trusted (e.g., backup)
│ │ └── Consider changing to Allow + Intrusion Policy
│ └── No (Allow) → Add Intrusion Policy binding
│
└── Action = Trust vs Allow?
├── Trust → Zero inspection; use sparingly
└── Allow → Inspection possible; bind policiesNAT Conflict Resolution
NAT rule conflict suspected
├── [ASA] Which section is each rule in?
│ ├── Section 1 (Manual) vs Section 2 (Auto) → Section 1 always wins
│ ├── Both in Section 2 → Static evaluates before dynamic; check overlap
│ └── Section 1 vs Section 3 → Section 1 wins; Section 3 may be unreachable
│
├── [FTD] Same three-section model via FMC
│ └── Review NAT policy → identify ordering conflicts
│
└── Verify with packet tracer:
packet-tracer input <iface> tcp <src> <sport> <dst> <dport>Report Template
CISCO ASA / FTD SECURITY POLICY AUDIT REPORT
===============================================
Device: [hostname]
Platform: [ASA model / FTD model]
Software: [ASA version / FTD version]
Management: [ASDM / FMC hostname / FDM]
Mode: [routed / transparent] [single / multi-context]
Failover: [active-standby / active-active / standalone]
Audit Date: [timestamp]
Performed By: [operator/agent]
INTERFACE / ZONE SUMMARY:
[ASA]: Interfaces: [count] (security levels: [list]) | Multi-context: [yes/no]
[FTD]: Zones: [count] ([list]) | Managed by: [FMC/FDM]
ACCESS POLICY:
[ASA]: ACLs: [count] | ACEs total: [n] | hitcnt=0 (>90d): [n] | Global service-policy: [yes/no]
[FTD]: ACP rules: [n] (Allow:[n] Block:[n] Trust:[n])
IPS-bound: [n]/[allow] | File/Malware-bound: [n]/[allow] | Default: [Block/Allow]
NAT: Section 1: [n] | Section 2: [n] | Section 3: [n] | Static: [n] | Conflicts: [n/none]
INSPECTION / IPS:
[ASA]: Service-policy: [applied/missing] | Inspected: [protocols]
[FTD]: IPS policy: [name] | Snort: [inline/passive] | SSL decrypt: [n rules/none]
VPN: Tunnels: [n] | IKE: [v1/v2] | Crypto: [algs] | AnyConnect: [yes/no] | Split: [yes/no]
FINDINGS:
1. [Severity] [Category] — [Description]
Platform: [ASA/FTD] | Rule: [id] | Interface/Zone: [name]
Issue: [problem] → Recommendation: [remediation]
RECOMMENDATIONS: [Prioritized by severity]
NEXT AUDIT: [CRITICAL: 30d, HIGH: 90d, clean: 180d]Troubleshooting
ASA-to-FTD Migration Assessment
When evaluating an ASA for migration to FTD, document: ACL count, NAT rules, MPF inspections, VPN configurations (crypto maps don't migrate directly), and multi-context usage (FTD does not support multi-context). The Cisco Firepower Migration Tool provides a baseline but audit the migrated policy for accuracy — automated migration often produces suboptimal rule ordering.
Multi-Context ASA Audits
Each security context is an independent firewall with its own interfaces, ACLs, NAT, and routing. Audit each context separately via changeto context <name>. Use show context in the system context to list all contexts and show resource allocation for per-context limits.
Large ACLs (>1000 ACEs)
Export the configuration (show running-config access-list) and parse programmatically. Prioritize by hit count — high-hit-count ACEs carry the most traffic. Zero-hit-count ACEs over 90 days are removal candidates.
FTD Diagnostic CLI
FTD runs Snort on top of an ASA-derived data plane. Use system support diagnostic-cli for ASA-style show commands. The canonical policy source is FMC — the diagnostic CLI shows deployed results.
Packet Tracer for Policy Verification
Both platforms support packet tracer for simulating traffic:
packet-tracer input <interface> tcp <src-ip> <src-port> <dst-ip> <dst-port>Shows each processing phase: ACL/ACP evaluation, NAT translation, inspection, routing, and egress. Use to verify audit findings.