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capability-composition-analyzer能力构成分析仪

Agent Skill

capability-composition-analyzer 用于补充开发相关能力,适合在 OpenClaw 中需要让 Agent 承接开发相关任务时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

总安装

12,059

周安装

518

GitHub Stars

公开资料未说明

下载量

4,227
OpenClaw

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

MIT-0

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:capability-composition-analyzer(能力构成分析仪)
来源仓库:https://github.com/andyxinweiminicloud/capability-composition-analyzer
安装命令:
openclaw skills install capability-composition-analyzer
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 OpenClaw 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

ClawHubOpenClaw
openclaw skills install capability-composition-analyzer

简介

识别 Agent Skill 组合时可能出现的危险能力冲突。

  • 帮助预防因权限叠加导致的安全风险或功能异常。
  • 在安装多个技能前后主动扫描潜在问题组合。
  • 无需额外配置,但需确保运行环境有足够日志权限。
  • 建议定期运行以维持技能生态的安全性。capability-composition-analyzer 属于开发类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

SKILL.md

name
capability-composition-analyzer
description
>
version
1.0.0
metadata
openclaw
requires
bins
[curl, python3]
env
[]
emoji
🔗
agent_card
capabilities
[capability-composition-analysis, dangerous-combination-detection, exfiltration-path-detection]
attack_surface
[L1, L2]
trust_dimension
attack-surface-coverage
published
clawhub
false
moltbook
false

Your Agent Has 12 Skills. Together, They Can Do Things None of Them Should.

Helps identify when individually benign skills compose into dangerous capability combinations — the attack surface that per-skill auditing cannot see.

Problem

A skill that reads files is benign. A skill that sends HTTP requests is benign. An agent that has both can exfiltrate files — and no individual skill audit will flag it, because neither skill is doing anything wrong on its own.

This is the capability composition problem. Agent security tooling inherited from software security tends to analyze skills in isolation: does this skill request excessive permissions? does this skill contain malicious code? These are the right questions for individual skills. They are the wrong questions for understanding what an agent can do.

What an agent can do is the product of its capability set, not the sum of individual skill assessments. An agent with twelve benign skills may have emergent capabilities that no skill declared and no auditor reviewed. A poisoned skill dropped into that composition inherits everything the agent can already reach — and the blast radius is determined by the composition, not the skill.

The attack surface that matters is not what any individual skill can do. It is what the agent's combined capability set enables.

What This Analyzes

This analyzer examines capability composition risk across five dimensions:

  1. Dangerous pairs — Which pairs of capabilities in the agent's skill set create

risk when combined? read-files + send-HTTP, execute-code + network-access, read-environment + write-logs are canonical examples. The analyzer checks for known dangerous compositions and flags novel combinations that share structural properties with them

  1. Emergent capability surface — What capabilities does the agent effectively

have that no individual skill declared? A skill that can read arbitrary paths and a skill that resolves environment variables together create an effective "read secrets" capability that neither declared

  1. Inheritance amplification — If a poisoned skill is injected into this agent,

what capabilities does it immediately inherit? The inherited capability set determines the potential blast radius of any single skill compromise

  1. Permission declaration gaps — Where does the agent's effective capability

exceed its declared permissions? Gaps indicate either undeclared scope or capability composition the publisher did not model

  1. Composition change velocity — How often is the agent's skill set changing?

Rapidly changing compositions create new dangerous combinations faster than audits can track them

How to Use

Input: Provide one of:

  • An agent's declared skill list with capability metadata
  • Two or more skills to analyze for dangerous composition
  • An agent's permission declarations to check against its effective capability set

Output: A composition risk report containing:

  • Dangerous pair inventory (known + structurally novel)
  • Emergent capability surface (undeclared effective capabilities)
  • Inheritance amplification score for each skill slot
  • Permission declaration gap assessment
  • Composition risk level: SAFE / ELEVATED / HIGH / CRITICAL

Example

Input: Analyze capability composition for agent with skills: file-reader, http-requester, env-resolver, log-writer, code-executor

🔗 CAPABILITY COMPOSITION ANALYSIS

Agent skill set: 5 skills
Declared permissions: file-read (scoped), network-outbound (scoped)
Audit timestamp: 2025-05-01T09:00:00Z

Dangerous pair inventory:
  file-reader + http-requester: ⚠️ HIGH
    Effective capability: file exfiltration
    Neither skill declares exfiltration intent
    Path: read arbitrary file → send as HTTP body/parameter

  env-resolver + http-requester: ⚠️ HIGH
    Effective capability: credential exfiltration
    Environment variables commonly contain API keys, tokens
    Path: resolve $API_KEY, $DB_PASSWORD → send outbound

  code-executor + network-access: 🔴 CRITICAL
    Effective capability: arbitrary remote code execution staging
    Path: fetch payload → execute locally

  log-writer + file-reader: ✅ LOW
    No dangerous composition identified

Emergent capability surface (undeclared):
  - Secret exfiltration (env + HTTP) — not declared in any skill
  - Arbitrary file exfiltration (file + HTTP) — scope exceeds declared "scoped"
  - RCE staging (executor + network) — not declared

Permission declaration gaps:
  Declared: file-read (scoped to /app/data)
  Effective: file-reader can access any path agent process can read
  Gap: declared scope not enforced at composition level

Inheritance amplification:
  If any skill slot is compromised, attacker inherits:
  - File read (all accessible paths)
  - Outbound HTTP (all accessible endpoints)
  - Environment variable access
  - Code execution
  Combined: full agent compromise with exfiltration path

Composition risk level: CRITICAL
  Five individually-audited skills compose into an effective
  remote access and exfiltration toolkit. No individual audit
  would flag this — it is only visible at the composition level.

Recommended actions:
  1. Apply capability isolation: skills that read files should not
     have access to network-capable skills' output channels
  2. Scope network-outbound to specific allowlisted endpoints
  3. Add composition policy: no agent should hold both arbitrary
     file-read and arbitrary network-outbound simultaneously
  4. Audit any agent inheriting this skill set for composition drift

Related Tools

  • blast-radius-estimator — Estimates propagation impact if a skill is

compromised; capability-composition-analyzer determines what the compromised skill immediately inherits

  • permission-creep-scanner — Detects individual skills requesting excessive

permissions; composition analyzer detects dangerous emergent capabilities across multiple appropriately-scoped skills

  • observer-effect-probe — Tests runtime evasion; a skill exploiting composition

risk may only activate the dangerous path after establishing context

  • runtime-attestation-probe — Validates runtime behavior; composition risk

manifests at runtime when capabilities are exercised together

Limitations

Capability composition analysis requires accurate capability metadata for all skills in the agent's composition. Skills that do not declare capabilities accurately — or that acquire capabilities dynamically at runtime — will produce incomplete composition maps. The dangerous pair inventory covers known composition risks; novel compositions with no prior pattern may not be flagged. Effective capability analysis is necessarily conservative: it identifies what the composition could do, not what it will do. False positives are expected for agents where dangerous capability pairs exist but are operationally isolated by other means. Composition analysis is a complement to per-skill auditing, not a replacement — individual skill integrity remains necessary even when composition risk is low.

适合场景

01

OpenClaw 用户查找和安装 Skill 时

02

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

03

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

04

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

补充不同宿主或平台的使用分布数据

能力 5

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

OpenClaw

97.78%
按下载量换算4,133

安全审计

VirusTotal

通过

ClawScan

通过

Static analysis

未展示

权限和风险

敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。当前只有一个来源,正式发布前建议补源仓库或其他目录站核验。

来源信息

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