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Agent Skill · 研究检索

build-mcpb(构建 MCPB)

build-mcpb 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

build-mcpb 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为接触敏感数据;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描已通过,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 4,627。

总安装 30,888周安装 1,337GitHub Stars 18,236下载 10,816核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:build-mcpb(构建 MCPB)
来源仓库:https://github.com/anthropics/claude-plugins-official
仓库路径:skills/build-mcpb
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/anthropics/claude-plugins-official --skill build-mcpb
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/anthropics/claude-plugins-official --skill build-mcpb

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

用于构建本地打包的 MCP 服务器(MCPB),单文件分发,无需用户机器上安装运行时。适合需要本地运行、访问文件系统或调用 OS API 的场景,如桌面应用集成。通过 npx skills add 命令从 GitHub 安装,Anthropic 推荐远程 MCP 服务器用于目录列表。

注意权限范围和维护状态,避免触发不必要的联网、命令执行或文件写入操作。build-mcpb 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

来源仓库内路径:skills/build-mcpb

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/anthropics/claude-plugins-official --skill bui…;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要接触敏感数据,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

build-mcpb 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/anthropics/claude-plugins-official --skill build-mcpb。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

build-mcpb 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

build-mcpb 需要什么权限?

权限级别是接触敏感数据。该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

build-mcpb 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

build-mcpb 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 30,888 次,近一周安装 1,337 次,下载 10,816 次,GitHub 18,236 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

build-mcpb 安全吗?

第三方扫描结果为通过,但这只覆盖已知的静态检查项,不能替代自己读一遍源码和安装命令。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。
  • 第三方扫描已通过,常见的高风险行为没有命中。
  • 来源仓库有 18,236 星,维护活跃度相对可查。

先想清楚的地方

  • 需要接触敏感数据,装到常用环境前要先评估影响面。
  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 环境里有大量密钥、凭证,不方便给第三方 Skill 读取的人。
  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
build-mcpb

构建 MCPB · 本页

30,88818,236接触敏感数据未明确通过

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Build an MCPB (Bundled Local MCP Server)

MCPB is a local MCP server packaged with its runtime. The user installs one file; it runs without needing Node, Python, or any toolchain on their machine. It's the sanctioned way to distribute local MCP servers.

MCPB is the secondary distribution path. Anthropic recommends remote MCP servers for directory listing — see https://claude.com/docs/connectors/building/what-to-build.

Use MCPB when the server must run on the user's machine — reading local files, driving a desktop app, talking to localhost services, OS-level APIs. If your server only hits cloud APIs, you almost certainly want a remote HTTP server instead (see build-mcp-server). Don't pay the MCPB packaging tax for something that could be a URL.


What an MCPB bundle contains

my-server.mcpb              (zip archive)
├── manifest.json           ← identity, entry point, config schema, compatibility
├── server/                 ← your MCP server code
│   ├── index.js
│   └── node_modules/       ← bundled dependencies (or vendored)
└── icon.png

The host reads manifest.json, launches server.mcp_config.command as a stdio MCP server, and pipes messages. From your code's perspective it's identical to a local stdio server — the only difference is packaging.


Manifest

{
  "$schema": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anthropics/mcpb/main/schemas/mcpb-manifest-v0.4.schema.json",
  "manifest_version": "0.4",
  "name": "local-files",
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "description": "Read, search, and watch files on the local filesystem.",
  "author": { "name": "Your Name" },
  "server": {
    "type": "node",
    "entry_point": "server/index.js",
    "mcp_config": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["${__dirname}/server/index.js"],
      "env": {
        "ROOT_DIR": "${user_config.rootDir}"
      }
    }
  },
  "user_config": {
    "rootDir": {
      "type": "directory",
      "title": "Root directory",
      "description": "Directory to expose. Defaults to ~/Documents.",
      "default": "${HOME}/Documents",
      "required": true
    }
  },
  "compatibility": {
    "claude_desktop": ">=1.0.0",
    "platforms": ["darwin", "win32", "linux"]
  }
}

server.type — node, python, or binary. Informational; the actual launch comes from mcp_config.

server.mcp_config — the literal command/args/env to spawn. Use ${__dirname} for bundle-relative paths and ${user_config.<key>} to substitute install-time config. There's no auto-prefix — the env var names your server reads are exactly what you put in env.

user_config — install-time settings surfaced in the host's UI. type: "directory" renders a native folder picker. sensitive: true stores in OS keychain. See references/manifest-schema.md for all fields.


Server code: same as local stdio

The server itself is a standard stdio MCP server. Nothing MCPB-specific in the tool logic.

import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";
import { StdioServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js";
import { z } from "zod";
import { readFile, readdir } from "node:fs/promises";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { homedir } from "node:os";

// ROOT_DIR comes from what you put in manifest's server.mcp_config.env — no auto-prefix
const ROOT = (process.env.ROOT_DIR ?? join(homedir(), "Documents"));

const server = new McpServer({ name: "local-files", version: "0.1.0" });

server.registerTool(
  "list_files",
  {
    description: "List files in a directory under the configured root.",
    inputSchema: { path: z.string().default(".") },
    annotations: { readOnlyHint: true },
  },
  async ({ path }) => {
    const entries = await readdir(join(ROOT, path), { withFileTypes: true });
    const list = entries.map(e => ({ name: e.name, dir: e.isDirectory() }));
    return { content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(list, null, 2) }] };
  },
);

server.registerTool(
  "read_file",
  {
    description: "Read a file's contents. Path is relative to the configured root.",
    inputSchema: { path: z.string() },
    annotations: { readOnlyHint: true },
  },
  async ({ path }) => {
    const text = await readFile(join(ROOT, path), "utf8");
    return { content: [{ type: "text", text }] };
  },
);

const transport = new StdioServerTransport();
await server.connect(transport);

Sandboxing is entirely your job. There is no manifest-level sandbox — the process runs with full user privileges. Validate paths, refuse to escape ROOT, allowlist spawns. See references/local-security.md.

Before hardcoding ROOT from a config env var, check if the host supports roots/list — the spec-native way to get user-approved directories. See references/local-security.md for the pattern.


Build pipeline

Node

npm install
npx esbuild src/index.ts --bundle --platform=node --outfile=server/index.js
# or: copy node_modules wholesale if native deps resist bundling
npx @anthropic-ai/mcpb pack

mcpb pack zips the directory and validates manifest.json against the schema.

Python

pip install -t server/vendor -r requirements.txt
npx @anthropic-ai/mcpb pack

Vendor dependencies into a subdirectory and prepend it to sys.path in your entry script. Native extensions (numpy, etc.) must be built for each target platform — avoid native deps if you can.


MCPB has no sandbox — security is on you

Unlike mobile app stores, MCPB does NOT enforce permissions. The manifest has no permissions block — the server runs with full user privileges. references/local-security.md is mandatory reading, not optional. Every path must be validated, every spawn must be allowlisted, because nothing stops you at the platform level.

If you came here expecting filesystem/network scoping from the manifest: it doesn't exist. Build it yourself in tool handlers.

If your server's only job is hitting a cloud API, stop — that's a remote server wearing an MCPB costume. The user gains nothing from running it locally, and you're taking on local-security burden for no reason.


MCPB + UI widgets

MCPB servers can serve UI resources exactly like remote MCP apps — the widget mechanism is transport-agnostic. A local file picker that browses the actual disk, a dialog that controls a native app, etc.

Widget authoring is covered in the build-mcp-app skill; it works the same here. The only difference is where the server runs.


Testing

# Interactive manifest creation (first time)
npx @anthropic-ai/mcpb init

# Run the server directly over stdio, poke it with the inspector
npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector node server/index.js

# Validate manifest against schema, then pack
npx @anthropic-ai/mcpb validate
npx @anthropic-ai/mcpb pack

# Sign for distribution
npx @anthropic-ai/mcpb sign dist/local-files.mcpb

# Install: drag the .mcpb file onto Claude Desktop

Test on a machine without your dev toolchain before shipping. "Works on my machine" failures in MCPB almost always trace to a dependency that wasn't actually bundled.


Reference files

  • references/manifest-schema.md — full manifest.json field reference
  • references/local-security.md — path traversal, sandboxing, least privilege

平台分布

Codex

38.06%
按下载量换算4,117

Claude

29.22%
按下载量换算3,160

Cursor

18.61%
按下载量换算2,013

Gemini CLI

9.73%
按下载量换算1,052

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

通过

权限和风险

接触敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

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