- name
- audit-trail
- description
- Governance — immutable, timestamped, hash-chained audit log of all agent actions. Forensic-ready for compliance, investigation, and accountability.
- metadata
- {"openclaw":{"emoji":"📜","category":"governance"}}
Audit Trail — Immutable Action Log
Purpose
Provide a tamper-evident, complete record of every agent action for forensic investigation, compliance auditing, and accountability.
Integration
Always-on hook on ALL agent actions:
- Tool use (exec, file read/write, network)
- Skill invocations
- Channel messages (in/out)
- Memory reads/writes
- Configuration changes
- Error events
Log Format (JSONL, append-only)
{"id":"ACT-20260331-000001","ts":"2026-03-31T14:30:00.123Z","agent":"openclaw-main","session":"sess_abc123","type":"tool_use","tool":"exec","args":{"cmd":"npm test"},"skill":"contract-tester","channel":"telegram","user_hash":"sha256:a1b2c3...","outcome":"success","duration_ms":4200,"prev_hash":"sha256:000000","hash":"sha256:d4e5f6..."}Fields
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
id | string | Unique sequential ID |
ts | ISO 8601 | Microsecond timestamp |
agent | string | Agent identifier |
session | string | Session ID |
type | enum | tool_use, skill_invoke, channel_in, channel_out, memory_write, config_change, error |
tool | string | Tool name (if applicable) |
args | object | Sanitized arguments (secrets redacted) |
skill | string | Invoking skill |
channel | string | Source channel |
user_hash | string | SHA-256 of user identifier (never raw) |
outcome | enum | success, failure, timeout, blocked |
duration_ms | number | Execution time |
prev_hash | string | SHA-256 of previous log entry (chain) |
hash | string | SHA-256 of this entry (including prev_hash) |
Storage
.security/audit-trail/
├── 2026-03-31.jsonl (today, active)
├── 2026-03-30.jsonl (yesterday)
├── 2026-03-29.jsonl.gz (compressed, >7 days)
└── integrity-check.log (chain verification results)Integrity Verification
- Each entry's
hash= SHA-256(id + ts + type + tool + outcome + prev_hash) - Chain validation:
entry[n].prev_hash == entry[n-1].hash - Run verification:
jq -r '.hash' | sha256sum --check - Tampering detection: broken chain → CRITICAL alert
Retention Policy
| Age | Storage | Access |
|---|---|---|
| 0-7 days | Raw JSONL | Direct read |
| 7-90 days | Compressed JSONL.gz | Decompress on query |
| 90-365 days | Archive (if configured) | Restore on request |
| >365 days | Purge (manual only, human approval) | — |
Query Examples
# All actions by a specific skill
jq 'select(.skill=="contract-tester")' .security/audit-trail/2026-03-31.jsonl
# All failures
jq 'select(.outcome=="failure")' .security/audit-trail/*.jsonl
# Actions in a time window
jq 'select(.ts >= "2026-03-31T14:00" and .ts < "2026-03-31T15:00")' .security/audit-trail/2026-03-31.jsonl
# Channel activity summary
jq -s 'group_by(.channel) | map({channel: .[0].channel, count: length})' .security/audit-trail/2026-03-31.jsonlGuardrails
- Log file is APPEND-ONLY — agent cannot delete or modify entries
- Secrets in arguments are redacted BEFORE logging (using agent-firewall patterns)
- User identifiers are hashed, never stored in plaintext
- Log integrity verified on every read
- Manual purge requires human approval + logged as audit action itself