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analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds分析威胁情报源

Agent Skill

analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

总安装

1,094

周安装

47

GitHub Stars

5,883

下载量

384
CodexClaudeCursorGemini CLI

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明和来源信息,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。

GitHub

来源数

2

许可证

unknown

最后核验

2026-05-01

来源状态

来源可访问

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds(分析威胁情报源)
来源仓库:https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills
仓库路径:skills/analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds

简介

分析威胁情报源,用于评估商业或开源情报源的信号与噪声比。

  • 适用于处理 STIX 2.1、OpenIOC、YARA 等格式,构建自动化丰富管道。
  • 需访问威胁情报平台(TIP),支持在 Codex、Claude 等宿主中调用。
  • 安装通过 GitHub 仓库,建议确认权限范围及是否触发联网或命令执行。
  • analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

SKILL.md

Analyzing Threat Intelligence Feeds

When to Use

Use this skill when:

  • Ingesting new commercial or OSINT threat feeds and assessing their signal-to-noise ratio
  • Normalizing heterogeneous IOC formats (STIX 2.1, OpenIOC, YARA, Sigma) into a unified schema
  • Evaluating feed freshness, fidelity, and relevance to the organization's threat profile
  • Building automated enrichment pipelines that correlate IOCs against SIEM events

Do not use this skill for raw packet capture analysis or live incident triage without first establishing a CTI baseline.

Prerequisites

  • Access to a Threat Intelligence Platform (TIP) such as ThreatConnect, MISP, or OpenCTI
  • API keys for at least one commercial feed (Recorded Future, Mandiant Advantage, or VirusTotal Enterprise)
  • TAXII 2.1 client library (taxii2-client Python package or equivalent)
  • Role with read/write permissions to the TIP's indicator database

Workflow

Step 1: Enumerate and Prioritize Feed Sources

List all available feeds categorized by type (commercial, government, ISAC, OSINT):

  • Commercial: Recorded Future, Mandiant Advantage, CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence
  • Government: CISA AIS (Automated Indicator Sharing), FBI InfraGard, MS-ISAC
  • OSINT: AlienVault OTX, Abuse.ch, PhishTank, Emerging Threats

Score each feed on: update frequency, historical accuracy rate, coverage of your sector, and attribution depth. Use a weighted scoring matrix with criteria from NIST SP 800-150 (Guide to Cyber Threat Information Sharing).

Step 2: Ingest via TAXII 2.1 or API

For TAXII-enabled feeds:

taxii2-client discover https://feed.example.com/taxii/
taxii2-client get-collection --collection-id <id> --since 2024-01-01

For REST API feeds (e.g., Recorded Future):

  • Query /v2/indicator/search with risk_score_min=65 to filter low-confidence IOCs
  • Apply rate limiting and exponential backoff for API resilience

Step 3: Normalize to STIX 2.1

Convert each IOC to STIX 2.1 objects using the OASIS standard schema:

  • IP address → indicator object with pattern: "[ipv4-addr:value = '...']"
  • Domain → indicator with pattern: "[domain-name:value = '...']"
  • File hash → indicator with pattern: "[file:hashes.SHA-256 = '...']"

Attach relationship objects linking indicators to threat-actor or malware objects. Use confidence field (0–100) based on source fidelity rating.

Step 4: Deduplicate and Enrich

Run deduplication against existing TIP database using normalized value + type as composite key. Enrich surviving IOCs:

  • VirusTotal: detection ratio, sandbox behavior reports
  • PassiveTotal (RiskIQ): WHOIS history, passive DNS, SSL certificate chains
  • Shodan: banner data, open ports, geographic location

Step 5: Distribute to Consuming Systems

Export enriched indicators via TAXII 2.1 push to SIEM (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel), firewalls (Palo Alto XSOAR playbooks), and EDR platforms. Set TTL (time-to-live) per indicator type: IP addresses 30 days, domains 90 days, file hashes 1 year.

Key Concepts

TermDefinition
STIX 2.1Structured Threat Information Expression — OASIS standard JSON schema for CTI objects including indicators, threat actors, campaigns, and relationships
TAXII 2.1Trusted Automated eXchange of Intelligence Information — HTTPS-based protocol for sharing STIX content between servers and clients
IOCIndicator of Compromise — observable artifact (IP, domain, hash, URL) that indicates a system may have been breached
TLPTraffic Light Protocol — color-coded classification (RED/AMBER/GREEN/WHITE) defining sharing restrictions for CTI
Confidence ScoreNumeric value (0–100 in STIX) reflecting the producer's certainty about an indicator's malicious attribution
Feed FidelityHistorical accuracy rate of a feed measured by true positive rate in production detections

Tools & Systems

  • ThreatConnect TC Exchange: Aggregates 100+ commercial and OSINT feeds; provides automated playbooks for IOC enrichment
  • MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform): Open-source TIP supporting STIX/TAXII; widely used by ISACs and government CERTs
  • OpenCTI: Open-source platform with native MITRE ATT&CK integration and graph-based relationship visualization
  • Recorded Future: Commercial feed with AI-powered risk scoring and real-time dark web monitoring
  • taxii2-client: Python library for TAXII 2.0/2.1 client operations (pip install taxii2-client)
  • PyMISP: Python API for MISP feed management and IOC submission

Common Pitfalls

  • IOC age staleness: IP addresses and domains rotate frequently; applying 1-year-old IOCs generates false positives. Enforce TTL policies.
  • Missing context: Blocking an IOC without understanding the associated campaign or adversary can disrupt legitimate business traffic (e.g., CDN IPs shared with malicious actors).
  • Feed overlap without deduplication: Ingesting the same IOC from five feeds without deduplication inflates indicator counts and SIEM rule complexity.
  • TLP violation: Redistributing RED-classified intelligence outside authorized boundaries violates sharing agreements and trust relationships.
  • Over-blocking on low-confidence indicators: Indicators with confidence below 50 should trigger detection-only rules, not blocking, to avoid operational disruption.

适合场景

01

用户想查找某类 Agent Skill 时

02

需要根据任务场景推荐可安装能力包时

03

需要对比不同来源的安装命令和来源信息时

能力概览

能力 1

按任务关键词查找相关 Skills

能力 2

展示可复制的安装命令

能力 3

保留来源站点、仓库和原始说明,方便继续核验

能力 4

展示第三方安全扫描或审计结果

安装后应在对应宿主中按原始 README 的触发条件使用;具体调用方式请以来源页面和 README 为准。

平台分布

Codex

34.04%
按下载量换算131

Claude

32.82%
按下载量换算126

Cursor

18.23%
按下载量换算70

Gemini CLI

10.02%
按下载量换算38

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

可疑

权限和风险

需要联网

该 Skill 可能需要联网访问来源站点、仓库或外部 API;具体网络访问范围需要结合源码和 README 复核。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在 warning/failed 结果,不能写成本站确认安全。当前只有一个来源,正式发布前建议补源仓库或其他目录站核验。

来源信息

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