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Agent Skill · 研究检索

analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds(分析威胁情报源)

analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI,通过GitHub 仓库获取,权限为需要联网;许可证信息还不明确,第三方扫描有提醒项,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 42,236。

总安装 1,094周安装 47GitHub Stars 5,883下载 384核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
unknown

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds(分析威胁情报源)
来源仓库:https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills
仓库路径:skills/analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds
安装命令:
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 npx skills 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

skills.shnpx skills
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

分析威胁情报源,用于评估商业或开源情报源的信号与噪声比。适用于处理 STIX 2.1、OpenIOC、YARA 等格式,构建自动化丰富管道。需访问威胁情报平台(TIP),支持在 Codex、Claude 等宿主中调用。安装通过 GitHub 仓库,建议确认权限范围及是否触发联网或命令执行。

analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。

来源仓库内路径:skills/analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skil…;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要需要联网,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds 怎么安装?

在终端执行 npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill analyzin…。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 Codex、Claude、Cursor、Gemini CLI。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds 需要什么权限?

权限级别是需要联网。该 Skill 可能需要联网访问来源站点、仓库或外部 API;具体网络访问范围需要结合源码和 README 复核。

analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds 是免费的吗?

公开资料没有标注明确许可证,收费和商用限制都无法确认。正式使用前请到来源仓库核对授权说明。

analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 1,094 次,近一周安装 47 次,下载 384 次,GitHub 5,883 星。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds 安全吗?

第三方扫描有提醒项,说明存在需要人工确认的行为。安装前请打开源码看清它读了什么、联网到哪里。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 同时适配 4 种工具,换客户端不用重新找替代品。
  • 来源仓库有 5,883 星,维护活跃度相对可查。

先想清楚的地方

  • 许可证没有明确标注,能不能商用、能不能再分发都不确定。
  • 第三方扫描存在提醒项或未通过项,需要人工逐条确认。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 Codex,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 需要明确授权才能用到公司项目里的场景。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
analyzing-threat-intelligence-feeds

分析威胁情报源 · 本页

1,0945,883需要联网未明确有提醒

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

Analyzing Threat Intelligence Feeds

When to Use

Use this skill when:

  • Ingesting new commercial or OSINT threat feeds and assessing their signal-to-noise ratio
  • Normalizing heterogeneous IOC formats (STIX 2.1, OpenIOC, YARA, Sigma) into a unified schema
  • Evaluating feed freshness, fidelity, and relevance to the organization's threat profile
  • Building automated enrichment pipelines that correlate IOCs against SIEM events

Do not use this skill for raw packet capture analysis or live incident triage without first establishing a CTI baseline.

Prerequisites

  • Access to a Threat Intelligence Platform (TIP) such as ThreatConnect, MISP, or OpenCTI
  • API keys for at least one commercial feed (Recorded Future, Mandiant Advantage, or VirusTotal Enterprise)
  • TAXII 2.1 client library (taxii2-client Python package or equivalent)
  • Role with read/write permissions to the TIP's indicator database

Workflow

Step 1: Enumerate and Prioritize Feed Sources

List all available feeds categorized by type (commercial, government, ISAC, OSINT):

  • Commercial: Recorded Future, Mandiant Advantage, CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence
  • Government: CISA AIS (Automated Indicator Sharing), FBI InfraGard, MS-ISAC
  • OSINT: AlienVault OTX, Abuse.ch, PhishTank, Emerging Threats

Score each feed on: update frequency, historical accuracy rate, coverage of your sector, and attribution depth. Use a weighted scoring matrix with criteria from NIST SP 800-150 (Guide to Cyber Threat Information Sharing).

Step 2: Ingest via TAXII 2.1 or API

For TAXII-enabled feeds:

taxii2-client discover https://feed.example.com/taxii/
taxii2-client get-collection --collection-id <id> --since 2024-01-01

For REST API feeds (e.g., Recorded Future):

  • Query /v2/indicator/search with risk_score_min=65 to filter low-confidence IOCs
  • Apply rate limiting and exponential backoff for API resilience

Step 3: Normalize to STIX 2.1

Convert each IOC to STIX 2.1 objects using the OASIS standard schema:

  • IP address → indicator object with pattern: "[ipv4-addr:value = '...']"
  • Domain → indicator with pattern: "[domain-name:value = '...']"
  • File hash → indicator with pattern: "[file:hashes.SHA-256 = '...']"

Attach relationship objects linking indicators to threat-actor or malware objects. Use confidence field (0–100) based on source fidelity rating.

Step 4: Deduplicate and Enrich

Run deduplication against existing TIP database using normalized value + type as composite key. Enrich surviving IOCs:

  • VirusTotal: detection ratio, sandbox behavior reports
  • PassiveTotal (RiskIQ): WHOIS history, passive DNS, SSL certificate chains
  • Shodan: banner data, open ports, geographic location

Step 5: Distribute to Consuming Systems

Export enriched indicators via TAXII 2.1 push to SIEM (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel), firewalls (Palo Alto XSOAR playbooks), and EDR platforms. Set TTL (time-to-live) per indicator type: IP addresses 30 days, domains 90 days, file hashes 1 year.

Key Concepts

TermDefinition
STIX 2.1Structured Threat Information Expression — OASIS standard JSON schema for CTI objects including indicators, threat actors, campaigns, and relationships
TAXII 2.1Trusted Automated eXchange of Intelligence Information — HTTPS-based protocol for sharing STIX content between servers and clients
IOCIndicator of Compromise — observable artifact (IP, domain, hash, URL) that indicates a system may have been breached
TLPTraffic Light Protocol — color-coded classification (RED/AMBER/GREEN/WHITE) defining sharing restrictions for CTI
Confidence ScoreNumeric value (0–100 in STIX) reflecting the producer's certainty about an indicator's malicious attribution
Feed FidelityHistorical accuracy rate of a feed measured by true positive rate in production detections

Tools & Systems

  • ThreatConnect TC Exchange: Aggregates 100+ commercial and OSINT feeds; provides automated playbooks for IOC enrichment
  • MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform): Open-source TIP supporting STIX/TAXII; widely used by ISACs and government CERTs
  • OpenCTI: Open-source platform with native MITRE ATT&CK integration and graph-based relationship visualization
  • Recorded Future: Commercial feed with AI-powered risk scoring and real-time dark web monitoring
  • taxii2-client: Python library for TAXII 2.0/2.1 client operations (pip install taxii2-client)
  • PyMISP: Python API for MISP feed management and IOC submission

Common Pitfalls

  • IOC age staleness: IP addresses and domains rotate frequently; applying 1-year-old IOCs generates false positives. Enforce TTL policies.
  • Missing context: Blocking an IOC without understanding the associated campaign or adversary can disrupt legitimate business traffic (e.g., CDN IPs shared with malicious actors).
  • Feed overlap without deduplication: Ingesting the same IOC from five feeds without deduplication inflates indicator counts and SIEM rule complexity.
  • TLP violation: Redistributing RED-classified intelligence outside authorized boundaries violates sharing agreements and trust relationships.
  • Over-blocking on low-confidence indicators: Indicators with confidence below 50 should trigger detection-only rules, not blocking, to avoid operational disruption.

平台分布

Codex

34.04%
按下载量换算131

Claude

32.82%
按下载量换算126

Cursor

18.23%
按下载量换算70

Gemini CLI

10.02%
按下载量换算38

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub

通过

Socket

通过

Snyk

可疑

权限和风险

需要联网

该 Skill 可能需要联网访问来源站点、仓库或外部 API;具体网络访问范围需要结合源码和 README 复核。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在提醒或未通过项,安装前请自行复核。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

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