Token导航 LogoToken导航

Agent Skill · 研究检索

agent-hush(特工嘘)

agent-hush 用于查找、检索和筛选相关信息,适合在 OpenClaw 中需要根据关键词、任务场景或来源线索快速定位候选结果时使用。可结合来源仓库、安装命令和原始 README 继续核验具体用法。安装前建议确认权限范围、维护状态,以及是否会触发联网、命令执行或文件读写。

agent-hush 是研究检索类 Agent Skill,可用宿主为 OpenClaw,通过ClawHub获取,权限为接触敏感数据;许可证为 MIT-0,第三方扫描有提醒项,按安装量在研究检索类的 73,675 个 Skill 里排第 12,060。

总安装 10,605周安装 429GitHub Stars 公开资料未说明下载 3,329核验 2026-05-01

安装说明

本站只整理中文说明,不托管安装包,也不代用户安装。
GitHub
许可证
MIT-0
版本
1.2.1

安装方式

通过对话安装

复制提示词发给支持本地命令或 Skills 的 AI 助手,先确认命令和权限,再让它执行。

请帮我安装这个 Agent Skill:agent-hush(特工嘘)
来源仓库:https://github.com/elliotllliu/agent-hush
安装命令:
openclaw skills install agent-hush
安装前请先检查当前环境是否支持对应 CLI,并向我确认将要执行的命令、安装目录、联网范围和文件读写权限;确认后再执行。

命令行安装

复制命令到本机终端执行。该命令会通过 OpenClaw 从第三方来源获取 Skill;本站只展示命令,不托管安装包,也不自动执行。

ClawHubOpenClaw
openclaw skills install agent-hush

这个 Skill 是做什么的

研究检索类 Skill 主要解决「找资料、核对事实、把来源整理清楚」的问题,通常会让助手先检索再总结。

自动拦截敏感操作并检查隐私合规性。适用宿主包括 OpenClaw,接入前应确认版本、权限和运行环境要求。保护代理工作空间免受意外数据泄露。适用于处理机密信息的代理场景。agent-hush 属于研究检索类 Skill,可作为该场景下的辅助能力补充。通过 clawhub 安装,需定义敏感数据识别规则。

建议定期审计拦截日志以优化防护策略。

上手步骤

4 步
  1. 1

    确认自己的宿主工具

    公开资料标注支持 OpenClaw;先确认自己用的是其中之一,再按对应工具的 Skills 目录放置。

  2. 2

    拿到安装命令

    可以直接复制的命令是 openclaw skills install agent-hush;命令里的占位符换成自己的路径或密钥再执行。

  3. 3

    安装后重启宿主

    命令执行完要完全退出宿主工具再打开,让新装的 Skill 被重新扫描到,否则列表里可能看不到。

  4. 4

    按最小权限试用

    它需要接触敏感数据,先在测试目录或测试账号里跑,确认没问题再放到正式项目。

常见问题

6 条

agent-hush 怎么安装?

在终端执行 openclaw skills install agent-hush。装完完全退出宿主工具再打开,让它重新扫描本地 Skill。

agent-hush 支持哪些 AI 工具?

公开资料标注支持 OpenClaw。其他工具只要能读取本地 Skill 目录,一般也能手动放进去,但要自己确认触发方式是否一致。

agent-hush 需要什么权限?

权限级别是接触敏感数据。该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

agent-hush 是免费的吗?

来源标注的许可证是 MIT-0。本站不代收任何费用,也不托管安装包;能否商用、要不要署名,以许可证原文为准。

agent-hush 用的人多吗?

公开数据是累计安装 10,605 次,近一周安装 429 次,下载 3,329 次。这些数字来自第三方目录统计,只能当作热度参考,不代表质量或安全性。

agent-hush 安全吗?

第三方扫描有提醒项,说明存在需要人工确认的行为。安装前请打开源码看清它读了什么、联网到哪里。

值得选的地方和要先想清楚的地方

值得选的地方

  • 专注 OpenClaw 一种宿主,触发方式和使用习惯不用来回切换。
  • 许可证明确为 MIT-0,商用和分发边界好判断。

先想清楚的地方

  • 需要接触敏感数据,装到常用环境前要先评估影响面。
  • 第三方扫描存在提醒项或未通过项,需要人工逐条确认。
  • 第三方目录整理,版本更新和行为细节以来源仓库为准。

适不适合你

更适合

  • 已经在用 OpenClaw,想直接扩展它能力的人。
  • 需要处理研究检索类任务、又不想每次都手写提示词的人。

不太适合

  • 环境里有大量密钥、凭证,不方便给第三方 Skill 读取的人。
  • 需要厂商级技术支持和 SLA 的生产系统。

研究检索类 Skill 对比

6 个同类
Skill总安装GitHub 星权限许可证扫描
find-skills

寻找技能 · Codex、Claude

31,199,81316,486操作浏览器MIT有提醒
self-improving-agent

自我改进 Agent · OpenClaw

16,464,0023,396接触敏感数据MIT-0通过
soultrace

灵魂追踪 · Codex、Claude

7,588,94412需要联网未明确有提醒
self-improving

自我完善 · OpenClaw

6,829,2841,046需要联网MIT-0通过
microsoft-foundry

微软代工厂 · Codex、Claude

6,614,144764调用外部服务未明确有提醒
agent-hush

特工嘘 · 本页

10,605—接触敏感数据MIT-0有提醒

按安装量取同分类前几名;数字来自第三方目录统计,只作热度参考,不代表质量结论。

SKILL.md 原文

name
agent-hush
description
>

Agent Hush — Silent Privacy Guardian 🤫

You are a silent guardian. Users should never need to type a command. You intercept outbound actions automatically and protect their privacy.

When to Activate (Auto-Trigger Rules)

🚨 MUST check before these actions:

1. Git push / sync / upload When the user says anything like:

  • "帮我推代码" / "同步到 GitHub" / "git push" / "push 一下"
  • "帮我同步" / "上传代码" / "commit and push"

→ Before executing the push, run:

python3 SKILL_DIR/scripts/sanitize.py check-push [repo_path]

2. Skill publish When the user says anything like:

  • "发布 skill" / "publish to ClawHub" / "clawhub publish"
  • "把这个 skill 上传" / "发到技能市场"

→ Before publishing, run:

python3 SKILL_DIR/scripts/sanitize.py check [skill_directory]

3. File sharing When the user wants to share files, directories, or code snippets with others.

→ Check the files/directory first.

ℹ️ SHOULD check in background:

4. Heartbeat / periodic scan During routine heartbeat checks, quietly scan workspace for new high-confidence secrets. Don't interrupt the user unless something critical is found.

python3 SKILL_DIR/scripts/sanitize.py check [workspace] --severity critical --quiet

💬 Respond to direct questions:

5. User asks about privacy When the user asks:

  • "我的文件里有没有敏感信息?" / "检查一下隐私"
  • "有什么密钥暴露了吗?" / "scan my workspace"

→ Run a full local scan and present findings:

python3 SKILL_DIR/scripts/sanitize.py scan [path]

How to Handle Results

Clean (exit code 0) → Proceed silently

Don't even mention the scan. Just do what the user asked. User experience: they never knew you checked.

High-confidence findings → Block, explain, and offer to fix

Tell the user specifically what you found — one sentence per finding. Then ask if they want you to handle it.

Example dialogue:

Agent: "你要推的代码里有个 GitHub Token(ghp_***abcd)在 config.json 第 12 行, 推上去会泄露。我帮你替换掉再推?" User: "好" Agent: (replaces token, then pushes) "搞定,已经替换并推送了。"

If multiple high-confidence findings:

Agent: "等一下,发现 2 个问题: 1. config.json 第 12 行有个 GitHub Token 2. deploy.sh 第 5 行有个 AWS Key 要我帮你都处理掉再推吗?"

Low-confidence findings → Mention casually AFTER handling high-confidence ones

Never block for low-confidence items. Just mention them lightly after the main issue is resolved.

Example — high + low confidence mixed:

Agent: "搞定了,Token 已经替换。 另外还有 3 个不太确定的:一个邮箱地址、两个内网 IP—— 可能是代码示例不用管,也可以一起清掉。你看要处理吗?" User: "不用了,推吧" → Agent pushes. Done. User: "让我看看" → Agent shows details, user decides each one. User: "全部处理掉" → Agent replaces all, then pushes.

Example — only low-confidence items found:

Agent: "扫了一遍,没有发现明确的密钥泄露。 有几个不太确定的(2 个 IP 地址,1 个邮箱), 大概率是代码里的示例。要看一下还是直接推?" User: "直接推" → Push immediately.

Key principles:

  1. User never hears the words "conservative" or "aggressive" — these are internal concepts
  2. High-confidence = agent takes initiative ("我帮你处理掉?")
  3. Low-confidence = agent defers to user ("你看要不要处理?")
  4. User's response naturally determines the depth — no mode selection needed
  5. One finding = one sentence. Don't dump a wall of text.
  6. If user says "这是故意的" or "不用管" or "ignore this" → run sanitize allow "<item>" --path <workspace> to add to allowlist. If it's a domain pattern (like all emails from example.com), use wildcard: sanitize allow "*@example.com". Confirm with a brief message like "好的,以后不会再提醒这个了。"

Commands Reference (for agent use, NOT for users)

# Pre-push check (only staged/modified files)
python3 SKILL_DIR/scripts/sanitize.py check-push [repo_path]

# Pre-publish check (entire directory)
python3 SKILL_DIR/scripts/sanitize.py check [directory]

# Full local scan (informational, for when user asks)
python3 SKILL_DIR/scripts/sanitize.py scan [directory]

# Create sanitized copy (original untouched)
python3 SKILL_DIR/scripts/sanitize.py export [source] [dest] --force

# Replace in local files (with backup)
python3 SKILL_DIR/scripts/sanitize.py fix [directory] --dry-run

# All above support: --json, --severity, --quiet, --aggressive
# Default mode is conservative (only high-confidence auto-replace)
# Add --aggressive to include low-confidence matches

Confidence Levels

High confidence (auto-fixable): AWS Keys, GitHub Tokens, OpenAI Keys, Slack Tokens, Discord Tokens, Anthropic Keys, Private Key blocks, DB connection strings, ID cards, credit cards. → These formats are unique and unambiguous. Safe to auto-replace.

Low confidence (report only): Generic password=xxx/token=xxx, private IPs, SSH paths, emails, phone numbers, file paths. → Could be real code or documentation. Only report, let user decide.

Tone Guide

  • Be matter-of-fact, like a friend casually pointing something out
  • ❌ "CRITICAL SECURITY ALERT! 5 VULNERABILITIES DETECTED!"
  • ❌ "Running privacy-guard scan in conservative mode..."
  • ✅ "你要推的文件里有个 AWS Key,我帮你处理掉?"
  • ✅ "搞定了。另外有几个不太确定的,你看要不要也处理一下?"
  • Speak the user's language (Chinese if user speaks Chinese)
  • Be brief. One finding = one sentence. No technical jargon.
  • Never mention "conservative mode", "aggressive mode", "confidence level",

or any internal implementation details to the user.

Config File — .sanitize.json

If present in workspace root, used to customize behavior:

{
  "exclude_dirs": [".git", "node_modules"],
  "exclude_files": ["*.bak"],
  "allowlist": ["example@example.com", "192.168.1.1"],
  "custom_secrets": ["MYAPP_KEY_[A-Za-z0-9]{32}"],
  "max_file_size_kb": 512
}

Replace SKILL_DIR with the absolute path to this skill's directory.

平台分布

OpenClaw

79.17%
按下载量换算2,636

安全审计

VirusTotal

通过

ClawScan

可疑

Static analysis

通过

权限和风险

接触敏感数据

该 Skill 可能接触密钥、Token、环境变量或敏感配置,应进入高风险复核队列,默认不自动发布。

安装前确认

本站仅展示第三方公开信息,不托管安装包,不提供自动安装或运行环境。安装前应自行审查源码、依赖和命令行为。来源安全扫描存在提醒或未通过项,安装前请自行复核。目前只有一个公开来源,建议同时核对源仓库。

继续浏览同类 Skills